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Proponents of globalisation often have difficulty comprehending moral concerns 
about trade integration.  After all, trade is essential to economic development, and 
what could be objectionable about voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange?  Yet 
this perspective is blind to the possibility that we owe the disadvantaged abroad more 
than the market requires us to pay.  Indeed, perhaps we owe more because of trade 
integration?  To date, scholars have defended this claim merely by positing that a 
trade-integrated world is a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (the 
arrangement in which Rawls believed there should be an egalitarian distribution).  In 
contrast, I seek to assess this claim by utilising an original and more rigorous 
methodology.  To establish the basis and shape of cross-border duties of a 
distributive kind without extraneous factors skewing moral judgement, I reflect on a 
series of hypothetical worlds.  As a baseline, I first consider a world of economically 
autarkic societies.  I then introduce a discrete trade-relation in each subsequent 
chapter: first, private exchange, then the state capacity to affect a commercial policy, 
followed by bilateral bargaining between states, before finally, coordinated and 
multilateral bargaining, as in the World Trade Organization.  I argue that while there 
would only be a limited obligation to assist persons falling below an absolute poverty 
 threshold in a world of autarkies, in a trade-integrated world there are additional 
duties.  Private exchange grounds an obligation to equitably distribute the gains of 
trade—on pain of exploitation—and there is reason to believe that the market price 
does not reflect an equitable distribution.  The capacity to affect a commercial policy 
implicates even non-trade-participants in exploitation in their role as citizens—given 
the impact that trade policy might have on the terms of trade—and obligates them 
not to wrongfully disadvantage dependent foreigners via a change in trade policy.  
Finally, the capacity to bargain grounds an obligation not to utilise trade sanctions to 
blackmail, not to induce other states to violate their duties to dependents, and to 
equitably distribute the gains of trade agreements across signatory societies.  Indeed, 
when concessions are legally enforced, relatively disadvantaged societies may 
require a greater share of gains than would otherwise be the case, in order that trust 
between parties to agreements might be maintained and equal status secured.
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Introduction 
 
What sort of theory? 
This dissertation is an attempt to develop and defend a theory of fair trade.  But this requires 
elaboration.  The theory I develop is a normative one.  My aim is to develop and defend a certain 
moral ideal—a conception of fairness of and in trade—towards which we ought (morally 
speaking) to aspire.  I have nothing special to say about what empirical conditions would need to 
pertain in order for this ideal to be realised in practice, nor why such conditions would be 
causally necessary for the realisation of this ideal.  This puts my project somewhat at odds with 
much literature on fair trade and trade relations, which assumes a moral ideal and discusses how 
that ideal might be attained.  A good example is Stiglitz and Charlton’s valuable Fair Trade for 
All.1  Although Stiglitz and Charlton arrive at prescriptions (for, most importantly, movers-and-
shakers within the World Trade Organization) they arrive at these prescriptions via an analysis of 
what best promotes the goal they take as given.  This is exemplified by their subtitle: How Trade 
Can Promote Development.  Even to the extent that I would advocate the same policy 
prescriptions as Stiglitz and Charlton do, my project is different.  I want to know what the ideal 
is towards which we ought to aspire.  It is this ideal, after all, that ultimately justifies the policy 
prescriptions that one might make, either on the basis that these prescriptions promote the ideal 
(as Stiglitz and Charlton take it) and/or on the grounds that they are otherwise required by it. 
Somewhat surprisingly—given the visibility of the fair trade social movement and the 
degree of passion invoked in debate over the World Trade Organization (WTO)—there was no 
single philosophical work devoted exclusively to developing such an ideal until very recently.  
(Aaron James’s Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for the Global Economy, published 
                                                 
1 Stiglitz and Charlton (2005). 
1
earlier this year, perhaps represents the first such work.2)  Indeed, in developing my fair trade 
ideal I seek to close a gap that was left by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples.  In this work, 
Rawls articulates a vision of global ethics in which claims concerning the justice of relative 
inequalities (either between members of different societies or societies themselves) are not truth-
apt.  According to Rawls, to claim that a relative inequality of this kind is unjust is a category 
error.  Relative inequality is only problematic morally when it arises as a consequence of the 
violation of the prohibitions on interference that Rawls believes representatives of peoples would 
agree to behind a veil of ignorance,3 or when it is attended by absolute impoverishment so dire 
that is it impossible for the society experiencing it to maintain a minimally just political order 
domestically.4  To have less than an equally talented and motivated member of a different 
society might appear unfair—particularly to the person who dissents from the way her society is 
politically ordered—but is never unjust in and of itself. 
In arriving at this vision, however, Rawls left to be specified those principles that 
representatives of peoples would choose (again, behind a veil of ignorance) to ensure fairness in 
cross-border trade and interstate treaty.  Having outlined a list of “familiar and traditional 
principles of justice among free and democratic peoples”—including that “peoples are to observe 
a duty of non-intervention” and “peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings”—Rawls notes 
                                                 
2 See James (2012).  Hassoun (2012) might also qualify, although it is broader in scope.  There is also legal scholar 
Frank Garcia’s (2003) valuable Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade, although this 
is primarily committed to defending the idea that we should think of trade law as being governed by justice, and 
arguing (from the premise that Rawls’s difference principle ought to be implemented globally) for particular 
measures under special and differential treatment, rather than developing a conception of trade justice as such.  
Among other work by non-philosophers, there is also social scientist Ethan Kapstein’s (2006) Economic Justice in 
an Unfair World.  His position is similar to Garcia’s, although his recommendations proceed from the premise that 
representatives of peoples deliberating behind a veil of ignorance could not accept the current distribution of 
national income gains between countries. 
3 Rawls (1999b, p. 37). 
4 Rawls (1999b, pp. 105–113). 
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that “this statement of principles is, admittedly, incomplete”.  Amongst other things, there is a 
need for “standards of fairness in trade and other cooperative institutions”.5 
From his very brief remarks on these matters, it is unclear what he envisages such 
standards might look like.  However, he does mention two considerations that my project might 
be thought to build on.  First, he mentions that a “free competitive-market trading scheme” must 
be “suitably regulated by a fair background framework”, as in the absence of such a framework, 
“market transactions will not remain fair, and unjustified inequalities among peoples will 
gradually develop”.6  To the extent that the ideal I offer is one that does not require trade-
participants to address each and every unfair inequality that might exist, but does not permit such 
inequalities to wrongly skew trade and treaty returns, I elaborate on this thought.  Second, Rawls 
specifies that when acting according to the right standard of fairness in trade and cooperation, 
“wealthier economics will not attempt to monopolize the market, or conspire to form a cartel, or 
to act as an oligopoly”.7  To the extent that I consider the moral implications of market power—
both on the part of particular states and groups of states, and with respect to the terms on which 
trade agreements are concluded as well as the prices of international trades—my own project 
integrates this insight. 
The Law of Peoples is often criticised on the basis that the account of economic justice 
contained therein is insufficiently generous to the poor and unfortunate.  Rather than requiring 
equality of fair opportunity and the difference principle to regulate the economic distribution—as 
in the domestic sphere—Rawls offers the more limited duty of assistance.8  This duty applies to 
redistribution between societies, rather than individuals (so an individual might be worse off than 
                                                 
5 Rawls (1999b, pp. 37–38). 
6 Rawls (1999b, p. 42). 
7 Rawls (1999b, p. 43). 
8 For the view that Rawls’s vision of domestic economic justice ought to be applied globally, see Beitz (1979), 
Pogge (1989), and Moellendorf (2002). 
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a comparable foreigner in an equally wealthy society purely as an accident of luck, but be owed 
nothing).  And only requires action if a society is so poor that it is unable to achieve domestic 
justice (unlucky inequalities between societies are otherwise tolerable).9  Yet it is worth noting 
that Rawls foresaw the possibility that his principle of assistance would need to be amended once 
a full standard for fairness in trade and cooperation had been specified.  Having offered the brief 
comments on such a standard quoted above, he goes on to note that “should these cooperative 
organizations [those ideally charged with embodying and enforcing such a standard] have 
unjustified distributed effects between peoples, these would have to be corrected, and taken into 
account by the duty of assistance…”.10  The fair trade ideal that I offer in this dissertation is fully 
in accord with this thought.  While Rawls’s account of international economic justice would be 
adequate for a world that was not trade-integrated, or so I will argue in the next chapter, in our 
own world there are duties beyond assistance to alleviate absolute need grounded on cross-
border exchange and international treaty. 
 The normative ideal I offer in this dissertation is a comprehensive one, in the sense that 
the moral theory developed is not one in which only the value of fairness features.  The question 
I ask, in other words, is not merely the following: assuming fairness (either substantive or 
procedural) was the only thing of value, what would an ethically trade integrated world look 
like?  Indeed, the implication of my argument it that there are some contexts in which an 
inequality might be unfair without any corresponding duty to address that unfairness arising.  It 
just turns out that substantive fairness—equitable division of the gains of trade and treaty—
emerges as a particular concern given the method I employ (discussed under “Method” below).  
                                                 
9 The view that justice requires the neutralization of brute luck (although not option luck—chosen risk) has been 
termed, by Elizabeth Anderson (1999), “luck egalitarianism”.  For Luck egalitarianism see, for example, Dworkin 
(2000), Arneson (2004), and Cohen (2008). 
10 Rawls (1999b, p.43). 
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But I could just as easily, and perhaps more accurately, say that I offer a theory of the ethics of 
trade.  Part of what I have to say takes it, for example, that there is an enforceable duty to assist 
people who fall below some minimum threshold such that they are needy—and which might, in 
the case of foreigners, be satisfied by market opening. 
The only (dis-)value I do not dwell on is malfeasance.  I take it that harms to third-
parties—negative externalities, economists would say—that might arise in the course of trade-
integration are necessarily wrong.  This is purely on the basis that this is not, I would have 
thought, controversial.  Both free traders and fair traders have reason to be concerned that, for 
example, the trade-integration of China has led to people’s homes and farms being appropriated 
by the powerful to build factories.  No other value is deemphasised a priori, however.  I refer to 
“fair trade” only because this particular term is dominant in wider public discourse, in part as a 
consequence of the alliterative mirroring of its rival: free trade. 
 Talk of ideals is appropriate too, because my project falls largely, although not wholly, 
within the realm of ideal as opposed to non-ideal theory.11  There is more than one way of 
making this distinction, so I will draw it in the way that is most revealing about what 
differentiates my project from much work on fair trade, including Stiglitz and Charlton’s.  In 
making prescriptions, non-ideal theory starts from where we are—how trade relations and other 
dimensions of the global political order currently stand—and seeks practical guidance for how to 
proceed.  In contrast, ideal theory paints a picture of the end toward which this guidance is 
ultimately (although perhaps circuitously) directed.  Part of what “starting from where we are” 
and being “practical” is meant to imply is that non-ideal theory takes as given (hopefully on good 
empirical grounds) that some people will never be motivated to do what is morally required of 
them, and some relations and institutions will never be fully just.  In this context, it might not be 
                                                 
11 Rawls (1999a, pp. 7–8; 215–216). 
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possible to simply read off from ideal theory what is required of other people and other relations.  
Say that others are constantly failing to do what is ideally required of them.  What is required of 
me might vary as a consequence.  Perhaps less would be required of me (on the basis that, 
otherwise, I would bear an unfair share of the moral burden or be exploited by others) or perhaps 
more would be required of me (to compensate for others’ deficiencies or ensure they play their 
part). 
 As I say, my theory is largely an ideal one.  While I do, at relevant junctures, ask what 
one actor should do given the likely moral deficiencies of others (I ask, for example, how those 
with the power to shape a state’s trade policy should exercise their choice given that citizens of 
that state cannot be relied upon to fulfil their obligation to aid needy foreigners unilaterally) my 
focus is not on the empirical detail of current trade flows and international trade law.  Discussing 
in detail the extent to which, for example, each of the treaties that the World Trade Organization 
oversees is in accord with the ideal I offer, and deriving prescriptions based on what elements of 
these treaties are most amenable to amendment, is beyond the remit of this project.  While not 
quite at the level of abstraction and generality as A Theory of Justice—which, it should be 
remembered, left to be determined whether the vision it articulated was more likely to be realised 
in a property-owning democracy or under liberal socialism—my theory is, nevertheless, 
somewhat abstract and general. 
This might be thought a major weakness of the project.  But the exact opposite is the 
case.  There is no dearth of literature by economists, lawyers, political scientists, and policy 
professionals—not to mention concerned laypeople and activists—criticising one aspect or other 
of the world trade regime.12  Indeed, in this post-Cold War and globalised era, there is scarce any 
                                                 
12 From examples of critiques from each of these perspectives, see Stiglitz (2006), Thomas and Trachtman (2009), 
Kapstein (2006), and Wallach and Woodall (2004). 
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other dimension of international politics that has attracted so much normative attention.  In the 
realm of personal choice, Western consumers are criticised for failing to ensure that the workers 
who grow their coffee and manufacture their consumer goods are paid a decent wage.  In the 
realm of trade policy, the US and European Union are criticised for protecting their agricultural 
producers, thereby denying trade opportunities to less affluent foreigners.  And in the realm of 
relations between states, the WTO is criticised on the basis that the views of rich countries 
dominate negotiations—or on the grounds that, in concert with the IMF, World Bank, and US 
Treasury, poorer countries have been induced to accept a developmental strategy—not merely a 
commercial policy—which they neither accept nor is in their best interest.  But the 
comprehensive ideal that might underlie these particular judgements—and would demonstrate 
how they might cohere with one another and provide guidelines in cases of consumer choice, 
trade policy, and treaty negotiation that are not so easy to judge intuitively—is either unspecified 
or left somewhat vague.  As the legal academic Frank Garcia has noted, constructive normative 
dialogue about international trade law is hampered by a failure to explicitly address fundamental 
questions of trade justice and their basis.13 
Why might providing a principle or set of principles constituting such an ideal be 
necessary?  Coherence might be thought necessary, of course, to demonstrate the rationality of a 
particular moral perspective.  This is at least important for the persuasive appeal of that 
perspective.  But beyond this, what is wrong with moral particularism—that perspective 
according to which we should not seek out or be guided by general and abstract moral principles 
(whether “maximise utility” or Kant’s categorical imperative), but follow our intuitions in 
particular cases?  One problem with particularism is that it can leave us at a loss as to what to do.  
Take the criticisms of the trade regime raised in the previous paragraph.  The first might be 
                                                 
13 Garcia (2006). 
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thought to require, morally speaking, a retreat from trade-integration.  Yet the second seems to 
imply the opposite.  If it is wrong to (in the terminology of this project) exploit the need of 
foreigners—through benefiting from consuming the goods they produce while they receive a 
sub-decent living—surely we have an obligation, at least some of the time, to purchase 
domestically produced goods?  But how can this be squared with the apparent implications of the 
second criticism?  For what European protection of agriculture achieves is precise this—
consumption of relatively higher levels of European-produced as opposed to non-European- 
goods.  There is also the problem of how moral judgments critical of the current state of trade 
relations can be squared, in policy-prescriptive terms, with unstated but widely shared 
judgements about just how good the developmental gains of trade-integration can be.  Hardly 
anyone thinks, for instance, that development and poverty-alleviation are matters of moral 
indifference; most people think they are very good things indeed.  To the extent that trade would 
actually lead to these gains, therefore—witness the developmental success of the East Asian 
Tigers and China—we have reason to promote trade-integration.  But how can this be squared 
with the exploitation complaint raised above, the thrust of which seems to be that we should 
retreat from trade-integration? 
Clarifying a fair trade ideal would also help us to arrive at judgements in cases where our 
intuitions are conflicted.  Take Northern protection of agriculture again.  This is sometimes 
defended on cultural grounds: namely on the basis that agricultural practices, the impact that they 
have on the landscape and rural people’s lives, and the qualitatively unique products they 
produce help to sustain a nation’s social values, geographic aesthetic, and distinctive diet.  It is 
relatively easy see through this defence though.  The vast majority of agricultural support is 
directed towards corporate agribusiness rather than small-scale farmers.  But surely we want to 
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say that protecting culture is sometimes justified, even if this leaves foreigners at a competitive 
disadvantage.  What are we to say in cases where protection would help to sustain local culture?  
Detroit has shrunk to a fraction of its former size on the back of the decline of the American 
automotive industry.  Putting to one size, for a moment, the claim that such a policy could not 
have been justified to American consumers faced with higher automobile prices, might it have 
been permissible for the US to continue to protect its automobile industry, even if this would 
have placed foreigners producing equivalent goods at a competitive disadvantage? 
Or consider support merely for the purposes of protecting the livelihoods of American 
manufacturing workers.  Might this support be permissible—or perhaps even obligatory, as part 
of fulfilling a political duty incumbent on Americans to provide for their compatriots—despite 
the fact that foreigners would be denied opportunities as a result.  In everyday political discourse, 
it is commonly thought that protection of any kind is within the scope of a society’s democratic 
choice, with the only moral constraint being whether that protection can be defended to citizens 
of that society who would do better without it.  But there is a powerful cosmopolitan challenge to 
protectionism of any kind.  How is protecting the livelihoods of Americans at the expense of 
foreigners any less objectionable than protecting the livelihoods of whites at the expense of 
blacks, or the livelihoods of men at the expense of women?14  Discrimination on the basis of 
unchosen characteristics of people—characteristics for which they cannot be held responsible—
is often thought wrong.  And purposeful (rather than unintended) discrimination on the basis of 
an unchosen feature that is central to a person’s sense of self and worth is usually thought a very 
bad wrong indeed. 
Finally, the reader might wonder whether the theory I develop is a normative and ideal 
theory of trade or a normative and ideal theory that applies in trade.  Do I, in other words, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Singer (2002, ch. 5). 
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provide an account of when trade is permissible or obligatory, or an account of the moral 
demands that apply when trade (taken as always permissible, given its voluntary and mutually 
beneficial nature, but never obligatory) takes place, but not otherwise?  The answer is that the 
theory I develop is both a theory of the ethics of trade and a theory of ethics in trade, and as such 
I will use these expressions interchangeably.  In terms of the former, I argue both that we might 
ultimately be required to extent trade opportunities to needy foreigners (at least if this is more 
effective at achieving need-alleviation than, say, transfer aid)—opportunities whose terms are 
“loss making” even when compared to equitable terms that can be found elsewhere—and that, in 
theory at least, one might have to decline a trade opportunity on inequitable terms, despite the 
potential for mutual benefit, because equitable terms would cost one too much.  In terms of the 
latter, I argue that when persons engage in mutually beneficial exchange—or states sign mutually 
beneficial treaties—that relation establishes duties of fairness in dividing the gains, or 
prospective gains, of those exchanges.  These are not duties that extend to non-participants, and 
therefore are duties in trade only. 
Finally, it is worth specifying the subject of my theory in such a way as to make clear 
how my concerns intersection the concerns of non-philosophers who invoke “fair trade”.  In 
contemporary public debate, an appeal is made to “fair trade” in a variety of different contexts, 
and applied to a variety of different actors.  First, it is applied to individuals—particularly in 
wealthy countries—in their role as consumers.  It is claimed that the global affluent face an 
imperative, if they choose to purchase imports at all, to purchase only those imports that are 
certified fair trade.  Goods that are certified fair trade are, then, goods whose producers are 
afforded a decent return and which are produced utilising environmentally sustainable practices.  
10
A social movement has coalesced around the promotion of these sorts of fair trade practices, 
effective certification, and marketing to wealthy consumers.15 
Second, talk of fair trade arises in debates over trade policy.  Both advocates and 
defenders of trade protection—whether direct or indirect—couch their arguments in terms of 
fairness.  Protectionists argue that the measures they favour are necessary to ensure that those 
members of that society who would fare worse without those protections, or would be 
disadvantaged if they were removed, are necessary to ensure fairness domestically.  So, 
opponents of the lowering of US tariffs on manufactured goods, which has lead US 
manufacturing jobs to move offshore, argue that protection is necessary to ensure that American 
workers are not forced to compete with foreigners able or willing to accept wages magnitudes 
lower. Were their more fortunate compatriots to fail to ensure such protection, they would be 
subjecting those workers to unjust treatment, and failing to fulfil their political obligations.  On 
the other hand, proponents of trade liberalisation argue that withholding trade opportunities from 
foreigners (or worsening their terms) via trade protection constitutes discrimination that violates 
equality of opportunity, and is therefore wrong.16 
Finally, it is claimed that the mission of the WTO should be to promote “fair trade” rather 
than “free trade” amongst its members.  Critics of the WTO claim that its liberalisation agenda 
provides meagre benefits to poorer countries as opposed to richer countries.  Requiring both rich 
and poor countries to liberalise is unfair to the latter because their need for trade policy flexibility 
is greater.  Trade-protection is vital to fostering industries that are likely to fare well in the global 
market in the long-term, but are still in their infancy, to revenue collection in states with limited 
                                                 
15 On this movement, in particular its effectiveness, see Nicholls and Opal (2005), Jaffee (2007), and Lyon and 
Moberg (2010). 
16 Matthias Risse (2007, pp. 366–367) has argued that if protectionism is democratically determined to be 
appropriate on the grounds that this is what domestic workers are morally entitled to, then it is justified.  
Moellendorf (2002, pp. 56–57) criticises views like this. 
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bureaucratic capacity, and to protect local culture.  Further, poorer states are ill-prepared to 
shoulder the costs of adjustment when protective measures already in place are removed.  They 
lack the industrial and social infrastructure needed to support the emergence of new businesses 
and enable reskilling. 
Defenders of the WTO also appeal to fairness considerations.  Two of the primary pillars 
of the WTO system are reciprocity and the most-favoured-nation principle.17  Reciprocity 
demands that any concessions a state might be required to make in a WTO treaty are 
reciprocated by sought-after concessions on the part of others.  That no party can get “something 
for nothing” has obvious fairness appeal.  More significantly perhaps, members of the WTO are 
not allowed (in theory at least) to discriminate between foreign countries in terms of whatever 
trade barriers they do have in place.18  This too has obvious fairness appeal.  I have already 
mentioned that, contrary to conventional wisdom, discriminating against foreigners by means of 
tariffs or other trade barriers is subject to a cosmopolitan challenge.  An analogous challenge can 
also be made to commercial policies that discriminate amongst foreigners supplying the same or 
relevant similar goods.  Isn’t it wrong for a country to level higher tariffs on banana producers in 
one country than another?  Isn’t this like an employer discriminating amongst equally qualified 
job candidates on the basis of their race? 
Given the variety of these contexts and actors, the reader might wonder what debate I am 
entering into and to whom my prescriptions are intended to apply.  My response is that I intend 
to address, if incompletely, each of these contexts and actors.  In Chapter 2, I consider how 
cross-border trade between private actors, or the potential for it, might bear on our distributive 
duties.  What I have to say here, of course, bears most directly on what should concern us in 
                                                 
17 Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, pp.38–43). 
18 It is instructive to note that this sort of discrimination is illegal under the WTO even though it might be in a states 
economic interest.  See Saggi and Yilditz (2005) and Broda et al (2008). 
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exercising consumer choice.  In Chapter 3, I consider what moral constraints are grounded on the 
capacity for members of a society to affect a commercial policy.  My analysis here bears most 
directly over debates about what range of trade policy choices are permissible, and of these, 
which is obligatory, if any.  Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I discuss what duties are grounded on 
both the potential and practice of political bargaining between states, whether bilaterally or in a 
coordinated setting, as in the WTO.   My analysis here is most pertinent to normative debates 
over the shape of the global trade regime.  As I seek to contribute to each of these debates, I 
discuss moral constraints both on individuals and on societies/states.  However, I take it that, 
ultimately, the obligations incumbent on societies are derivative of those on individual members 
of those societies in their political capacity.  An obligation to adopt such-and-such a commercial 
policy, or such-and-such a bargaining position, is, in other words, an obligation incumbent 
citizens of that society to push for such a policy or position given their effective political 
influence justly exercised. 
 
Why a Theory of Fair Trade? 
At this point, the sceptically inclined reader might wonder what cause they have to read further.  
For surely if there is anything on which we can all agree, morally speaking, is it is that the 
economic disparities of our world are unconscionable.19  What plausible moral theory would not 
conclude that someone, somewhere, must do something about world poverty?  And if this is my 
conclusion too, surely the real action is on Stiglitz and Charlton’s turf?  While there is something 
to this objection, there is value to this project over and above the contribution it makes to the 
philosophical literature on the grounds and scope of egalitarian distributive justice (which I 
discuss further below).  First, while hardly anyone thinks that there is no reason to be concerned 
                                                 
19 For just how dire the situation is, see Singer (2009). 
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about the extent and depth of world poverty, there remains the question of equity.  Even if no one 
in our own world were in absolute poverty, we might still ask if trade or trade relations were 
fair—either procedurally or in terms of their substantive implications.  Consider trade and trade 
relations between more or less affluent countries in our own world, and the impact that this 
might have on their respect economy’s structures, socio-economic distributions, or cultures.  
Don’t we have reason to care about this? 
At least in policy circles, there seems to be an impression that international trade and 
trade relations between states are necessarily immune from moral criticism, at least harms to 
third-parties or the environment to one side.  As long as trade and trade treaties are voluntary (no 
one has had a gun held to their head) what procedural objection could there even be?  And if 
trade and trade treaties are voluntary, they must be mutually beneficial subjectively—even if 
there were no economic evidence to the effect that they are mutually beneficial objectively 
(which, in fact, there is—qualms about appropriate economic measures to one side).  In this 
context, what sort of objection to the substantive implications of trade and trade relations would 
even make sense, let alone be warranted? 
Yet this impression is mistaken.  Merely because someone voluntarily concedes to an 
economic exchange that benefits them is no necessary indication that they are have not been 
wronged.  Say that a firm paid blacks less than identically qualified and productive whites.  
Wouldn’t that firm do wrong even if the black employees signed their employment contracts and 
were better off than they would have been if they had taken their next best employment option 
instead?  In ordinary language, we often call the wrong entailed by a voluntary and mutually 
beneficial exchange exploitation.20  This concept is central to my theory. 
                                                 
20 Wertheimer (1996, pp. 27–28). 
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Second, even if we agreed that addressing world poverty should take priority—and the 
most interesting question is how trade and trade relations might further this end—this project has 
instrumental value.21  This is because there is good reason to believe that articulating a 
systematic conception of fairness in trade and trade relations would help to ensure progress in 
international trade negotiations.  Not only is there amble laboratory evidence that a concern for 
fairness motivates people when bargaining in general, but widespread consensus that resolving 
disagreement over what fairness entails is crucial if the Doha Development Round is to get up 
and running again.22  Without a focal point, negotiations would be impeded even if all parties 
were appropriately motivated. 
Of course, it is doubtful that state representatives in WTO negotiations are sufficiently 
motivated by ethical considerations.  The most widely accepted accounts of the determinants of 
countries’ bargaining positions in the WTO see these positions as the result of self-interested 
bargaining between powerful institutions and organized interests in the domestic political 
economy.23  Yet even if these accounts are right that there are structural constraints on what 
might be expected of trade negotiators, my account is more likely to motivate powerful actors 
within rich countries than the leading alternatives.  To date, most theorists of global justice who 
maintain that the global rich owe those who have less more than what they might voluntarily 
commit themselves to in contract or treaty tend to base their arguments on one of two values.  
Either they argue that the demands of beneficence are greater than commonly supposed,24 or they 
                                                 
21 For an argument of this kind see De Bres (2011). 
22 Narlikar (2006); Davidson et al (2006); Brown and Stern (2007). 
23 Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, pp. 34–38). 
24 Singer (1972); Peter Unger (1996). 
15
maintain that (what amounts to) rectification is owed to poorer countries on the basis that the 
current global political order has, in effect, harmed them.25 
Evaluated purely in instrumental terms, both approaches lack motivational force.  
Beneficence is a synonym for charity, and charitable acts are normally thought of as good, but 
beyond the call of duty.  And arguing that individuals in rich countries owe rectification for 
something that they did not choose is more likely to raise their hackles than prompt them to show 
greater concern, even if an empirical claim about imposition can be squared with the ostensibly 
voluntary character of trade and treaty relations (at least) in our decolonised world.  In contrast, I 
offer an account in which what is owed by the global affluent is neither charity nor compensation 
for harm, but merely that they not take advantage of their greater bargaining power in trade and 
trade relations, but rather insure that poorer persons and countries are extended the share of the 
gains of exchange and treaty to which they are entitled on the basis of fairness.26  As long as 
affluent persons and governments of wealthy countries do what is required of them in these 
terms, there is no reason for them to feel guilty about gaining from trade and treaty, even if some 
persons and societies from whom they gain face relatively worse life prospects (overall) as a 
consequence of an accident of birth. 
 
Why Not a Deliberative Ideal? 
Even the sceptic concerned about equity apart from its consequences for the absolutely poor—
and who was prepared to recognise the instrumental value of my project in terms of specifying a 
focal point and motivating powerful actors—might still worry that a substantive account of the 
ethics of trade-integration threatens to preclude democratic deliberation on the matter.  Aren’t 
                                                 
25 Thomas Pogge’s work is associated with this position.  See, for example, Pogge (2008, pp.18–26).  For a criticism 
of this position see Risse (2005). 
26 For an account of global economic justice that starts from the same premise, see R. Miller (2010, ch. 3). 
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there likely to be a range of reasonable views globally, all of which ought to be given appropriate 
weight or otherwise recognised?  Why not offer a theory of democracy in global economic 
governance instead, and leave it open what particular moral ideal will ultimately be arrived at?27  
There are a variety of reasons why I do not find this point particularly persuasive, at least when it 
is interpreted as an objection to this project.  The first is that one can accept the view that it is not 
the task of the political theorist to legislate for others once-and-for-all—but rather to broadly 
specify terms that would allow others to legislate for themselves—while still recognising value 
in this project.  If there are indeed a variety of reasonable views on what constitutes a fair trade 
ideal, all of which ought to be countenanced in democratic deliberation, then this project should 
be seen as one reasonable view among many—as an input into democratic debate rather than the 
only output that would justify a putatively democratic process. 
Second, the most plausible moral objection to the trade regime in our own world is not 
that it is, in institutional form at least, undemocratic.  In contrast to the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund—in which votes are weighted according to financial contribution—
every member of the WTO has, formally speaking, equal influence.  Indeed, WTO agreements 
are (again, formally speaking) arrived at via consensus, rather than majority voting.  Every 
country’s influence is thereby a veto option, not merely a vote.  To the extent that criticisms of 
the WTO for being undemocratic are warranted therefore—and I believe they generally are—I 
would suggest that they are warranted primarily because the reforms they imply are valuable for 
instrumental rather than intrinsic reasons.28  Indeed, I doubt that “green room” negotiations at the 
WTO (from which all but a handful of large economies are excluded) would attract much 
negative attention if it were not for the fact that what comes out of these closed-door sessions 
                                                 
27 For global democracy see Held (1995), Archibugi (2008), and Fraser (2010). 
28 For an instrumental argument for democratising international organisations see Weinstock (2006). 
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appears so unfair to the poor.  Further, allegations that “consensus” agreements in the WTO are, 
in fact, anything but, necessarily rely on an implicit view about what constitutes unreasonable 
pressure on less powerful states.  In Chapters 4 and 5 I seek to provide such an account. 
 Third, even to the extent that democracy has intrinsic value—justifying the consequences 
of decisions arrived (when they are arrived at democratically) rather than being justified by 
them—there remains the question of democracy’s scope.  Unfortunately, this question has 
received surprising little explicit attention.29  The claim that many questions of political ethics 
should be resolved democratically rather than legislated by the political theorist might be a better 
fit for our most secure convictions, but it is difficult to judge without an attendant account of 
who should have a (democratic) say over any given choice.  Almost everyone would admit that 
there are some choices over which the individual alone is entitled to decide.  Any moral theory 
that admits individual rights—of whatever shape and irrespective of their grounding—admits 
this.  Most people would additionally admit a range of choices over which only a subset of 
humanity have a prerogative to decide, whether on the basis that only some person’s rights are 
implicated by the choice or on the grounds that groups can themselves bear rights.  Anyone who 
believes in the value of self-determination and worries about persistent minorities in democracies 
admits this.  If, therefore, the democratic objection to the value of this project is interpreted to 
imply that every trade or trade-related choice should be subject to democratic deliberation 
globally, this objection is likely to run up against firm and widely shared intuitions. 
 Indeed, one of the virtues of the ideal I develop is that, while admitting spheres of 
democratic choice, it appropriately draws the boundaries between these spheres.  Thus, I argue 
that a country with no diplomatic or other ties with other countries—and which has already 
                                                 
29 As noted by Saunders (forthcoming).  Saunders criticises the popular, but flawed, “all affected” approach, as 
represented by Goodin (2007). 
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fulfilled any duties to provide charitable assistance to foreigners in dire poverty—can establish 
whatever trade policy it sees fit, even if foreigners would be worse off than equally talented and 
motivated citizens of that country in part as a result of opportunities thereby denied (at least as 
long as that country did not impact prices of traded goods in making that choice).  This is part of 
the democratic prerogative of citizens of that country.  If unwilling to accept this proposition at 
first, consider what its denial implies when it is recognised—as the WTO has in our own 
world—that almost any domestic legislation can have an impact on trade, whatever its intention.  
To deny this proposition then is to deny societies democratic autonomy.  Yet I also argue that 
when a country is considering being party to a treaty with a number of other societies it can no 
longer pick whatever viable treaty option is in its best interest.  For not all viable options are also 
permissible options.  Our country must seek to ensure that the gains of treaty—the gains over 
and above what those societies could acquire if autarkic—is distributed fairly across all parties to 
that treaty.  Even if other societies would be prepared to voluntarily sign a treaty offering them 
worse terms, this is no reason for inequity. 
Fourth, the ideal I offer is, in fact, one that reserves considerable space for democratic 
deliberation, albeit across a set of actors that varies according to the choice at stake and within 
some broad bounds of principle.  First, I do not seek to presume what goals a (democratic) 
society might seek that could be furthered via trade policy.  Much normative economics assumes 
that states seek to maximise national income—or some other aggregative and material measure, 
like community surplus (producer surplus plus consumer surplus)—and asks what trade policy is 
optimal given this end.  Recognising that societies might, and are indeed likely to have, other 
priorities—like preserving local culture and ensuring an equitable division of income, influence, 
and standing domestically—I do not seek to prescribe, at least once obligations are satisfied. 
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Neither do I presume to define fair division in such a way as to exclude reasonable 
difference.  Take what I have to say about equitable division of the gains of treaty in Chapters 4 
and 5.  Here, I argue that ensuring a fair division of the social surplus is likely to be much more 
demanding of richer countries than is conventionally though.  This is because we are accustomed 
to define the range of treaty terms that would result in mutual net-benefit—over which fair 
division is restricted—by resort to actual rather than permissible BATNAs (threat points) for all 
parties.30  Once it is recognised that a state’s actual “reserve price” in treaty negotiations—the 
best terms it could get in some other treaty—may itself reflect a potential transaction that is 
exploitative, we can see that the treaty surplus is, in fact, larger than usually assumed.  
Nevertheless, across this range of potential terms I recognise that there is more than one 
reasonable interpretation of what would be a fair division.  A fair division is obviously an equal 
division, but what would be an equal division?  Even were there one way of specifying equality 
theoretically (do we mean equality on a common currency, equality in utility, or minimax 
relative concession?) people would disagree on what actual treaty terms embody this ideal.31  As 
such, parties to treaties must deliberate with one another within the bounds of reasonable 
disagreement established via specification of the treaty surplus and in terms of the value of 
equality. 
 
  
                                                 
30 BATNA stands for “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”.  This is the baseline against which to assess how 
much two or more parties to an agreement gain given a set of terms.  In a market, an actor’s BATNA is his or her 
reserve price: the price below which (for a seller)—and above which (for a purchaser)—that actor would not 
consent to the trade. 
31 For the problem of what equality entails when it comes to dividing trade gains, see D. Miller (2010, pp. 18–23).  
Minimax relative concession is the bargaining solution defended by David Gauthier (1986) in Morals by Agreement.  
He argues that give the philosophical problem of how to compare utility across persons, a rational (some would say 
fair) division of a surplus between two individuals is that under which each gains (usually) to the same proportional 
extent, where the relevant proportion is how much better off that person is under the ultimate division relative to 
how better off they would have been if they got the whole surplus. 
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A Relational Account 
Part of the motivational power of the theory I develop is a consequence of its relational 
character.  A relational theory of distributive justice can be contrasted with a recipient-orientated 
theory.32  Recipient-orientated theories are of the form “to each according to X”, whether X be 
need, merit, entitlement, or some other variable.  In contrast, according to a relational theory of 
distributive justice, whether one is owed anything, and how much one is owed, is a function of 
the relationships (of the kind relevant to that theory) in which one is situated.  Two prominent 
recipient-orientated theories in the global justice literature are utilitarianism and (one variety of) 
luck-egalitarianism.  The former maintains that more must be done to address global economic 
inequality on the basis that this will best promote aggregate utility.  In determining whether 
anyone is owed anything, and, if so, how much they are owed, relationships are only of 
derivative importance.  Let me give an illustration.  If utilitarianism were right, more would have 
to be done to address global economic inequality whether or not the world was trade-integrated, 
or, indeed integrated relationally in other respects.  The imperative to redistribute that applies to 
our own world would apply equally to a world in which there was no economic intercourse 
across borders, or indeed the potential for it.  If foreigners live worse lives than us, and we can 
alleviate their burdens without sacrificing something of comparable moral worth, we ought to do 
so, whether we are tightly bound to their societies via trade (imagine these people producing our 
sneakers and iPads) or not.  The fact of trade-integration might matter, but only to the extent that 
it shapes people’s preferences (the satisfaction of which the theory is concerned to maximise) or 
renders one means of rendering assistance a lesser sacrifice (in terms of preferences) than 
another.  For example, more assistance would be required for an equivalent welfare gain in a 
trade-integrated world if globalization raised the social aspirations of the poor, but not otherwise. 
                                                 
32 For this way of making the distinction, see Schemmel (2012). 
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Similarly, natural-right luck egalitarians, as I shall call them, maintain that brute luck 
should be equalised irrespective of how persons stand relationally.33  At a minimum, luck 
egalitarians believe that how much persons are owed should not be influenced by factors over 
which they exercised no choice, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation.  Chosen 
inequalities might be consistent with justice, but unchosen inequalities definitively are not.  Now, 
natural-right luck-egalitarianism is that variant of this theory according to which what one is 
owed in order that brute luck be equalised is owed to one as a natural right.  In other words, it is 
owed by those who would otherwise be arbitrarily more fortunate on the basis of common 
humanity alone, and is not conditional on standing in some more specific relation.  According to 
natural-right luck-egalitarians, then, it is unjust if someone has less than others as a consequence 
of the accident of nationality.  I did not choose where I was born any more than I chose what 
race or gender I am.  Therefore, it is unjust if I have less than those who happen to have been 
born elsewhere.  This is true, whether I toil in factories producing consumer goods for them and 
live under a domestic political order constrained by the imperatives of the global trade regime, or 
inhabit a world in which each and every society is economically autarkic and there are no 
diplomatic relations between states. 
In contrast, the theory I offer here is a relational one, in the sense that what less affluent 
foreigners are ultimately owed depends on the extent to which the world is trade-integrated.34  At 
the core of a my approach is a sense that justice, or morality more generally, is not merely about 
                                                 
33 Just whose views better represent natural-right luck egalitarianism and whose views better represent relational 
luck-egalitarianism (whether “institutional” or “interactional”) is not clear cut, although Charles Beitz tends towards 
the former while Thomas Pogge tends towards the latter—see the discussion in Caney (2005, pp. 107–116).  Here, 
Simon Caney claims that what I would call natural-right luck egalitarianism is best represented by David A. J. 
Richards (1982). 
34 For the independent significance of relationships, and the derivative importance of distributive justice in terms of 
its impact on these relationships, see Walzer (1982) and Anderson (1999).  For a view of international distributive 
justice that builds on these accounts, see Altman and Wellman (2009, ch. 6).  For a somewhat different relational 
view, see R. Miller (2010). 
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how well a series of separate individuals’ lives go—even once their enjoyment of fulfilling social 
relations and sense of comparative status within a social order is taken into consideration—but 
how people are treated by and in the social and political processes that determine how their lives 
go.  This is not, obviously, a unique perspective in the history of political thought.  Witness 
Rousseau’s argument in The Social Contract, that it is not the chains that bind man—once in 
society—that constitute his regrettable loss of liberty, but the political source of those 
constraints, at least when they originate outside the general will publically expressed, as he 
believed they did in his own society.  Or consider Marx’s claim that improving the wages and 
conditions of workers does nothing to address their alienation.  As long as the capitalist is able to 
dominate the worker as a consequence of the power extended to him in a system of private 
property, the worker is wronged.  Or ponder Kant’s second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, according to which (in part) it is wrong to treat others as mere means to our ends, 
how well their lives go to one side.  If their lives would go better if you did treat them as a mere 
means, you would still wrong them by failing to respect them.  And if their lives are going badly, 
but you do not receive cooperative benefits from them (thereby standing in such a way that they 
are a means to nothing for you) you do not owe them anything on this score. 
Indeed, my theory finds particular inspiration in this dimension of Kant’s categorical 
imperative.  This puts me in somewhat unusual company.  Robert Nozick’s libertarianism, of 
course, gives pride of place to the notion that it is wrong to use people, even as a means to ensure 
that others aren’t used.35  It might be thought, therefore, that the fair trade ideal I develop must 
ultimately render free trade fair.  This is not the case, however.  For unlike Nozick—and even 
many egalitarian liberals—I don’t take actual consent on the part of another as sufficient to 
ensure that I do not use them as a mere means.  Actual consent is necessary, for sure, but I must 
                                                 
35 Nozick (1974, pp. 28–34). 
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additionally ensure that the terms of our interaction are such that my partner in interaction is 
treated fairly.  When our interaction is one for productive economic purposes, at least, this 
requires an equitable division of the social surplus, on pain of exploitation. 
 
The Scope of Distributive Concern 
In developing a theory of this kind, I am not merely attempting to construct a coherent fair trade 
ideal.  I also seek to make a contribution to the current debate among philosophers on the scope 
of egalitarian justice.  Indeed, in a sense this is what my dissertation is about first and foremost.  
Specifically, I aim to provide an account of global distributive justice that accounts for the sense 
that “global justice has become more important as the world has become more connected”.36 
Define an egalitarian theory of distributive justice as any theory according to which what 
people owe one another is more extensive than respect for their Lockean rights (i.e. life, liberty 
of contract, and property) and whatever costs must be borne to ensure that the duties 
corresponding to these rights are enforced.  Amongst egalitarians so-specified, there is division 
between those who believe that these more extensive duties are conditional on standing in a 
certain relationship, and those who believe that they are not.  (This division can be seen even 
between relational and natural-right luck-egalitarians, for example.)  Amongst relational 
egalitarians, there is further disagreement about which relationships are those that ground 
egalitarian duties.  The key division here is between those who believe that only the compatriot 
relationship grounds egalitarian duties, and those who believe that common subjection to the 
                                                 
36 Julius (2006, p. 187). 
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global order—however that is characterised—is sufficient to generate such duties, even if these 
duties differ somewhat in kind to the duties that bind citizens to one another.37 
In developing my relational account of fair trade in stages—with each chapter concerned 
with a new relationship—I seek to show both how particular relations matter and how a sense 
that the compatriot relationship is particularly important can be squared with the notion that 
distributive duties across borders have become more demanding as the world has become more 
integrated, the inflexibility of international law notwithstanding.  Many relational accounts of 
global distributive justice that take an intermediate position between statism and 
cosmopolitanism—which are increasingly prevalent—imply such a function.  But in breaking 
my trade-relational account into five separate stages I hope to make the function that I see as 
explicit as possible. 
Of course, developing a relational account of global distributive justice in the whole is 
not my primary aim.  Were this true, I would not arbitrarily restrict my analysis to those 
relationships entailed by trade-integration—relationships that have not received as much 
emphasis in the global justice literature as ties with perhaps more obvious moral-import, like 
cultural or political ties.  Indeed, I might well emphasise relationships that least controversially 
generate duties: obviously coercive or harmful ones.  I could seek, for instance, to build an 
account of global distributive justice on the historical wrongs of colonialisation and conquest, or 
the on-going wrong of global warming externalities. 
But the fact that I focus on trade-integration for other reasons (namely because I am 
specifically concerned with establishing a fair trade ideal) does have an unintended benefit.  If a 
                                                 
37 Those who argue that duties of egalitarian justice are restricted, in our own world, to the compatriot relationship 
include Rawls (1999b), Blake (2001), Nagel (2005), Sangiovanni (2007).  Egalitarians who have pointed to 
relational features of global politics that, in their view, ought to ground such duties across borders include Beitz 
(1979), Pogge (2002), Cohen and Sabel (2006), Julius (2006), Caney (2008), Pevnick (2008), Ronzoni (2009), 
Valentini (2011a), and James (2012). 
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convincing case can be built for a more-or-less egalitarian global economic order on the fact of 
relations of a voluntary and mutually beneficial character alone, the prospects for an all-things-
considered egalitarian vision are all the stronger.  In this respect, my study is analogous to a 
crucial-case study of the “least likely” variety in causal analysis.38  If the hypothesis is that 
relationships ground extra-promissory obligations of an egalitarian kind, the case of voluntary 
and mutually beneficial economic exchange might seem to be that case in which the hypothesis 
is least likely to withstand falsification.  After all, it isn’t a personal relationship of the kind we 
normally think carry obligations (like a relationship to family or friend), or one into which the 
normative authority of the law normally intrudes. 
Of course, it might be objected that even if I am purely concerned with establishing an 
ideal to guide us in our trade and trade relations, it would be foolish to neglect ties across borders 
outside the domain of trade.  For this would be to engage in a kind of moral reductionism.  
Perhaps the all-things-considered global distributive ideal towards which we ought to aspire is 
more than the sum of its parts.  Maybe no single cross-border tie grounds an egalitarian duty, but 
all such ties considered together generate a set of such duties—including some applying to trade 
and trade relations?  Perhaps, to use Rawlsian terminology, it is only all such relations together 
than constitute a “basic structure” (that social structure towards which egalitarian distributive 
principle exclusively apply)?39   But this is to beg the question.  A theoretical account would 
have to be offered to explain why we should expect an ideal of this kind.  For my own part, I 
think it more plausible that the correct account of global distributive justice, and indeed domestic 
distributive justice, is a sum of its relational parts, albeit a complex sum. 
                                                 
38 See Eckstein (1975) and Gerring (2007). 
39 For Rawls’s discussion of a society’s basic structure, see Rawls (1999a, pp. 6–10).  For three interpretations of 
“basic structure”—all of which imply, in the author’s view, egalitarian duties across borders in our own world—see 
Abizadeh (2007). 
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Indeed, it might be thought a weakness of egalitarian accounts of distributive justice in 
general—especially accounts that take their distributive requirements as being grounded on 
political association rather than applicable in, for example, the state of nature—to explain where 
the extra-Lockean obligations they specify come from.40  Aren’t these merely duties of charity—
indeed, natural duties of charity—masquerading as something more?  Why should it be that, for 
instance, equality of fair opportunity and the difference principle ought to determine the pattern 
and shape of socio-economic inequality amongst citizens of a state—to illustrate the claim with 
Rawls’s principles of domestic economic justice—but do not provide individuals with reasons 
for action in the absence of the tie of common citizenship?  Why wouldn’t individuals in the 
state of nature, in other words, face an obligation to (at a minimum) construct common 
institutions to ensure that these two principles determine the socio-economic distribution?  My 
account does not suffer from this weakness, however.  As I build my account on the basis of its 
particular relational parts, I seek to explicate how different sorts of egalitarian obligations arise 
even from micro-relations as opposed to macro-social-structures. 
 
What Relationships? 
I am not, of course, concerned with every international or transnational tie that characterises our 
own world.  I am, rather, concerned with the relationship(s) of “trade”.  After all, as the fair trade 
ideal I offer is a relational one, is also answers the following question: is there anything special 
about a trade-integrated world—as opposed to a world in which every society is economically 
autarkic—that generates extra-Lockean distributive demands?  What is it about the way that 
foreigners stand with respect to one other in a trade-integrated world that leads them to owe each 
other more than merely respect for negative rights? 
                                                 
40 Nozick (1974, pp. 183–189). 
27
Yet it should be immediately apparent from reflecting on this question that a trade-
integrated world entails more than one international or transnational relation.  Indeed, one of the 
strengths of my project is that not only do I disaggregate “global order”—abstracting from its 
complexity in order to show how our judgements about one dimension of it might rest on firm 
foundations—but I disaggregate “trade-integration” itself.  The various relations entailed by 
trade-integration are revealed by the differential sites of political disagreement and debate 
discussed above.  First, there is the relation between individuals and firms entailed by trade 
itself—i.e. that relation entailed by private exchange across international borders.  Second, there 
is the relation to foreigners established given a state capacity to enact a (potentially non-laissez-
faire) commercial policy.  This is of particular moral concern given its potential to shape the 
economic opportunities of foreigners and impact the terms on which private exchanges are 
actually concluded.  Third, there is the relation established between persons whose respective 
governments are party to a trade agreement with one another (committing each country to refrain 
from protectionist measures of some kind, say).  In this dissertation, each of these separate 
relations is the subject of a different chapter, with the third relation disaggregated further into 
that entailed by what I term a bilateral agreement and that entailed by what I call a coordinated 
agreement (for an example of the latter, think of a deal that both involves more than two 
countries and restricts what further trade deals each member-country might be party to). 
Indeed, in the following pages I not only consider those cross-border relations between 
persons established by trade, trade-policy, and trade treaty (both bilateral and coordinated).  I 
also consider those relations entailed by the potential for ties of these various kinds.  Thus, I 
consider both what individuals might owe others by way of trade opportunities, as well as what 
might be owed given the practice of on-going trade (my project concerns both the ethics of trade 
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and in trade, the reader will recall).  And I reflect on what a society might owe to others given a 
capacity to exercise a non-laissez-faire trade policy (e.g. is it obligatory to extend market access 
to countries with needy producers?) and what moral duties might emerge given a choice amongst 
otherwise permissible trade policy options (e.g. what is owed to those foreigners who would 
become tied to my society via trade under my society’s optimal trade-policy choice?).  Finally, I 
consider whether a country or group of countries might be obligated to admit outside parties to a 
trade treaty, as well as what co-members of such a treaty owe one another. 
The reader might think that “relationship” is not the right term for the sort of ties I 
examine in this dissertation.  (Indeed, “tie” might be thought inappropriate too, given the arms-
length nature of some of the relevant relations.)  After all, “relationship” is often reserved for 
personal ties—affective ties or those thought to be constituted by certain special obligations 
rather than merely entailing them as a by-product.  A person’s ties to their parents, children, 
relatives, friends, and colleagues obviously constitute relationships.  It sits less easily with 
common usage, on the other hand, to describe someone as having a relationship with a stranger, 
especially a stranger with whom they share no common allegiance or loyalty.  This perhaps 
explains why scholars of global distributive justice who adopt what I would call a relational basis 
to their account have turned recently to speaking instead of participation in common “practices”, 
and their views of distributive justice as “practice-dependent”.41 
Yet despite the ties I am concerned with being largely impersonal, I prefer “relationship”.  
This is for two reasons: first, to emphasis the parallels between my view of global distributive 
justice (in its trade dimensions at least) and those view of domestic distributive justice that base 
obligations amongst compatriots on their interdependence rather than common allegiance or 
culture.  Second “relationship” can be used to connotate relative positions in a social setting of a 
                                                 
41 See James (2005), Sangiovanni (2007, 2008), Valentini (2011b), James (2012, pp. 25–31). 
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particular structure, even in the absence of an interactive or cooperative tie.  (Think of the 
“relationship” between actors in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma.)  As some of the “relationships” 
I consider are of this kind (think of the relationship I have to a foreigner when I play a role in 
determining my state’s trade policy, even if I do not trade with that foreigner), “relationship” 
seems like a more appropriate term. 
 
Method 
The most distinctive aspect of my method is that I seek arrive at trade and trade-policy 
prescriptions via reflection on a series of hypothetical worlds—worlds that I also ask the reader 
to reflect on the for the purpose of assessing these claims.  Each of these worlds is intended to 
pinpoint those moral intuitions or judgements (I will use the two terms interchangeably) that are 
pertinent to the dimension of trade-integration at hand.  The world I start with, in Chapter 1, 
provides a baseline.  This is a world of autarkies, in which there are a number of societies, as in 
our own world, but no economic or other cooperative ties across borders—or, indeed, the 
potential for them.  This world is, in essence, Milton Friedman’s archipelago of Robinson 
Crusoes, which has often cropped up as a baseline against which to determine the gains of social 
cooperation in political philosophy.42  The central question in this chapter is what distributive 
duties might extend across the border in the absence of trade-integration of any kind. 
In Chapter 2,  I consider what I call the world of liberal trading societies, in which there 
is at least the potential for private trade across borders, but no society’s institutional capacity is 
sufficiently advanced such that it might interference with trade (via commercial policy).  The 
central question here is how trade or the potential for it might reconfigure what is owed across 
                                                 
42 Friedman (1962, p. 165).  See also Nozick (1974, p. 185), Buchanan (1995, pp. 63–65), Blake (2001, pp. 289 – 
294) and R. Miller (2010, p. 35). 
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borders.  In Chapter 3, I reflect on a world of protectionist societies—a world in which states 
possess the institutional capacity to implement a non-laissez-faire commercial policy, but do not 
possess the means to establish channels of diplomatic communication with one another, and 
therefore trade-policy bargaining or agreements are off the cards.  The most important question 
here is what moral constraints bear on a society’s trade policy choice given its impact in shaping 
the economic opportunities of foreigners.  Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I consider worlds in 
which states might bargain with one other or conclude trade treaties.  (I call these the world of 
bargaining states and the world of coordinated bargaining.)  The central questions here are how 
to determine the gains from treaty, how these gains ought to be divided, and under what 
circumstances it might be necessary to admit an outside state to an agreement even if this would 
represent a cost to current parties to that agreement. 
It is, of course, common in moral and political philosophy to reflect on hypothetical, as 
opposed to actual, cases.  This serves a number of important purposes.  One is to enable us to test 
moral principles that, in the absence of such a test, would seem to justify ethical judgements 
made about actual cases.  Say that you judged America right to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945, and the reason that you thought justified that particular judgement was that 
fewer lives were lost overall than if there had been an invasion of Japan.  Indeed, you thought 
that a justified moral principle was the following: quality of lives being equal, one should always 
act so as to minimise lives lost.  You might pause and reconsider both this principle and this 
judgement if faced with the well-known hypothetical scenario of Philippa Foot’s that Judith 
Jarvis Thomson has called “transplant”.43 
In this scenario, you are a doctor faced with a moral dilemma: either you can save one of 
your patients—who has an easily curable illness—and let five others awaiting transplants die, or 
                                                 
43 Thomson (1985, p. 1396). 
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you kill that patient and use his organs to save the five.  If you think that you would do wrong to 
kill the patient, you surely have reason to reconsider whether America did wrong in dropping the 
bomb on Japan.  For in “transplant”, killing the patient and using his organs is that option that 
results in fewer lives being lost overall.  Of course, there might be real cases that give us pause 
to reconsider what moral principles we consider justified.  Indeed, for some people, their 
judgment that dropping the bomb on Japan was wrong might be so strong that this real case is 
one that causes them to reassess the principle that one should act so as to minimise the number of 
lives lost overall.  But appealing to hypotheticals allows us to utilise our moral imagination 
without extensive knowledge of actual cases, and allowing for such appeals in general provides 
us with an incentive to engage that imagination in moral discourse with one another. 
Second, hypotheticals can assist us in pinpointing those empirical features of the world 
that are morally relevant via controlled comparison.  Just as comparing largely similar cases 
where the outcome was, in fact, different can help the social scientist to pinpoint those features 
of the world that constitute the cause of the difference in outcome—as per Mill’s method of 
difference—comparing largely similar instances in which one’s moral judgement is, in fact, 
different can help the moral philosopher to pinpoint those features of the world that seem to 
make a difference morally. 
Again, Judith Jervis Thomson has utilised this technique extensively in assessing a 
variety of permutations of the famous trolley problem.  Consider the contrast between the 
original formulation of the trolley problem and that variant called “fat man”.44  In the original 
formulation, the reader is asked to picture themselves as the driver of a runaway trolley—a 
trolley that is about to mow down five workers on the line—who must decide whether to turn the 
trolley onto an adjacent track on which there is only one worker.  In “fat man”, in contrast, the 
                                                 
44 Thomson (1985, p. 1409). 
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reader is asked to envisage themselves as a bystander who can save the five by pushing a fat man 
into the path of the trolley.  Now, both scenarios share much in common.  Both are cases where 
there is a runaway trolley about to kill five workers, and the reader is offered the option of acting 
so as to ensure that only one person die.  Yet most people have very different moral judgements 
about the permissibility of taking that option in one case versus the other.  What then is that 
differential feature that explains this difference in judgement?  While there is still more than one 
feature that might be doing the work here (is it the fact that the fat man is a bystander rather than 
a worker, or that the reader is a bystander rather than the trolley driver, for example?) the general 
point is that it is much easier to restrict the range of difference hypothetically than by scouring 
the world in search of real cases that are sufficiently similar. 
Sometimes this method of pair-wise comparison is most practically useful when, instead 
of contrasting two hypothetical cases, a real case is compared to a largely similar hypothetical 
case.  In comparing something real with something postulated, this method is somewhat similar 
to counterfactual comparison in causal analysis.45  Say that we thought that Western barriers to 
immigration should be less restrictive, but we disagreed why.  Some people argued that there 
was a natural right to migrate, while others argued that barriers to immigration should be lowered 
so as to advantage foreigners currently in poverty.  One way of proceeding would be to contrast 
the judgement on our own world with one prompted via reflection on a world like ours in all 
respects bar one: namely bar that feature that figures in one reason but not the other.  Say that, 
upon reflecting on a hypothetical world identical to ours—except that no individual in that world 
suffered from the degree of neediness that would trigger a duty for more affluent foreigners to 
assist—one judged that lowering immigration barriers was not morally required.  Then one 
                                                 
45 On causal inference using counterfactual analysis see Fearon (1991), Tetlock and Belkin (1996), and Lebow 
(2010). 
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would have reason to discount the view that a duty to lower such barriers in our own world was 
owed in order not to violate the natural rights of outsiders.  The feature of our world that triggers 
a moral demand to lower barriers to migration is not, in other words, a natural freedom to move 
in social space, but rather significant economic inequality across borders.46 
Indeed, contrasting life under government with conditions in a state of nature (a scenario 
as like as our own as possible, but without a government)—as in the social contract tradition—
can serve as just such a comparative analysis.  We are used to thinking of the state of nature as 
serving a couple of related functions.  One is to establish what purpose government might serve 
(the moral merits of this purpose to one side).  In contrasting a world under government with a 
world without government, social contract theorists seek to pinpoint government’s role.  
Speaking in crudely simplified terms, Hobbes alerts us to the role that government might play in 
furthering the self-interests of individuals, while Locke alerts us to the role that government 
might play in enforcing pre-existing moral constraints (which individuals would otherwise be 
tempted to violate as a consequence of their self-interests). 
Another function that the state of nature serves is to model the choice situation in which 
persons are taken to contract with one another.  Given the interests (self- or otherwise) that are 
assigned to people in the state of nature (which establishes broadly what the social compact is 
intended to further), and a picture of what life is like in the state of nature (which establishes a 
threat point or BATNA for parties to the social compact) what would people consent to?  Having 
answering this question, it is then possible to establish whether a real government has 
overstepped the bounds of permissible action—or has failed to do all it ought to do—by 
contrasting how people’s lives go under that government with how their lives would go (Hobbes) 
or ought to go (Locke) in the state of nature. 
                                                 
46 This is the method and argument of James Woodward (1992). 
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However, there is also a somewhat neglected third purpose to comparing our own world 
to a state of nature: that is to establish the grounds on which (relational) duties are established.  
Say that we wanted to determine whether the existence of a state (say our own state) generated 
duties amongst its citizens, as Rousseau is concerned to ask.  Then it seems inevitable that we 
contrast our own world with a similar world that lacks such a state.  After all, it is only in 
contrasting our moral judgements on both of these worlds that we are able to establish whether 
the state itself grounds obligations, or is merely a vehicle to ensure that pre-existing obligations 
are fulfilled. 
Via my schema of hypothetical worlds, I take advantage of all the benefits that might be 
had from reflecting on imagined scenarios.  First, I use the various hypothetical worlds I describe 
to test, roughly speaking, principles that we might otherwise be inclined to endorse, particularly 
the principle that all that fairness requires in the international arena is non-interference and the 
fulfilment of contractual or contract-like commitments (like treaty commitments between states), 
whatever these might happen to entail.  Describing possible acts, omissions, and their 
implications in the simplified model-like context of each of these hypothetical worlds may be 
enough, in itself, to convince some people of the need to reassess this principle. 
It might be thought, for instance, that in the absence of treaty commitments to foreign 
societies, there are no moral constraints on what trade policy a state might adopt—this is, it 
might be thought, its democratic prerogative.  After all, if the individual is not obliged to 
purchase any particular good, at least once duties of assistance to the needy are fulfilled—why 
should a society not be able to limit trade to any extent whatsoever, at least as long as its position 
is determined via an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure domestically?  
Yet by describing how, for example, a society’s trade policy can shape the terms on which trades 
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with foreigners are concluded—quite apart from determining the extend of trade in general—I 
seek to illustrate how this principle is inconsistent with the intuition that the gains of private 
exchange ought to be divided equitably.47 
Second, I seek to pinpoint what empirical features of the world are of relevance 
morally—and how they are relevant, in terms of what moral obligations they engender—via 
most-similar analysis, most obviously of contrasting hypothetical worlds.  This is most evident in 
the way I contrast each successive hypothetical world with the one preceding it.  In contrasting, 
for example, a world in which states are tied, or might be tied, via treaty, with one in which 
diplomatic contact is not even a possibility, and trade policy must be determined in political 
isolation, I seek to show how the potential and practice of diplomatic intercourse between 
societies bears on what each state is obliged to do or avoid in its political choice. 
Indeed, to the extent that the account of cross-border distributive duties I offer in my final 
chapter is insufficiently generous—when contrasted with what the reader believes is owed in our 
own world—I establish another potentially productive contrast.  If the reader accepts my 
argument, but nevertheless believes that we ultimately owe foreigners more, all things 
considered, then the contrast establishes that it must be some other relational feature of our own 
world that engenders these additional demands. 
The flip side of this point is that, in each and every of my hypothetical worlds, I seek to 
exclude empirical features of our own world that might be thought to ground distributive duties 
on their own part.  Thus, even when contemplating the fully trade-integrated world of Chapter 
5—what I call a world of coordinated bargaining—I ask the reader to assume a context in which 
there are no non-trade-related political ties between societies (there is no UN-like institution in 
                                                 
47 For the impact that the trade policy of a large country might have on world prices, and how this figures into a 
functional explanation of the WTO, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002). 
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this world, or even anything analogous to the World Bank or IMF) and no legacies of historical 
injustice that might demand rectification in the present.  The reader should take it, for instance, 
that the global distribution he or she is called upon to contemplate in assessing my fair trade 
ideal is not one that is in part a legacy of conquest and colonisation.  (Indeed, the reader should 
take it that my hypothetical worlds do not represent a Westphalian vision of international society 
that was imposed to the exclusion of alternative models of transnational order, but rather 
emerged spontaneously as autonomous nations and peoples encountered one another.)  This is 
not to deny that these other features of the global order might have distributive import.  Indeed, 
the opposite is the case.  It is precisely because these other features of the world might 
themselves ground distributive demands that it is necessary to exclude them.  Ultimately, I want 
to be sure that it the trade-relations I consider that are doing the driving work morally. 
Finally, by abstracting from those political and legal features of our own order that might 
be thought to carry normative authority (think especially of the UN system and international law) 
I seek to establish what cross-border obligations are owed when established norms are put to one 
side.  It might be thought that a project seeking to articulate a fair trade ideal must necessarily 
start with what already carries normative weight in international relations, and not merely on 
pragmatic grounds.  International affairs often seem so far removed from the sites where we 
usually apply our moral reasoning—including our personal and professional relations—that it 
might seem as if there is no other way to proceed.  But the advantage of reflecting on simplified 
analogues to our own world is that it allows us to better engage our own reason, thereby 
facilitating the development of an external standard by which to assess existing trade law.  In this 
ways, I suppose, I share with the great theorists of the social contract tradition the thought that it 
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is only by abstracting away from existing institutions and structures of power that we can see the 
duties that bind us as human beings. 
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Chapter 1 – A World of Autarkies 
 
In this dissertation, I ultimately seek to determine what cross-border obligations with distributive 
implications would pertain in a world characterised by full trade integration.  It might seem 
strange, therefore, that in this first chapter I ask the following: what duties would be owed to 
foreigners in the absence of trade integration—indeed, in the absence of all transnational ties 
beyond mutual awareness and the practical possibility that economic assistance might be 
rendered.  Yet the necessity of addressing this question is quickly made apparent when it is 
remembered that if there are any such duties, we already have a moral metric by which to assess 
a trade-integrated world.  If people have obligations to one another even in the absence of trade 
ties—or even the potential for them—then we must ask ourselves how these ties, if and when 
they are to emerge, might be made consistent with duties already owed.  
To concretely flesh-out what I mean here in terms of an important example: if it were the 
case that no person should be worse off than another merely because of where they were born—
because one’s place of birth is, like race and gender, a matter of brute luck—then we would 
already have a basis on which to assess a global trade regime, one that generates duties 
independent of whatever additional duties might be grounded on, for instance, private exchange 
across borders and commercial-policy agreements between states.  If the rules of such a regime 
could be amended so as to achieve this outcome, then, presumably, this ought to be done—
irrespective of what the shape or depth of trade integration under that regime currently looks like.  
Indeed, if this demanding luck-egalitarian claim were true, then there would be very little moral 
space left for a relational theory of global distributive justice to fill—whether that theory 
grounded its claims on trade ties (as I do in this dissertation) or on other relational features of 
global political practice.  As such, it is not only necessary to reflect on a non-trade-integrated 
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world in order to establish what pre-existing duties ties of trade and treaty might need to be 
consistent with, but in order to establish what additional work a trade-relational account of trade 
ethics must do. 
Of course, as I noted in the introduction to this dissertation, it is entirely possible that in 
our own world there are obligations grounded on non-trade-related features of global politics or 
history that are best cashed out via changes in the trade regime.  (Think of amending the rules of 
the WTO not to ensure an equitable share of trade and treaty gains, but to compensate poorer 
countries for the harms of climate change.)  Yet because my particular concern is trade and trade 
relations, I want to control for as many of these as possible. The reader should take it, for 
example, that each of the hypothetical worlds I leverage in this project precludes, by definition, 
the possibility of cross-border harms, whether via the utilisation or threat of military force, or as 
a consequence of environmental externalities, such as greenhouse gas emissions. 
It is impossible though, to imagine a world in which all bases on which obligations might 
be grounded—beyond cross-border exchange and trade-treaty bargaining—are excluded.  This is 
because for it to even make sense for us to ask what these ties ground, we must already assume 
several additional bases that might generate distributive duties of their own: namely the bases of 
common humanity and whatever grounds are implicated via the division of the world into 
multiple national jurisdictions, each exercising a claim over everyone within a particular territory 
(rather than across some subset of persons globally, regardless of location).  It is also 
unavoidable, therefore, that I address what sorts of duties are grounded on these bases, even if 
my only concern is with the distributive implications of transnational exchange and international 
treaty. 
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Definitively determining what distributive duties are generated by common humanity 
alone, and by the division of the world into multiple national jurisdictions defined territorially 
(both with respect to fellow nationals and foreigners) would, of course, require me to develop 
much more that a relational fair trade ideal.  Indeed, if I were to do so I would come quite close 
to developing an all-things-considered ideal of global distributive justice, albeit one that must be 
cashed out via trade relations.  This would, of course, take me far outside the remit of this 
particular project.  As such, the view that I develop in this chapter is somewhat tentative and not 
defended as deeply as it might be.  Nevertheless, I hope to structure my case in sufficiently clear 
a way such that the reader can supplement their own conclusions on the questions I address while 
still agreeing with—or, at least, appreciating the value of—the case I make in the remaining 
chapters of this project.  There is probably some room, in other words, for the reader to disagree 
with me about how much any of us should be required to sacrifice to assist the distant needy on 
the basis their common humanity, while still agreeing with much of what I say about how much 
we owe our trade and treaty partners on the basis of our relations with them. 
The following chapter is, then, structured as follows.  After painting a picture of the 
world that the reader should envisage for the purposes of reflecting on the moral claims that I 
make in the remainder of the chapter—the world of autarkies—I address, first, the question of 
when, if ever, inequalities are unjust.  I make the claim that, at least in a world of autarkies, 
relative inequalities between societies (or between individual members of different societies)—
cannot be appropriately assessed as unjust.  If those who have more would be equally well of if 
all those who have less did not exist (as is necessarily true in a world in which every society is 
economically autarkic) it is not clear that the relatively advantaged wrong the relatively 
disadvantaged, even when such inequalities can genuinely be attributed to brute luck.  
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Nevertheless, I claim in section II of the chapter that absolute disadvantage—that level of 
disadvantage that falls below a minimum threshold defining neediness or poverty—remains a 
concern even in the absence of social cooperation. 
Indeed, in section III I defend an interpretation of our obligation of beneficence informed 
by, those less demanding than, Peter Singer’s moderate principle of beneficence as articulated in 
his formative 1972 article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”.1  I claim that we do have a duty to 
assist the needy (although not the relatively disadvantaged) up to the point at which we would 
have to sacrifice something morally significant, at least as long as doing so would not entail the 
violation of anyone’s rights.  However, the appropriate standpoint from which to assess what 
counts as morally significant is that of one’s life as a whole, rather than each and every particular 
instance in which one might further sacrifice to assist the poor, or else a moderate stance on 
beneficence quickly erodes into something far more demanding.  
In section IV, I continue the theme of beneficence, arguing that we often have reason to 
show particular concern to those needy persons who are close to us, and therefore our 
compatriots, at least in a world of autarkies. 
In the fifth section of the chapter I consider why it might be that we have distributive 
duties to our compatriots over and above the duties we have to foreigners.  At least in a world of 
autarkies, our compatriots are the only ones who benefit us through market transactions.  To the 
extent that the terms of these transactions are unfair—they inequitably distributive the gains of 
exchange because of asymmetries in bargaining power, and are thereby exploitative—we have 
reason to push for a political regime that the libertarian would characterise as redistributive.  
Further, in a world of autarkies—and even in a world of private exchange across borders but 
little more—our compatriots are the only ones who provide us with public goods (conventionally 
                                                 
1 Singer (1972). 
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defined, and more broadly).  As such, we owe our fellow nationals—although not foreigners, at 
least in a world of autarkies—a political duty to seek to ensure that each person net-gain 
equitable from these.  Finally, at least in a world of autarkies, the public goods we enjoy 
domestically do not arise spontaneously.  It is not as if they are positive externalities arising as a 
by-product as each and every person best pursue their self-interest.  Rather, everyone must 
comport their will to law’s command.  As such, we may owe those of our compatriots who are 
less able to co-generate value in the market even more than an equal share of their joint gains. 
 
A World of Autarkies 
As the purpose of this chapter is to establish what obligations with distributive import would be 
owed in the absence of trade or trade-related ties across borders, the reader should, when 
reflecting on the normative claims that I make in the remainder of a chapter, reflect on a world of 
autarkies—a world in which each and every society is economically self-contained.2  But what 
exactly would this world of autarkies look like?  Beyond the self-evident, several other 
specifications seem necessary. 
First we should take it not merely that there is no private trade across borders in this 
world, but that trade is not even a viable possibility.  Whether trading or declining to trade is ever 
itself obligatory, and what duties might be grounded on private exchange when it would 
otherwise be permissible, are questions that are intentionally reserved for Chapter 2. 
Second, we should take it that, like trade, international migration is not a practical 
possibility either.  When, if ever, immigration restrictions are permissible is much disputed in the 
global justice literature.  On the one hand, cosmopolitans worry about the distributive 
                                                 
2 As noted in the introduction, this thought experiment is not original.  See Friedman (1962, p. 165), Nozick (1974, 
p. 185), Buchanan (1995, pp. 63–65), Blake (2001, pp. 289 – 294), and R. Miller (2010, p. 35). 
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implications of such restrictions for foreigners denied market opportunities and welfare 
provisions.3  And libertarians worry about how such restrictions can be justified to compatriots 
who would prefer to hire foreign labour or welcome foreigners into their homes.4  While on the 
other hand, proponents of national self-determination argue that any immigration restrictions are 
justified just in case they are the product of an adequately democratic procedure domestically.5  
And communitarians argue that immigration restrictions are necessary to preserve a liberal and 
democratic public culture, even if it would be wrong to discriminate between potential admits on 
the basis of a perceived propensity for cultural adaption.6  Migration is not, however, the subject 
of this project.  Unfortunately, it cannot be avoided altogether, as it is impossible to conceive of 
even a remotely plausible world that is trade integrated, but in which migration is not a 
possibility.  Nevertheless, we will put off considering this issue until we are forced to confront it, 
as we will be in the next chapter when I outline the hypothetical world of liberal trading 
societies. 
 Third, we should take it that each of the societies in the world of autarkies is—or was in 
the not-too-distant past—roughly identical in its natural resources.  The relative quantities and 
positions of arable land, rivers, and minerals, for example, are roughly equivalent; so too are 
each of the absolute quantities of each of these goods taken per capita.  Further, the reader should 
take it that no country is so small or so large that concerns about economies or diseconomies of 
social scale arise.  These assumptions are necessary in order for us to set aside, to the extent that 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Abizadeh (2008, 2010). 
4 Although not a libertarian, the case for open borders is put most strongly by Joseph Carens (1987). See also 
Kukathas (2005). 
5 Wellman (2008); Pevnick (2011) 
6 Walzer (1983, ch. 2); D. Miller (2005, 2008, 2010). 
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this is possible, a potential basis for redistributive duties in our own world—the de facto division 
of the world’s resources between nation-states.7 
I say that the reader should take it that societies in the world of autarkies (and all 
subsequent hypothetical worlds discussed in this project) have identical natural resources, rather 
than bundles of resources of equal value, because the latter seems more likely to entangle us in a 
tricky discussion of metrics.  In our own world, actual market price seems inadequate as a means 
of assessing the value of natural resources within a given national territory.  First, there is such 
disparity in means across persons globally, that going by actual market value threatens to 
privilege the valuations of some over those of others despite equal willingness to pay.  Second, 
even if all were in an equal position to pay, actual market valuations would enable majorities to 
overrule minorities.8  Third, market valuations do not take into consideration externalities (think 
of harms to the environment or indigenous populations brought about by mineral extraction).  
Fourth, market valuations do not take into consideration the extent to which some country’s 
natural resources assume an economic value only because of something that persons within the 
same country did with, or do to, those natural resources.9  Think of a country that has a 
monopoly of a very valuable metal, but this metal is only valuable at all because of a recent 
invention by nationals of that country which enables its extraction for the first time.  Or think of 
a country with very high urban property values, not because the land is arable or lies above 
valuable mineral seams but because of proximity to a dense network of economic exchange 
(largely among nationals of that country).10 
                                                 
7 Beitz (1979, pp. 136–143) was the first to raise this issue. 
8 There are several differences senses in which this might be so.  For one, see Waldfogel (2007). 
9 Miller (2007, pp. 55–62). 
10 Miller (2007, pp. 60–61). 
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Fifth, market valuations do not take into account the extent to which some physical things 
should not be taken to be resources—mean to other ends, rather than ends in themselves—at 
all.11  Consider an indigenous tribe who are in desperate need because they recently suffered an 
environmental disaster.  Further suppose that that tribe live in lands containing highly sought-
after energy resources, but if they extracted those resources everything that is culturally 
meaningful about the territory they inhabit would be destroyed.  Using a market metric for 
assessing the value of natural resources threatens—once combined with any plausible egalitarian 
principle concerning how natural resources should be distributed—to require this tribe to transfer 
to others despite their need. 
By specifying that the reader should take it that societies in the world of autarkies have 
roughly identical natural resources, I do not, of course, avoid this problem entirely.  After all, it 
might be objected that an identical distribution of natural resources is consistent with unfairness 
between a society under whose culture its identical share is the optimal bundle and a society 
whose national culture takes its identical share as the worse of all possible endowments.  
Nevertheless, this seems like the best working assumption on which to proceed. 
Fourth, the reader should envisage a world in which there are no plausible grounds on 
which territorial jurisdiction might be disputed.  I leave it open to the reader what grounds of this 
kind there might be.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out that I intend this stipulation to 
apply both with respect to claims to territory on the basis of cultural attachment—on the basis, in 
other words, of a special role played by a particular physical territory in the identity of a nation—
and with respect to claims to territory on the basis of who some or all of the people resident in 
that territory are, regardless of their nationality.  In other words, the reader should assume that 
there are no plausible grounds on which states in the world of autarkies might claim cultural right 
                                                 
11 This is Avery Koler’s (2012) argument in “Justice, Territory, and Natural Resources”. 
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over a territory, and/or jurisdictional authority between persons in a territory, that is currently 
ruled by another state.  This is partly why I do not make a sharp conceptual distinction, in 
developing my fair trade ideal, between a state and a society (although I tend, of course, to use 
the former in reference to my hypothetical communities’ institutional manifestations and the 
latter in reference to such communities as collections of interdependent persons). 
The reader might wonder why we should start with a hypothetical world that is divided 
into a number of states at all.  Even if we could determine how the world ought to be divided up 
territorially and/or otherwise into population segments taking the fact of multiple states as given, 
it might be thought that an ideal that must allow for this will inevitably be imperfect.  Some 
people might suspect, for instance, that building a theory from a basis that already entails 
multiple states inevitably biases that theory against global egalitarianism.  Yet there is no reason 
to think that this is so.  What is important is not how many jurisdictions there are, but what they 
are charged to do and what powers are reserved for them to exercise.  A world that is divided 
into multiple jurisdictions might well be consistent—on the relevant interpretation of the purpose 
and powers of each and every jurisdiction—with a justice-demand for luck-egalitarianism of 
global scope. 
Finally, the reader should imagine a world in which citizens of different societies are 
aware of one another’s economic circumstances.  After all, it would be a moot point whether 
economic inequality across borders is unjust if no one were ever in a position to determine 
whether there was any such inequality.  Further, despite the fact we are to take it that there are no 
economic, social, or political ties across borders in the world of autarkies—or the potential for 
(most of) them—we must allow for the possibility that societies might aid one another via 
transfer payments. 
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It is difficult to imagine a world that is geographically or otherwise similar to our own 
that satisfies all of the criteria listed above.  As such, it is perhaps better that we begin by 
picturing an analogous world that is much simpler.  Specifically, it seems helpful to imagine an 
archipelago of autarkic island-societies.12  Let us say that the residents of the various island-
states in this world can observe the conditions of those living on other islands due to their close 
proximity, but they do not interact with one another.  Further, let us say that there is no potential 
for trade or migration between the islands because the waters are considered by all as too 
perilous to safely cross.  We should also imagine, however, that it would be technically possible 
for one society to transfer economic resources to another, even at some transaction cost, should 
they choose to do so.  So, while migration might be ruled out due to the treacherousness of the 
waters, it would be possible under favourable conditions for provisions to be floated on rafts 
from one society to another.  Finally, let us imagine, for the time being at least, that each of these 
island-societies has equal natural resources.  Indeed, due to the difficulties of assigning value to 
natural resources across cultural contexts and in the absence of particular human practices, it 
seems sensible to interpret “equal” to mean “identical” rather than “of equivalent value”. 
 
I. Relative Inequality 
Now, picture a variant of the world of autarkies in which some societies are richer than others.  
There might be, of course, some inequalities in such a world that hardly anyone would find 
morally problematic.   Imagine, for instance, that one society is richer than an otherwise similar 
other only because of a recent political difference in response in the same event.  Say, for 
example, that our archipelago of autarkies has recently been beset by heavy rains that destroyed 
                                                 
12 Friedman (1962), Nozick (1974), Buchanan (1982), and Miller (2010) all picture their worlds are archipelagos, 
although Blake (2001) pictures mountains as the natural barriers between his hypothetical societies. 
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crops that were ready for harvest in every society.  The effect on each and every of the 
economies as a consequence of this supply shock has been sufficient to induce recession.  Now 
say that one of our island-societies (country A) responds with a fiscal stimulus package while 
another society (country B) responds by imposing austerity.  Further suppose that one of these 
policy approaches is more successful than the other.  Now, picture two similarly motivated and 
talented persons—one from each of these two societies respectively—who were both fully 
supportive of their government’s approach to tackling the recession.13  If some inequality opens 
up between them only because one government’s approach happens to be more effective than the 
other government’s approach, it is difficult to see what could be unjust about this. 
 However, this is not the sort of inequality that concerns people in our own world, and 
with which we will be primarily concerned in this dissertation.  Consider first, dissenters.  Take 
an individual citizen of the country that opted for austerity who would have preferred that his or 
her country take the stimulus route.  Further suppose that he or she did all that was within their 
justified political power to prevent austerity from being imposed.  Isn’t it wrong if this person 
ends up worse off than a similarly motivated and talented member of country A?  Or imagine 
that country B did not choose to impose austerity—according to an appropriately democratic and 
rights-respecting procedure—but inherited from previous generations a severely eroded 
bureaucracy, effectively preventing it from pursuing an alternative approach.  Wouldn’t it be 
unfair if a citizen of B were worse off than a similarly motivated and endowed citizen of A so 
                                                 
13 That we should compare individuals that are equivalently motivated and endowed when seeking to establish if 
there is any distributive unfairness between them is from Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity (he also 
talks, more accurately perhaps, of equality of fair opportunity).   Rawls himself (1999, p. 63n) credits it to 
Sidgwick’s Method of Ethics in a footnote.  Luck-egalitarians would object, of course, that even if there is no 
inequality between any pair of persons equivalently motivated and endowed, there might still be unfairness all things 
considered—namely to the extent that people can’t help being more or less endowed, or even motivated.  And it is 
the luck-egalitarian side of Rawls that leads him to supplement equality of fair opportunity with the difference 
principle.  Nevertheless, I will often use an inequality between persons equally motivated and endowed as the 
axiomatic example of unfairness in order that my account speaks to as wide an audience as possible. 
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long as they had the same political preferences?  Both of these examples give us pause to 
remember the problems inherent in identifying individuals with the societies of which they are 
members for the purposes of normative analysis. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that even inequalities such as these do not 
pose a problem of political injustice across borders, at least in a world of autarkies.  First, that an 
individual dissents from one particular policy or law that is instituted in their country—in 
circumstances where, had an alternative policy or law been adopted, that person would not have 
been so badly off relative to a similarly motivated and talented foreigner (as in the example 
illustrated above)—is not sufficient to establish that the entirety of the wealth gap between that 
person and the similar foreigner is unfair.  If there would still have been somewhat of a wealth 
gap if that person’s ideal policy or law had been adopted—or, indeed, if that gap had been 
greater still (in circumstances where the best alternative policy or law was not that person’s ideal 
policy or law)—then we cannot gauge the extent of unfairness merely by contrasting their 
holdings. 
 Second, it is important to note that merely because one person is poorer than another (i.e. 
has a lower income or a less valuable bundle of material assets) is no reason to think that they are 
relatively worse off all things considered.  There are several reasons why we should reject this 
inference.  Most obviously, human wellbeing is multifaceted: to be poorer than someone else is 
not to be unambiguously worse off than them.  You might have a spiritual practice that is 
uplifting, while they do not; you might have a supportive family, which they do not; you might 
have bodily vitality, which they lack; or you might be part of a close-knit community, while they 
are not. 
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Not only is wellbeing multifaceted, but there is no uncontroversial way to compute a 
commensurate measure across these different facets.  How should different sorts of satisfactions 
be weighted?  Metric problems are compounded when we seek to make comparisons between 
individuals who are members of different societies.  Most importantly, there is the problem of 
cultural difference.14  Even if we could determine some way of computing an aggregate measure 
of wellbeing, that measure is likely to be much more controversial across societies that within 
them—whatever the precise shape of that measure—simply because cultural difference is greater 
globally than within any one society, even the most multicultural society. 
Further, even if it were true that income, or material wealth, were the only facet of 
wellbeing that we should be concerned with for the purposes of distributive justice, it would not 
follow that contrasting the holdings of otherwise similar individuals across borders would be the 
right way to determine the extent of distributive unfairness globally.  This is because money is 
not valuable in and of itself, but in terms of what it can acquire, and what it can acquire is 
sensitive to our location and societal context.  This is more than a call to compare holdings at 
purchasing-power parity rather than at global market prices, although this is an important 
consideration.  (A Teaching Assistant’s stipend of US$20,000 would be sufficient to sustain an 
affluent lifestyle in rural Sri Lanka, but is barely enough to cover rent in a Collegetown 
apartment complex in Ithaca.)  Rather, it is a reminder that an identical bundle of goods differs in 
meaning depending on its social context. 
To acquire a particular status or standing in a community is usually dependent, to some 
degree at least, on how wealthy one is—but an identical bundle of goods will give one higher 
social standing in a poorer community than a rich one.  This is, of course, because one’s social 
standing depends on how much one has relative to others in one’s community, not on what one’s 
                                                 
14 D. Miller (2007, pp. 62–68). 
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bundle contains per say, or what one’s bundle contains in comparison to similar others outside 
your community.15  If we were concerned to establish the degree of cross-border inequality in 
social standing, for instance, we would compare not the absolute holdings of similarly motivated 
and talented members of different societies, but the position occupied by each within their 
respective social-economic distribution domestically.  That two persons similarly motivated and 
talented occupy equivalent positions in the socio-economic hierarchies of their own communities 
might be sufficient to avoid the charge of unfairness.16 
Now it might be argued that it is wrong to look down on people who have less than you, 
to envy those who have more, or even to feel a sense of shame at not being as wealthy as your 
neighbours.  As such, it might be thought that the correct distributive justice ideal could not be 
one that pandered to, or permitted, such sentiments.  Or it might be argued that economic 
inequality should be limited not because our distributive ideal must cater to these sentiments but 
because economic inequality tends to create them.  But if the analysis above is right, then these 
arguments are going to be conditional on persons already being part, in some sense, of the same 
community. 
Let us say, however, that the problem of what metric to use when attempting to establish 
the extent of inequality between persons across international borders is not insurmountable.  
Further suppose that it is possible to identify persons who would be indisputable better off if only 
they had not been born in their actual society, but rather in the society that best accords with their 
socio-political ideal all things considered.  Isn’t it unfair that such persons are worse off than 
similarly industrious and talented members of that other society?  While admitting that such 
                                                 
15 Wellman (2000); Singer (2004, p. 22). 
16 This is David Miller’s position (2007, p. 78). He is inspired by Michael Walzer’s vision of “complex equality” 
(1983, chs. 1 and 13). 
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relative inequalities might be bad—such that if they could be corrected without cost they ought 
to be—there is reason to think that a defensible distributive ideal would still permit them. 
 First, it is instructive to note that merely because something is unfair is no necessary 
reason to think that it is unjust.17   Even Rawls’s egalitarian theory of justice—in which there is a 
presumption of simple equality in income and wealth (only to be departed from if this will 
improve the conditions of those who end up worst off, and only then if this is consistent with 
equality of fair opportunity)—admits a degree of unfairness.  This is because Rawls leaves the 
(non-discriminatory) market to determine the identity of who ends up in the worst-off position.  
This is more than merely the point that Rawls tolerates inequality on morally arbitrary bases—
namely on the bases of unchosen personal-drive and inherent talent.18 After all, the difference 
principle does a good job of justifying inequality on these bases in general by appealing to 
considerations of efficiency.  Rather, the point is that Rawls leaves it to the market to determine 
which talents and related aspirations will be rewarded more highly—even degrees of non-
arbitrariness in these features of persons held constant.  In a Rawlsian society, in other words, 
there is no telling who will end up at the bottom of the pile.  And on who ought to end up worst 
off, Rawls’s theory is agnostic.  Will it be miners or agricultural labourers?  Or will it be factory 
or retail employees?  Say that it is miners who end up worst off.  Why should it be that people 
who are miners are worse off than agricultural labourers, factory-workers, or retail-employees of 
equivalent drive and comparable talent (in their own spheres)?  The point is that Rawls allows 
brute luck—in the form of the procedural hand of a non-discriminatory market—to determine 
                                                 
17 Even luck-egalitarianism’s opponents usually accept that unfairnesses like these would probably demand 
neutralisation if it weren’t for more pressing concerns of domination, oppression, and exploitation.  See, for 
example, Altman and Wellman (2009, pp. 131–137).  My approach here, therefore, is somewhat different.  The 
thought that something can be unfair without being unjust I owe to Nozick (1974, pp. 185–186), but the argument I 
seek to advance below is obviously quite different. 
18 This is G.A. Cohen’s well-known criticism of Rawls.  See Cohen (2000, pp. 134–147 and 2008, pp. 116–180). 
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what will count as being more talented (even if the bounds of how much more greater talents 
will be rewarded is restricted by the difference principle). 
 As the difference principle is intended to regular the economic distribution as a whole—
determining the defensible wealth gap between each and every class in a society, not merely 
between the best and worst off—this point can be even better illustrated by the following 
example.  Picture someone who is an industrious and talented artist.  Further suppose that that 
person was born into a materialistic society in which most people think art is of little value, 
particularly art in the style of our artist.  Now picture another member of that society who is an 
industrious and talented soccer player.  Further suppose that most people in our materialistic 
society adore watching soccer.  Odds are, of course, that even if this society is organised along 
Rawlsian lines, the soccer player will end up better off than the artist, despite both being equally 
hard working and both being equally talented, at least in their respective fields.  If this society 
were one among many in a world of autarkies our artist might well wish that he had been born in 
a different society—one in which persons place a premium on aesthetic as opposed to sporting 
achievement.  But arguably, the relatively inequality here, while certainly unlucky—and perhaps 
even, on that basis, unfair—is not unjust.  Regulating where each particular occupation should 
stand in the socio-economic distribution would involve unjustified interference with people’s 
liberty.  It may well, of course, cost a society in terms of productive efficiency too.19 
Things might be different if the state mandated that the soccer player would make more 
than the artist—regardless of what anyone’s preferences happened to be about the merits of 
painters as compared to soccer players—rather than leaving it open to the market to see what 
would spontaneously emerge.  Indeed, this alerts us to an additional set of reasons why 
something that is putatively unfair—in that it can be attributed to brute luck—is not necessarily 
                                                 
19 Anderson (2008) elaborates both the freedom and efficiency criticisms of luck-egalitarianism. 
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unjust.  What process brought about an unlucky inequality is clearly going to bear on our justice-
assessment. 
This brings me to my second point.  In a world of autarkies, an inequality between 
otherwise similar persons across international borders is not unjust because that inequality cannot 
have been imposed on the worse off, either by the better off or by some common set of global 
institutions in which the better off dominate.  The reader will recall that, in specifying the 
hypothetical world of autarkies above, I explicitly ruled out the possibility that force might be 
rendered across international borders, or even that negative externalities might impact abroad.  
(If the latter seems implausible, the reader should take it that the societies in our hypothetical 
archipelago are not sufficiently advantaged such that they pollute the archipelago’s air or waters 
to a degree where there would not be enough and as good left for others.)  Indeed, someone who 
is on the wrong end of an unlucky international inequality in the world of autarkies would be no 
better off if all persons who might be contrasted as fortunate did not even exist. 
It might be argued—as I do in future chapters—that it is possible to wrong someone via 
an interaction with them even if they are not harmed.  If somebody benefits you in an interaction 
and you do not reciprocate sufficiently, you are open to the charge of exploitation.  The gains of 
such interactions should be evenly distributed if parties to them are to avoid the charge that they 
are using the other as a mere means.  Yet there are no mutually beneficial interactions across 
borders in the world of autarkies—nor, indeed, the potential for them.  As a consequence, those 
who are on the fortunate end of unlucky international inequalities are no better off than they 
would be if everyone who could be placed on the other end of such a cross-border comparison 
did not exit. 
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Not only is relative disadvantage in the world of autarkies neither the result of wrongful 
harming nor a product of exploitation (at least across international borders)—it can’t even be 
construed as being the foreseeable but indirect consequence of a common politico-legal order.  
Many egalitarians have argued, or at least implied, that a set of Lockean rights would be 
sufficient to secure distributive justice in a state of nature, but insufficient so long as persons are 
united under the institution of the state (or sufficiently similar institutions across borders of 
internationally).  This is because with the enforcement of distributive duties—think of stipulated 
legal penalties for wrongdoing—arises the potential for what has variously been described as 
oppression and domination, but which is best characterised as the violation of autonomy (where 
autonomy is understood as a life governed by one’s own will, rather than the will or wills of 
others).20 
This is best explicated by way of example.  If a person ends up relatively worse off than a 
similar other in a state of nature, at least they can still claim to be master of their own life.  They 
can say to themselves: “I might have less than others, but this is only because I have chosen to do 
the right thing and refrained from stealing”.  But if someone ends up relatively worse off than a 
similar other under a state—where they would be deterred from violating the rights of others by 
stipulated punishments even if they were purely self-interested—they can no longer make quite 
the same claim.  Of course, even in a state of nature, a person might be deterred from harming 
others to advance themselves.  Private threats might be sufficient, in other words, to deter 
someone insufficiency concerned about justice from stealing from others.  But the power at the 
                                                 
20 On autonomy, see Raz (1986).  Blake (2001) bases his statist account of egalitarian duties on the value of 
autonomy.  Critics, including Abizadeh (2007), have pointed out that international cooperation and institutions 
clearly bear on autonomy.  Hassoun (2012) argues that all those subject to the rules of institutions must have 
sufficient material resources to secure autonomy, or else they are not in a position to consent to, or dissent from, 
those rules. 
56
disposal of the state is obviously magnitudes greater, and generally considered to carry greater 
normative authority. 
I hope by now to have given the reader sufficient reason to believe that cross-border 
inequalities between unrelated strangers is not a serious concern in and of itself—at least not 
sufficiently grave a concern to justify restrictions on liberty.  (Later in the chapter I discuss 
circumstances in which how well off people are relative to one another is a concern—
circumstances which only arise within societies in a world of autarkies.)  However, this is not to 
deny that when persons fall below some absolute threshold—such that it makes sense to say that 
they are in need (rather than merely less well placed to satisfy their wants)—those who are more 
fortunate have an obligation to assist them.  If no one fell below such a threshold, it would not 
matter whether the fortunate were twice as well off as their foreign peers, or whether they were a 
hundred times better off—at least in the absence of ties across borders, or the potential for them, 
as in the world of autarkies.  However, if those on the unlucky end of international inequalities 
were actually in need, the more advantaged would have a duty to assist them, even if those 
persons more advantaged were only somewhat better off than the needy. 
 
II. Absolute Need 
Why accept that we have positive duties to assist the needy at all?  I do not propose, in this 
dissertation, to offer a defence of our obligations in general, whether positive or negative.  
Needless to say, this would take me well outside the scope of this particular project.  For present 
purposes, I see fit to rely on Peter Singer’s thought experiment from “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality”.21  In this article, Singer asks us to consider whether we would have a duty to pull a 
drowning toddler from a pond, even at the cost of ruining our, perhaps expensive, clothes.  As 
                                                 
21 Singer (1972). 
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Singer notes, hardly anyone thinks that we would fail to do wrong if we did not rescue the 
toddler.  As discussed further below, this seems to be true even if we were not responsible for the 
toddler falling into the pond, and even if there were others in a position to assist—including, 
perhaps, those responsible for the toddler’s plight—but these others did nothing to help.  Indeed, 
my guess is that most people would think someone that failed to assist in such a scenario 
committed a serious wrong—indeed, perhaps was criminally negligent.  Although Singer reasons 
from this judgement—seeking to justify assistance even to those at a distance—rather than 
seeking to justify the judgement itself, there is, I think, sufficient agreement on this point from 
those with widely differing moral perspectives to use it as starting point for the purposes of 
political theory. 
Before moving on to a discussion of what might be owed to assist the foreign needy—
even in a world of autarkies—it is necessary, however, to address a concern with centring this 
discussion on Singer’s thought experiment.  This concern is that Singer proffers, via this thought 
experiment, an example of someone who is not merely below that threshold that grounds a 
concomitant obligation on others to assist, but very far below that threshold indeed.  The worry 
is, then, that if we start our analysis with Singer we will build into our theory an insufficiently 
generous account of need.  First, are we to take it that persons are only in absolute need if they 
face a very high probability of premature death?  What if that probability is not near certainty, 
but nevertheless very high?  Second, what about persons who will only face a very high 
probability of imminent death when they have already lived a long life, but that life itself is beset 
by ongoing suffering—say as a consequence of health problems that are treatable?  Aren’t they 
entitled to assistance too?  Third, the thought experiment Singer offers us is one in which the 
actor in need of assistance is an axiomatic moral patient rather than moral agent.  Toddlers 
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cannot be held responsible for what they do under any circumstances.  Are we to take it then, that 
those who are suffering as a consequence of foolish gambles that they have made in their life are 
not to count as needy for the purposes of defining who is entitled to assistance, even if their 
circumstances are dire? 
In response to these queries, I should make clear that the working conception of need I 
would use for the purposes of this project is more generous that that implicated in Singer’s 
thought experiment.  If people are so poor that they are malnourished, or lack adequate housing 
and healthcare because they cannot afford it, I would count them as needy even if they are not in 
serious danger of imminent death, but merely endure ongoing suffering.  But I will not offer a 
full description or defence of what degree of deprivation grounds an obligation on others to 
assist.22  This would warrant a whole dissertation on its own—one that would require, I suspect, 
a full account of our obligations to others in general.  I will also not dwell on how we are to treat 
persons above, but close to, the threshold of absolute need, or discuss how differences in degrees 
of need affect how much we are required to sacrifice in providing assistance, and to whom in 
particular assistance should be directed.  In the interests of most clearly addressing the trade-
related issues that are my central concern, these tricky matters are better left for another place. 
It is also worth noting that I also think that people whose circumstances would otherwise 
dictate that they are entitled to assistance do not forfeit their entitlement when they are needy 
because they chose an option involving some probability of ending up needy that turned out for 
the worse.  If every course of action that a person faces involves some probability of them ending 
up needy (which one is tempted to think is usually the case when it comes to the global poor) it 
would be unfair to require that persons who chose anything other than the least risky option 
forfeit the whole of their entitlement.  More significantly, it just doesn’t seem that the fact that 
                                                 
22 On needs sufficiently grave to ground a right to be assisted, see Shue (1980) and D. Miller (2007, ch. 9). 
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someone in need consciously assumed a risk is enough to justify ignoring their plight, even if 
assisting them should be a lesser priority.  Elizabeth Anderson has made this argument under the 
heading “abandonment of negligent victims”.23  Picture Singer’s drowning toddler example 
again, but suppose instead that there is an adult struggling in the water—an adult who cannot 
swim but was balancing on the edge of the fountain for risk-taking fun.  Surely one has a duty to 
prevent that person from drowning, even if they behaved foolishly. 
 
III. Assisting the Needy and Sacrifice 
Peter Singer maintains that the moral principle that underlies the judgement that one should 
rescue the drowning toddler is the following: if one has the power to stop something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing something of comparative moral worth, one ought, 
morally speaking, to do it.24  (This is Singer’s Strong Principle; his Moderate Principle will be 
introduced later.)  In articulating the principle in this way, Singer means to put to one side 
constraints that critics of utilitarianism would be most concerned about.25  His Strong Principle is 
not meant to justify robbery or assault—violations of the rights of others—in the interests of 
assisting the needy, but rather demands that fortunate persons sacrifice the pursuit of their wants 
in order to alleviate the needs of others.  In other words, although one might value that which one 
could spend one’s money on if one didn’t have to replace the clothes ruined in saving the 
drowning toddler—or the greater freedom to choose what to spend one’s money on (that one 
would have had if not lacking a particular suit) in and of itself—this is not morally comparable to 
the loss of a life. 
                                                 
23 Anderson (1999, p. 296).  See also, Satz (2010, pp. 84–89). 
24 Singer (1972, p. 231). 
25 Arneson (2009). 
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Singer notes that this principle is not conditional in the sense that it restricts the scope of 
beneficent concern—such that some needy people do not count at all—or requires us to weight 
satisfying the needs of some more than the needs of others.  This is because he does not see any 
basic reason why we ought to prioritise strangers who we encounter, or who are close to us—or 
who are out compatriots, for that matter—over others.  Maybe we are more likely to feel 
sympathetic in these cases, but this does not seem morally relevant.  As such, Singer reasons that 
we are not only obliged to sacrifice in situations where we happen to encounter someone in need 
close at hand, but make analogous sacrifices (in terms of cost) whenever we can, just so long as 
there are persons in need somewhere in the world.  Every time we spend money on ourselves we 
should consider how much more good that money could do if donated, for instance, to Oxfam or 
Médecins Sans Frontières.  As long as it could do more good, we do wrong to spend it on 
ourselves.  If forced to make a trade-off between helping some needy people and helping others, 
we should do whatever happens to best minimise need overall (the Strong Principle dictates this 
too, as failing to assist more needy people would mean sacrificing something of greater moral 
worth). 
Singer’s article has provoked a long-running debate about the demands of beneficence, 
which is responsible for an extensive and growing literature.  Doing justice to this debate and 
literature would side-track us from our primary aim—namely to provide a working account of 
what would be owed to the foreign needy in a world of autarkies, so as to begin to consider the 
moral implications of trade.  Nevertheless, some further analysis is necessary even to arrive at 
this working account. 
Singer’s argument challenges us in two interrelated ways.  First, it challenges us to 
reconsider the upward limit on sacrifice that pre-reflective common sense seems to entail.  If we 
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accept that we should sacrifice our clothes to save a drowning toddler we encounter close at 
hand, why not think that we have to sacrifice further as long as there are people in comparative 
need somewhere out there?  Second, it challenges us to consider whether we are wrongfully 
biased in the way we distribute aid.  Is a toddler we encounter more important than one in a far 
way country at similar risk of premature death?  Isn’t prioritising those whom we encounter—or 
indeed our compatriots—as bad as saving white children but not black children?26 
 Critics have made a number of arguments in an attempt to establish some limit to 
requisite sacrifice under beneficence.  Liam Murphy, for instance, has argued that we need only 
sacrifice our fair share of what would need to be sacrificed overall to minimise neediness.27  If 
there are affluent others who do nothing to assist the needy, in other words, I am not required to 
take up their slack.  But this seems implausible when we reflect on Singer’s thought experiment 
again.  Say that there are two drowning toddlers in the water, and one other bystander besides 
myself.  Further suppose that this bystander does nothing to assist either child.  Wouldn’t I do 
wrong if I saved only one of the drowning toddlers—reasoning that to do more would be to 
shoulder a burden that, in fairness, should be shared by the other bystander too? 
Taking a different line of argument, Garrett Cullity has maintained that there is a 
contradiction at the heart of Singer’s Strong Principle.  If the strong principle says that we do 
wrong if we do not pursue an altruistic life—instead (on Cullity’s interpretation of a non-
altruistic life) devoting some of our time and resources to our special projects and 
relationships—why should the need of others place a demand on us at all?  If the value in 
                                                 
26 Singer (2004, p.18). 
27 Murphy (2000). 
62
assisting the needy lies in enabling them to pursue their special projects and relationships, then 
surely assisting them would be helping others to do wrong?28 
But an altruistic life, in the sense of Singer’s Strong Principle, is not one in which one’s 
self-interests ought to count for nothing, but rather one in which we should not assign our self-
interests greater weight than the self-interests of others when deciding what to do.  As such, 
assisting the needy does not entail helping them to do wrong (even if the extent to which they 
will thereafter live a life governed by the Strong Principle ought to matter when determining 
which particular needy people to prioritise).29  Also, Cullity fails to take into account degrees of 
wrongness.  Maybe if I help a person to escape need who won’t themselves do much to help 
others—instead focusing on their special projects and relationships—I do wrong to some degree.  
But I do much worse not to help them at all, at least when the sacrifice to my special projects and 
relationships entailed in assisting them would not be comparable to their loss (in the same terms) 
were I not to assist.  That two persons’ self-interests are somewhat satisfied is better than one 
person’s self-interests being a little more satisfied while the other person is left, in the drowning 
toddler case at least, to die. 
It is clear, however, that Singer’s Strong Principle departs significantly from what most 
people commonly think is required of us—regardless of their particular philosophical or political 
views—and this might be sufficient to reject it for the purposes of developing a political theory.  
If a political ideal is to command some degree of actual consensus to be justified, then we cannot 
start with so controversial a principle.  More importantly, perhaps, a political ideal is necessary a 
public one, and openly advocating Singer’s principle may do more harm than good—even by 
Singer’s lights—so long as people are likely to reject a demanding principle of beneficence when 
                                                 
28 Cullity (2003, 2004). 
29 Arneson (2009). 
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they would accept and act from a more moderate one.  Most of us do not, for instance, think that 
one is obliged to sacrifice an arm to save the life of an endangered stranger, even if an arm is not 
of comparable moral worth to a life, and even though doing so would be virtuous. 
The upward limit on sacrifice entailed by common-sense morality reveals itself if we 
adapt Singer’s drowning child scenario so that it better represents the choice situation that any 
one of us—the affluent class globally—find ourselves in with respect to the needy in general.  
Amending Singer’s scenario in this way also helps us to see that our intuition in Singer’s actual 
case is not a reflection of some potentially wrongful bias in favour of those who are close and/or 
our compatriots.  For it turns out that were the bad things we confront and/or that affect our 
compatriots sufficiently grave, the upward limit on requisite sacrifice would kick-in despite how 
close the needy stand with respect to us. 
In redrawing Singer’s scenario, let us say first that we are not to consider merely one 
point in time.  Rather than chancing across a drowning stranger at one moment in my life (when 
I have never been in such a situation before, nor am I likely to be in the future—the reality for 
the vast majority of Singer’s readers) let us say that I am constantly in the presence of a 
drowning stranger: as soon as I pull one from the water, another is floundering in need of 
assistance.  Further, let us say that the extended period we are to reflect on is not merely a matter 
of days or weeks, but one’s whole lifetime.  Next, let us say that rather than facing one stranger 
drowning, I am facing many—indeed, too many to count.  Such an amended case is much closer 
to the global aid scenario in which individual members of affluent countries actually find 
themselves.  Finally, in order to test whether reluctance to reason from Singer’s drowning child 
scenario to the case of foreign aid reflects a bias in favour of those who are close and/or our 
compatriots, suppose that all these drowning strangers are members of my direct community. 
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What would be my obligations if I lived in a frightening world in which I was constantly 
encountering a multitude of drowning strangers throughout the entire course of my life?  I 
suspect that most of my readers will think I would do no wrong to stop short of dedicating my 
life to saving these unlucky strangers, as Singer’s Strong Principle would require.  As Richard 
Miller has argued, “in the ghastly circumstance of frequent encounter, every day, with innocents 
in imminent dire peril, it might even be morally permissible for someone to neglect a drowning 
toddler close at hand, because he must ration individually easy aid to nearby victims to take 
adequate care of his loved ones and his life”.30 
As part of our working account of what the affluent would owe the needy even in a world 
of autarkies, let us move, then, to Singer’s Moderate Principle: if we have the power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing something morally significant (rather 
than of comparable moral worth), we ought, morally speaking, to do it.  Further let us take the 
aggregative rather than iterative interpretation of this principle.31  In other words, rather than 
seeing Singer’s moderate principle as applying separately at each particular instance (however 
defined) in our life—or to each extra increment of time or resources—we should see it as 
applying to our lives overall.  As such, it regulates our disposition to give in general (from which 
choices at particular instances and over particular increments proceed) rather than each of these 
choices in and of itself. 
It is necessary to interpret Singer’s Moderate Principle in this way merely to preserve its 
spirit, as otherwise it is unstable in the mode of Sorites Paradox.  No single dollar is a morally 
significant sacrifice for someone who is affluent by global standards, so if we applied Singer’s 
Moderate Principle of beneficence to each new dollar earned in isolation, all or almost all of 
                                                 
30 R. Miller (2004, pp. 113 – 114). 
31 This terminology is that of Cullity (2006).  Richard Miller also makes this argument (2004b, pp. 363–366). 
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one’s income would ultimately have to be sacrificed to help the needy.  Yet sacrificing almost all 
one’s income considered as a whole would be a morally significant sacrifice overall—except, 
perhaps, for an ascetic hermit—as it would severely erode one’s ability to pursue one’s personal 
projects and relationships.32 
The resulting dispositional and life-long interpretation of Singer’s Moderate Principle is 
informed by, and very similar to, Richard Miller’s Principle of Sympathy.  This is the principle 
of beneficence, and the limit on sacrifice that it entails, that I adopt for the purposes of 
developing my fair trade ideal: 
 
One’s underlying disposition to respond to neediness ought to be sufficiently 
demanding that giving which would express greater underlying concern would 
impose a significant risk, on balance, of significantly worsening one’s life, if one 
fulfilled all further responsibilities; and it need not be any more demanding than 
this.33 
 
IV. Distributing Assistance under Requisite Sacrifice 
It is clear then, I think, that even in a world of autarkies the affluent might be obligated to 
redistributive across borders.  This is true even if inequalities of brute luck are not unjust in and 
of themselves, and even if there is an upward limit on sacrifice that no one should be asked to 
surpass in assisting others (even if they are obliged to bear any burden up to this point).  This is 
because it might be the case that there are foreigners who are not merely worse off in relative 
terms but impoverished in absolute terms.  And relatively affluent persons might not yet have 
reached the upward limit on sacrifice.  Picture a world of autarkies in which there is one society 
that is uniformly affluent and several others in which everyone is impoverished.  In such a world 
it is clear, I think, that there would be duties to redistribute across borders. 
                                                 
32 R. Miller (2004b, pp. 370–371). 
33 R. Miller (2004, pp. 111–113 and 2004b, pp. 359–60). 
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 Nevertheless, what are we to say in the case where there are needy people both at home 
and abroad?  Might there be a reason to favour the nearby needy over the distant needy—or to 
favour one’s needy compatriots over needy foreigners—even if more need could be alleviated 
overall if one did not?  Perhaps there is a lexical ordering such that some persons’ needs should 
be satisfied in their entirety before other needy people are considered at all, or perhaps some 
people’s needs should be given greater weight in a function to be maximised? 
In answer to this question, I claim that there is no fundamental reason why, when it 
comes to the duty of beneficence considered in isolation, any person’s needs should count for 
more than any other person’s needs, in either of these senses.  Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that that we do wrong by primarily dedicating ourselves towards assisting our compatriots, 
especially in a world of autarkies.  First, there are a range of reasons to think that starting at 
home will be the best way to minimise need overall, if not in our own world then at least in a 
world of autarkies.  In the remainder of this section I briefly outline a variety of these reasons, 
pertinent both to individual members of primarily (but not wholly) affluent societies and to their 
governments.  More importantly, however, we have duties towards our compatriots, both in a 
world of autarkies and our own world, that go beyond duties of beneficence (in the sense that if 
we satisfy these duties our compatriots should be far from needy).  Even if a compatriot is not 
needy in absolute terms, we should seek to ensure that they are equitably compensated for the 
value they co-generate in the market, and receive an equitable net-share of public goods, broadly 
conceived.  In the next and final section of this chapter I consider in more depth what we owe to 
our compatriots (and only to our compatriots in a world of autarkies), and what we are to do if 
faced with a trade-off that might arise in non-ideal circumstances: when beneficence clashes with 
duties of equity to compatriots. 
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 Before we move on, however, let us consider a few reasons why it will often make sense 
to prioritise the needy who are close to us, or who are our compatriots, even if our aim is to 
alleviate the greatest need overall.  Let us start with physical proximity first.  For one thing, 
prioritising the proximate provides a solution to a coordination problem.34  Consider a world of 
autarkies in which the wealth of individuals is not in lockstep with their society: say forty percent 
of rich-state citizens are poor and forty percent of poor-state citizens are rich.  Further, imagine 
that, within each society, the rich and poor are not segregated spatially, but mixed together.  
Assuming that all those who are poor are entitled to assistance: who is to help whom? 
Obviously, a rule of assistance that answers this question is the following: each affluent 
individual should provide assistance to those who are close first, before expanding the circle of 
beneficence if need persists until the reasonable limit of beneficence (as defined by the Principle 
of Sacrifice) is reached.  In the particular version of the world of autarkies just outlined, this rule 
will only require aid across borders if more affluent residents of poorer societies do not alleviate 
domestic need themselves and residents of affluent societies have not sacrificed all they are 
obliged to at a point where all domestic need in affluent countries has been alleviated. 
Another reason why it may make sense, for reasons of efficiency, to prioritise those who 
are physically close is that rendering aid to those nearby is usually less costly than rendering aid 
to those further away.  Imagine that you are living in an affluent society in the archipelago of 
autarkies.  Further, imagine that a minority of your compatriots are in need of basic foodstuffs 
while every member of a poverty-stricken foreign society are in similar need.  Given a 
reasonable limit on the amount you are required to give (and let us say that giving up to this limit 
will not alleviate all the need, whether assistance is directed exclusively to those abroad or 
provided only to those at home) who should you assist?  Say that you are in a position to deliver 
                                                 
34 Goodin (1988). 
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food parcels directly to the domestic needy without any additional cost, but delivering aid to 
those on an adjacent island is costly: you must expend money and effort to build a raft, and a 
certain percentage of the food will be lost or ruined during its journey across the sea.  In these 
and similar circumstances, one is clearly better off directing assistance to those who are close.  
Even if one is obliged to give more than is required to alleviate domestic neediness, it is still 
sensible to help those who are close first. 
A third reason to prioritise the nearby in the interests of efficiently allocating limited aid is 
that information problems are usually less significant between people who are physically close.  
When need arises those who are close are more likely to be aware of the nature and extent of the 
need than those who are further away.  Indeed, if a principle of assistance did not require those 
had exclusive knowledge of a certain problem to act, that problem would go unaddressed.  
Information problems can also arise when determining how aid is to be allocated, even when the 
nature of need is determined: it often makes sense to privilege assisting those close at hand 
because one is in a better position to ensure that aid actually reaches its intended recipient and is 
used for its intended purposes. 
Take our archipelago of autarkies: affluent residents of affluent societies are in a better 
position to judge the need of those who live on the same island as themselves than they are to 
judge the needs of those they can only see from a distance.  They are also in a much better 
position to ensure that their aid is used for its intended purposes: if they float food parcels to a 
neighbouring island where some of the residents appear undernourished, they cannot be sure that 
the few fortunate residents of the poorer island will not greedily snatch the food supplies for 
themselves. 
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Fourthly, to the extent that the proximate expect to be prioritised, failing to do so adds 
insult to injury.  Imagine that those who are close expect their need to be given greater weight 
because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that this is the right thing to do.  Or imagine that the 
nearby needy expect to be prioritised because they know that proximity tends to trigger 
sympathy in a way that distance does not.  If one fails to act on beliefs such as these—regardless 
of whether they are justified or not—there is a fair chance that the nearby needy will feel 
insulted.  Say that I am a very wealthy entrepreneur who lives on the gentrifying edge of a 
seriously disadvantaged area.  Every day I drive my expensive car past boarded-up houses and 
drug dealers.  Further, say that I am not selfish as such, giving away a lot of my money to the 
poor.  However, all the money I give is to foreign charities.  Indeed, I make use of tax-code 
loopholes and offshore tax havens to avoid making a contribution to people living in my 
community, reasoning that more good can be done overall if all my resources go to persons in 
poor countries. (Let us put to one side, for a moment, the fact that this might be wrong on the 
basis that there are distributive duties beyond beneficence that unite compatriots, as I argue in the 
final section of this chapter.)  There is a fair chance, I think, that if I act in this way my needy 
neighbours will feel insulted. 
Now, it is obviously true that the mere fact that someone will feel insulted if I do not act in 
a certain way is not sufficient to establish an obligation to act in that way.  However, in this case, 
insult might bear on what we ought to do if whether someone counts as needy—as opposed to 
merely disadvantaged in relative terms—depends, to some degree, on more than merely the 
value of their holding of material resources.  Say that we are to count people as needy if they do 
not have an effective opportunity to acquire a certain degree of self-respect—say that degree 
needed to find some fulfilment in those personal projects that they can afford.  (The capabilities 
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approach, for one, would be amenable to such an account of need.)  Further suppose that 
insulting people in the way just described undermines their respect for themselves, such that they 
can achieve less fulfilment with the same holding of material resources.  Then we ought to 
favour the proximate needy for reason of insult even if our obligation is ultimately to minimise 
need for requisite sacrifice. 
Having discussed a few conditional reasons why it might make sense to prioritise the 
proximate needy, it should be clear that analogous reasons can be offered that justify 
governments normally favouring their needy citizens over needy foreigners.  First, so doing 
solves a coordination problem.  Even if it were best that, as seems plausible, we delegate much 
of what we owe on the basis of beneficence to governments, there would still be the question of 
which needy people each and every government should assist.  Clearly, “help your own citizens 
first” is one rule that would help to ensure that some are not helped too little while others are 
helped too much. 
It is not, of course, the only possible rule (another would be “help the citizens of the 
country that comes next alphabetically first”).  But a concern for efficiency would justify opting 
for the former rule even if compatriots owed each other nothing more than assistance to alleviate 
neediness.  First, governments tend to face fewer and lower transaction costs when assisting the 
domestic as opposed to foreign needy.  Further, governments are much better placed to overcome 
informational hurdles with respect to their own citizens than they are with respect to citizens of 
other countries—particular states possessing a modern bureaucracy.  It is much easier for a 
government to determine who in particular is in need—and what they are entitled to—with 
respect to their own citizens.  Finally, a government is also better placed to ensure that assistance 
reaches its intended recipients domestically than it is across borders. 
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In addition, if indeed a certain sense one’s own worth is to be counted among the basic 
needs to which one is entitled, then governments may have to favour their own citizens even if 
their only role was to minimise need in general.  Because the bonds of co-citizenship are 
expected to motivate help, if someone is need does not receive help from their compatriots they 
are likely to feel insulted.  This insult is greater—when compared to the case in which aid is not 
rendered by nearby strangers—because a failure to provide help in this case represents apparent 
indifference on the part not simply of an individual bystander, but of a valued collective. 
The potential for insult is further magnified by the fact that the state institutions that 
compatriots share are in a position to ensure that the burdens of providing assistance are fairly 
distributed, at least within that country if not across all non-needy people globally.  In the case 
where someone fails to receive costly help from close-by strangers, the feeling of insult might be 
diminished if those strangers were in a position to say “why should I help, when others are doing 
nothing?”  Yet governments are in a position to provide assurance to the individual in a position 
to assist the needy that the burden of doing so will be fairly distributed. 
 
V. Relative Inequality and Compatriots 
None of what have said so far has meant to imply that the only duties with distributive 
implications we might have to others—besides those minimal negative duties of a Lockean 
kind—are duties of beneficence to persons who are needy in absolute terms.  Indeed, in an 
attempt to refute the claim that putative unfairness between comparable individuals across 
international borders in a world of autarkies represents an injustice, I implied a number of 
circumstances that ground additional duties.  Clearly, in other words, there are cases in which 
inequalities of brute luck represent a concern from the perspective of political morality.  As these 
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additional obligations are owed to one’s fellow nationals exclusively in a world of autarkies—if 
not our own world—I discuss them as obligations of compatriotism here.35 
 In a world of autarkies, compatriots have distributive duties to one another on the basis of 
the market exchanges that they participate in.  They do not have any such obligations to 
foreigners, of course, because there is no trade across international borders in a world of 
autarkies, or even the potential for it.  When people trade with one another, they generate new 
value.  After all, trade is mutually beneficial by definition.  The question arises, however, how 
the mutual gain from each and every market exchange is to be distributed.  If you employ me to 
work in your store, how much should I gain as a compared to you (net the costs we respectively 
bear in working, of course)?  If you are to employ me, you must be careful not to use me as a 
mere means.  You must be careful, in other words, not to exploit me.  For if you do so you wrong 
me—even if, as it happens, I would be worse off without the job.  Yet actual consent is no way 
to judge whether you wrongfully use me or not.  In order to avoid exploitation, normally 
speaking, we must also seek to ensure that the mutual benefit in each and every exchange is 
equally distributed (even if there will be reasonable disagreement about what counts as an equal 
share in this context).  To do otherwise is to fail to treat one’s exchange partner as an equal.36 
Even someone who was otherwise a libertarian might accept that one wrongs one’s 
exchange partner if one does not equitably divide any surplus that that exchange generates, while 
pointing out that enforcing this requirement—were it possible—would do little to address 
inequalities of brute luck that might arise in a market society (justifiably, in his or her view).  
This is because, from a certainly perspective that might seem to accord with common sense, that 
                                                 
35 These are obligations over and above existing obligations to provide assistance to the needy.  They are thus 
consistent with the view that “special relationships can increase what we owe to our associates... but cannot decrease 
what we owe to everyone else”: Pogge (2002, pp. 86–91). 
36 For an account like this, see Mayer (2007). 
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set of potential exchange terms (or prices) that are consistent with what would be mutually 
beneficial are strictly defined by the parties’ actual reserve prices.37  And in competitive market, 
both parties’ actual reserve prices are whatever the market price already happens to be.  To give 
an illustration: say that the labour market for store workers is perfectly competitive, and the 
market wage is $10 an hour.  I will not accept anything less than $10 an hour to work in your 
store (as there are other employers willing to offer me this), nor will you be prepared to pay me 
more than $10 an hour (as there are other potential employees willing to work for this)—at least 
if we behave in the mode of homo economicus.  What surplus is there then, to be evenly divided? 
Yet his perspective take the wrong baseline for determining what constitutes that range of 
potential exchange terms that are consistent with mutual benefit.38  If you decide to hire me in 
your store for $10 an hour, in circumstances were the labour market is perfectly competitive, it 
would outrageous for you to say that you get nothing from our exchange (or, indeed, for me to 
make such a claim).  Here I am working long hours, stacking and restacking shelves night and 
day, and reaping (let us say) a small fraction of your store’s profits, and you get nothing from 
me?  What surplus is generated in a market exchange cannot be assessed by looking at both 
party’s actual reserve prices—even in a perfectly competitive market—for this is insensitive to 
the nature of the process, and identity of the persons, who are ultimately responsible for 
generating economic value once contracts are signed and in the exchange of goods. 
The baseline that is more appropriate, I think, is one in which we assume that both parties 
have a monopoly in the good they are providing—or are, at least, the only other persons out there 
in a position to provide such a good (one might, of course, work for one’s self).  In other words, 
                                                 
37 Wertheimer distinguishes between an actual reserve price and  a morally justified reserve price (1996, 211 – 214).  
However, he also sees one’s actual reserve price in a competitive market as necessarily justified.  I object to this 
view for reasons I develop further below. 
38 For a position of this kind, see Wolff (1998).  Ruth Sample (2003, pp. 16–26) also criticises the view that a 
competitive market price is necessarily non-exploitative. 
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the gain to you, as a store-owner, is relative to a scenario in which you have no employees—or 
no employees doing this particular work—at all.  If any shelf-staking is to get done at all, you 
must do it.  And my gain, as a store-employee, is relative to a scenario in which there is no work 
of this kind available, or no work with so talented a manager, or something of that sort. 
This is not a call for us to reflect on what would be a fair price every time we purchase 
something or sign a contract.  Those who do so, at least in a professional capacity, risk being 
forced out of the market entirely by actors who are more ruthless.39  And the informational 
burden of attempting to determine what would be equitable in each and every exchange is likely 
to be significant.40  Rather, it is a reminder that there is a relational argument for the claim that a 
just state would not tolerate market inequalities to become too great that does not resort to talk of 
a “basic structure”, which egalitarianism’s opponents find inscrutable.  An obligation not to 
exploit is, in many circumstances, appropriately delegated to the state as per a division of moral 
labour, with what counts as an equal division of the gains of different sorts of exchange left for 
democratic deliberation to determine.41 
In a world of autarkies, however, compatriots do not merely have obligations to one 
another beyond those of beneficence on the basis that they generate value together in each and 
every of their market transactions.  My compatriots also benefit me in ways that foreigners do 
not, even in our own world, via the provision of public goods.  So as to put to one side the issue 
of justification for a moment, call a public good anything that either ought to be, or may be, 
supplied by the state (rather than on the market).  Also, assume no peculiar definition of a 
“public good” (in a non-moralised sense) such that some things a state might justifiable provide 
                                                 
39 Young (2004), Mayer (2007b), Meyers (2007). 
40 Nozick (1974, pp. 186) may have had this concern. 
41 The claim that duties grounded in our economic interactions ought to be fulfilled politically in pushing for 
comprehensive and systematic changes in the structure of constraints in which our interactions take place is made by 
Young (2004, 2006, 2010), Mayer (2007b), Ronzoni (2009) and R. Miller (2010). 
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will not count as public goods.  This enables us to talk of things that must be provided to all if 
they are provided to anyone (the economist’s definition of a public good), goods that advance the 
actual interests of each and every person (the contractarian’s definition), and anything else that 
might be thought to advance the common good in the same breath. 
Now, the provision of any of these goods depends on most people always—or all people 
generally—obeying the laws that enable these goods to come into being, whether out of a sense 
of duty or because they are deterred by the threat of punishment.  Public goods do not simply 
arise spontaneously—in the form of positive externalities—as individuals go about pursuing 
their private interests within a market, non-exploitative or otherwise.  Rather, individuals must 
behave in a way that would not otherwise be in their best interests.  This is what makes the 
public-good-providing state a cooperative scheme in and of itself.  To give the textbook example, 
it is not in any of our private interests to pay a dollar in taxes.  Yet if the people as a whole do 
not contribute a sufficient quantity in tax revenue there could be no public goods. 
That the public-good-providing state is a cooperative scheme, then, grounds a duty that 
all net-gain from that scheme to an equal degree, even if it must be left to democratic 
deliberation to determine what an equal share of net public goods (either considered individually 
or overall) constitutes.   If public goods are not distributed in this way, then the state—or those 
who get more than an equitable share in public-good terms—are responsible for exploiting those 
who get less.  This is true even if those who get less are better off than they would be if they 
exited the country (a citizen’s actual BATNA/reserve price, as a consequence of the state’s 
coercive power).  Indeed, this is true even if those who get less are better off than they would be 
if there were no public goods at all—with the only goods available those that ought to be 
provided via the market (what we should presumably take as the baseline for assessing each 
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person’s net-gain from public goods if we see things from the moral point of view).  This is 
analogous to the claim that a cooperative transaction or contract in the private sphere—as 
between store-owner and employee—must entail an equitable division of gain, even if, were it 
not to entail such a division, both parties would still benefit. 
Now, there is the thought that while I might owe my compatriots collectively something 
for the provision of public goods, I don’t owe any individual compatriot anything (because their 
marginal contribution to the scheme of public-good provision is negligible).  But if I don’t owe 
any individual compatriot anything, then I don’t owe my compatriots collectively anything 
either, as a group is merely the sum of its parts.  This would be like the manager of a megastore 
with dozens of employees admitting that an equitable division of gain, properly considered, 
would require paying these employees more than the sum of what their wages would be at 
market prices if only they could be counted a single actor.  But as they cannot, and are 
expendable considered individually, it is permissible to pay each less than without wrongfully 
exploiting them.  Perhaps they need not be paid more than what would constitute a non-
exploitative return if they were the only employee (allowing the manager to pocket any extra 
gains due to increasing returns to scale in labour).  Or perhaps, indeed, they need not be paid 
more than the market price (not on the grounds that there are non-employees who would work 
for that price, but on the basis that they are expendable even if there was no outside labour 
market as such). 
Yet it would be a mistake to reason thus.  While a group is no more than the sum of its 
parts, the right way to determine what I owe to a compatriot individually is not determined by 
imagining circumstances in which that actor did not exist, or emigrated.  For reasoning in this 
way would imply that there might be gains that are rightly credited to cooperation that must 
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count as something to which no one has an entitlement.  (Imagine a cooperative endeavour in 
which every actor, whatever their function, is expendable. Wouldn’t it be wrong to say that 
participants in this endeavour have an entitlement to the surplus brought into being by their 
cooperation that non-participants do not?)   Rather, what one owes to each of one’s compatriots 
individually is an equitable share of what one owes collectively to all one’s compatriots.  This 
duty is appropriately expressed in seeking to ensure (within permissible means) that the each net-
gain equally from public good provision overall. 
So, in a world of autarkies our compatriots benefit us via their cooperation, both in 
private and public terms (i.e. both on the market and in public good provision).  As such we owe 
them more than merely assistance to alleviate need, which we also owe to those who do not 
benefit us—including, in a world of autarkies, foreigners.  However, this does not exhaust the 
relational reasons why compatriots might owe one another more than mere beneficence.  As 
noted earlier in this chapter, and in the introduction, scholars of global justice have argued that it 
is the “coercive” nature of the state (or similar institutions globally) that grounds a concern for 
relative inequity that would not otherwise exit.  While I will discuss this claim more extensively 
in Chapter 5—where I outline its potential implications for a world trade regime—I will say just 
a few words here. 
Picture a society in the world of autarkies in which there are no political measures in 
place to ensure that exploitation does not occur, or to compensate people to the extent that they 
are exploited.  For example, there are no workplace regulations, legal or criminal penalties for 
failures to comply with these regulations, or taxation of gains got by exploiting others.  Further 
suppose that this society has a democratic government, and citizens’ representatives have 
determined what sacrifice is needed on each and every citizen’s part to ensure that public goods 
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are provided.  Also imagine that these representatives abide by a democratic norm of deliberation 
and have determined in their consultations what an equitable net-share of these public goods for 
each citizen would be.  Finally, suppose that while the state engages in exchanges with others 
(bureaucrats and firms) to ensure that justified public goods are provided, there are no measures 
in place to appropriate each citizen’s fair contribution should they fail to provide it, or to punish 
them for free-riding.  For example, it is left to each citizen to decide whether to mail in his or her 
taxes. 
Now imagine that, all of a sudden, regulations and penalties of the relative kinds are 
introduced.   Why might there be any new obligations purely on this basis?  To the extent that 
citizens of that state exploit others, and free-ride on their compatriots by failing to pay their 
taxes, state coercion is already justified as a means of enforcement (presuming, of course, that 
the sorts of obligations we are concerned with ought to be legal as well as moral).  However, 
what are we to say with respect to those persons who would fulfil their obligations, even if there 
was greater practical license to escape them?  It seems obvious to me, that by being coerced in 
this way, these persons lose an opportunity to demonstrate their virtue to their compatriots.42  To 
be able to demonstrate your goodwill to others is vital to trust.  To the extent that social trust in a 
society might be necessary, therefore, inequality may need to be further limited.  After all, this 
might be necessary to give the more fortunate reasonable grounds on which to trust their 
compatriots despite knowing that they could not escape getting away with more due to the state’s 
overwhelming coercive power. 
Before moving on to the next chapter, it is necessary to address what we are to say in 
cases where the demands of beneficence and fairness conflict.  There are a variety of ways to 
characterise such a conflict, and some are more easy to solve than others.  For example, if faced 
                                                 
42 Here, I draw on Aquinas’s defence of private property (2002, pp. 205–220). 
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with a conflict between helping one person who is needy because I have exploited them (failing 
to fulfil duties of fairness to that person) and helping another who is needy but whom I have 
never interacted with before—in circumstances where I have not already sacrificed what the 
Principle of Sympathy requires of me—I think that most people would say I should prioritise the 
first person before helping the second.  However, what are we to say in a case where, for 
instance, someone is worse off than they would have been if I hadn’t exploited them, but I am no 
better off because I redistributed the gains acquired from exploitation to the needy?  Further 
suppose that if I sought to compensate the person whom I exploited, without reining back my 
assistance to the needy, I would sacrifice more than the Principle of Sympathy requires of me. 
I will have more to say on questions such as these in the next chapter, but at first glance it 
seems to me that in ideal circumstances—circumstances in which each and every other actor will 
act so as to do what is morally required of them—duties of fairness take priority over duties of 
beneficence, in the sense that it would be wrong to exploit someone (even someone who isn’t 
needy) to help someone else who is.  Indeed, it would be wrong to do this even if more need 
could be alleviated overall by so doing.  This is because, in the circumstances where others 
already sacrifice what is required of them for the needy, were I to exploit them I would, in effect, 
be inducing them to sacrifice more that the Principle of Sympathy demands. 
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Chapter 2 – A World of Liberal Trading Societies 
 
In the previous chapter, I sought to determine what cross-border obligations of a distributive 
kind, incumbent on the affluent globally, would exist in a world of autarkies—a world in which 
there are no ties across borders, including ties of interpersonal trade.  In order to isolate the 
relevant moral intuitions, I modelled our world as an archipelago of self-contained island-
societies, and asked the reader to consider whether, in such a world, relatively affluent persons 
would have an obligation to transfer supplies to the less affluent abroad, and if so, how 
demanding such an obligation would be. 
By way of a response to this scenario, I admitted that such an obligation might well exist, 
but that there are various reasons to think that the scope of distributive concern does not stretch 
far across the border such a world.  First, in the absence of mutually beneficial transactions 
across international borders, or some global scheme of cooperation for the provision of public 
goods, relative inequalities—as between two similarly motivated and endowed persons who 
happen to be members of different societies—may be unfair, but are not unjust.  Second, the 
affluent do have an obligation to assist needy persons—wherever they are located and whatever 
the cause of their need—but there are limits to this obligation.  First, requisite sacrifice is not as 
great as a utilitarian would posit.  While the affluent ought to adopt a disposition that will lead 
them to sacrifice to this limit, they need not sacrifice so much that the loss in terms of their 
personal projects and relationships is itself morally significant.  Further, when considering which 
needy persons in particular to assist, there are reasons to favour compatriots, both on the grounds 
of efficiency and because there are distributive duties beyond mere beneficence that unite 
compatriots. 
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In the present chapter, I seek to determine what obligations of a distributive kind are 
grounded on the potential for, and practice of, interpersonal trade.  In order to pinpoint the 
relevant moral intuitions, I ask the reader to reflect on a world in which there is at least the 
potential for exchange across international borders, but which is otherwise similar to the world of 
autarkies.  In order to leave to future chapters a consideration of the moral implications of other 
dimensions of trade-integration, a crucial feature of this world is that all societies have a defacto 
trade policy that is laissez-faire (hence “a world of liberal trading societies”).  Institutional and 
intellectual development is not sufficiently advanced to admit policy intervention of this kind.  
This assumption is only relaxed in the next chapter, where our concern shifts to trade policy for 
the first time. 
In the first substantive section below, I provide a brief description of this hypothetical 
world.  Then, in the remaining sections of the chapter, I articulate what I take to be a reasonable 
moral response to this scenario; one that provides guidance for our own world.  In doing so, I 
defend an account of cross-border obligations of a distributive kind in which both the potential 
for and practice of international trade necessarily bears on duties across borders.  Most 
importantly, duties not to take wrongful advantage—that is, not to exploit—emerge for the first 
time.  Regardless of whether one’s trade partner is needy or non-needy, one must be sure not to 
use them as a mere means, as to do so would mean failing to respect them as an equal.  In normal 
circumstances, this requires that they reap an equal share of the gains of exchange (as I argued in 
the context of compatriot duties in the previous chapter).  Indeed, in the unusual circumstances 
where one’s trade partner is needy, they have a special claim to an even greater share of the 
gains of trade.  Further, in a world where it is possible to trade there is a new means beyond 
transfer to advance the interests of the needy.  The obligation of beneficence itself requires that 
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these means to be utilised when doing so will enable more need to be alleviated for requisite 
sacrifice, just so long as the no one’s rights are violated—including the rights of the needy not to 
be exploited. 
Because there were duties of beneficence across borders even in a world of autarkies, I 
actually discuss what bearing the potential for trade has on what is already owed to the needy 
first.  I then move on to a discussion of exploitation.  Specifically, this chapter is structured as 
follows.  After defining the parameters of the world of liberal trading societies, in section I 
specify when trade ought to be preferred to aid in advancing the interests of the needy.  Then, in 
section II, I discuss how it is that the practice of exchange across international borders, even with 
the non-needy—bears on how need alleviation should be distributed. 
In section III, I turn to exploitation for the first time—specifically to the unusual 
circumstances where one’s trade partner is actually in need.  I claim here that avoiding using the 
needy as a mere means in a mutually beneficial transaction might require more than it usually 
does.  This is because needy people who are jointly responsible for producing economic value 
via their cooperation with others in the market have a special claim to this value that other needy 
people do not.  One should seek to ensure that one’s trade partner’s needs are satisfied first, even 
if more need could be sacrificed overall if one exploited them and transferred the gain elsewhere.  
In section IV, I turn to exploitation proper, arguing that, at a minimum, the fact that less affluent 
foreigners have poorer alternative options is no reason why they should receive a lesser share of 
the gains of exchange than they otherwise might.  In the final section of the chapter I remind the 
reader that the global affluent have these duties even if poorer societies are unjust, although 
meeting them may be more difficult. 
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A World of Liberal Trading Societies 
In the previous chapter, I sought to isolate the intuitions particular to the cross-border bond of 
common humanity alone.  In order to accomplish this, I asked the reader to envisage our world 
as an archipelago of autarkic island-societies, divided by turbulent waters.  Each society was 
autarkic both in the sense that it was economically self-contained and in the sense that it had its 
own socio-economic culture and state institutions.  Although the islands were sufficiently close 
to permit some degree of mutual awareness, the waters that divided the societies were 
sufficiently dangerous not to admit of navigation.  Members of one society could float supplies 
to members of another society on a raft, but trade or migration was out of the question. 
 For the purposes of the present chapter, however, imagine that circumstances have 
changed somewhat.  Natural climate change has led to a fall in the sea level and a diminishment 
in the rate of the previously treacherous ocean currents.  As a consequence, each of the island-
societies has been brought closer to the others, making trade a possibility.  Further, imagine that 
technological improvements—in boat-building and navigation, say—have reduced the costs 
associated with cross-border exchange, such that on-going ties of trade are not prohibitively 
expensive.  This world—a world in which there is the potential for trade, but no on-going trade 
as yet—is the first formulation of the world of liberal trading societies that will be invoked in the 
sections of the chapter below. 
The second formulation of the world of liberal trading societies is one in which this 
potential has been taken advantage of, and trade is taking place.  Residents of some of the island-
societies occasionally travel to other societies to purchase goods in their marketplaces, and a 
merchant class composed of members of a variety of societies is established, with traders 
purchasing goods on one island and selling them on another.  Let us even say, perhaps, that this 
84
trade extends beyond material merchandise to incorporate services.  Affluent members of some 
of the societies pay residents of others islands for their productive time and energy.  It is useful 
to include this possibility if we wish to bring to the fore moral judgements relevant to labour 
outsourcing in our own world. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, there remain some significant 
differences between the world of liberal trading societies and our own world.  It is necessary that 
the world of liberal trading societies depart from our own in these ways if we wish to control of 
characteristics of our own world that might ground distributive duties of their own.  The most 
important difference from our own world is that each state in the world of liberal trading 
societies has a trade policy that takes the form, in effect, of laissez faire.  No state seeks to 
regulate trade, tax imports, or subsidise exports—either directly or indirectly.  This is not 
because the government of each society has made a conscious decision to pursue such a policy, 
or because each society has a liberal culture: laissez faire is de facto rather than de jure.  Instead, 
it is built into our model that no other policy stance is a practical possibility. 
If this seems like an implausible parameter at first, adopt the following two assumptions.  
First, take it that state institutions are not sufficiently advanced to admit commercial-policy 
choice as viable.  We have said that each of the island-societies has an associated “state”, but let 
us suppose that all these states lack the bureaucratic capacity necessary to implement a non-
laissez-faire trade policy.  Second, take it the state of social-scientific knowledge is not 
sufficiently advanced to admit of the efficacy of commercial policy, regardless of its ends.  
Rulers do not realise that developmental, distributive, or other goals might be advanced via trade 
policy. 
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That this is a parameter of the hypothetical world on which we focus here should not be 
interpreted as implying that a perfectly open commercial policy is natural or rational (although it 
does not deny this either).  This parameter is simply put in place in order to more easily exclude 
moral intuitions that are not apposite to the questions are hand.  Intuitions provoked by reflecting 
on a world in which states have the power to pursue trade policies of various kinds first become 
relevant only in the next chapter (in which commercial policy is the explicit focus).  For present 
purposes we wish only to rely on those judgements that bear directly on private ties of cross-
border trade.  Hence we assume that it is not within the power of citizens or their governments to 
alter whatever trade stance they happen to have.  In theory, of course, it is possible to make this 
assumption without also supposing that all states have laissez-faire trade stances.  Yet it is 
difficult to envisage a plausible world of more-or-less protectionist states in which altering trade 
policy is out of the question.  Hence, laissez faire is assumed in the interests of plausibility.  
The second feature of the world of liberal trading societies that separates it from our own 
world is that there is not inter-state bargaining between states over their respective trade policies.  
This goes without saying, of course, if altering a state’s de facto commercial stance is out of the 
question.  Nevertheless, it is worth reminding the reader that, when envisaging the hypothetical 
world that is relevant in this chapter, there is no diplomatic interaction between representatives 
of different societies, nor the potential for it.  It cannot be claimed, for instance, that anything is 
owed across borders on the basis that there are mutually beneficial relationships of cooperation 
between states in this world.  This parameter is built into the world of liberal trading states so as 
to exclude moral intuitions that concern bargaining of this kind, which we set to one side until 
chapters 4 and 5.  Of course, is there is no diplomatic contact between represents of different 
societies—or the potential for it—there can be no mutually beneficial relations between states 
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outside the domain of trade either.  Nor can there be, in a world such as this, a global politico-
legal order of enforcement.  As such, there can be no distributive duties on either of these 
grounds. 
Before moving on to the substantive normative claims of this chapter, it is worth saying a 
few words about migration and immigration restrictions.  As I noted in the previous chapter, it is 
impossible to envisage an even remotely plausible world in which trade is a possibility but 
migration is not.  As such, the reader might wonder what he or she is supposed to imagine the 
world of liberal trading societies to look like in full.  Is this a world of completely open borders, 
completed closed borders, or one in which each and every society self-determines its 
immigration policy however it sees fit?  If this is a world in which it is at each society’s 
discretion to determine its immigration policy, what should the reader take to be the usual 
immigration stance?  In response to these queries, I think it is best to say that the reader should 
take it that states in the world of liberal trading societies are like states in our own world: most 
have the effective capacity to control their borders, all determine immigration policy largely 
according to what they take to be the national interest, and more affluent societies have more 
restrictive policies to protect their advantages. 
I think it best to assume that the world of liberal trading societies is like our own world in 
this respect because, despite the abstract natural of much of the analysis in this dissertation, I 
ultimately intend to be able to provide guidance to policy makers in our own world.  I don’t think 
that it is necessarily true, either, that taking the state of migration relations as being the same as 
in our own world will mean that my ideal theory must be biased towards the status quo.  Indeed, 
I think that the opposite may well be the case.  Because trade and migration are, in large part, 
economic substitutes, it may well be that the barriers to migration that I imbed in my 
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hypothetical worlds here are counterbalanced as obligations in the domain of trade are more 
generous than would otherwise be the case. 
Of course, the reader is free to make a different assumption is they wish: they may wish 
to suppose that there is justice in the domain of migration, whatever they take this to entail.  If 
this means, say, that no person who is able to find employment or buy property in another 
country should be prevented from migrating, so be it.   Adopting this assumption may mean that 
some of relations with which I am concerned in the remainder of this dissertation take on a 
different light (in moral terms).  But I leave this to the reader to judge. 
 
I. Beneficence in Trade 
Having outlined the relevant hypothetical world—which should be envisaged as generating 
judgements that drive the claims to be made in the remainder of the chapter, and which the 
reader should test these claims against—I turn first to a discussion of beneficence.  My primary 
claim here is that it is permissible to use trade to benefit the needy, as part of fulfilling one’s 
obligation of beneficence, as long as one does not use the refusal of exchange opportunities 
offered as a reason to limit one’s sacrifice overall, or exploit needy people in the process.  
Indeed, one ought to favour expressing beneficence via trade rather than transfer—within to 
these constraints—to the extent that trade enables more need to be alleviated for the same 
sacrifice.  While it is true that the primary purpose of the present chapter is to determine what 
cross-border obligations are generated by trade, if we were only to focus on this question, we 
would have forgotten a necessary preliminary.  Besides the question of what obligations are 
grounded by trade—i.e. grounded on permissible economic ties of a voluntary and mutually 
beneficial character—there is also the following: are ties of trade ever themselves obligatory? 
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 The relevant formulation of the world of liberal trading societies to keep in mind when 
addressing this question is, of course, the first—the formulation in which there is the potential to 
establish trade ties across borders, but no trade as yet.  This focus is not meant to imply that the 
extent and pattern of trade integration has no bearing on beneficence.  Indeed, in the next section 
I discuss how existing ties of trade—including ties to non-needy foreigners that are not necessary 
to further any duty—shape how need-alleviation for requisite sacrifice is to be distributed.  
Rather, the purpose of focusing on the first formulation of the world of trading societies is to 
exclude intuitions that are extraneous to the question at hand. 
 It will be recalled that the only cross-border obligation of a distributive kind that might 
pertain in a world of autarkies was the obligation of beneficence.  As such, if there is a duty of 
exchange in the first formulation of the world of liberal trading societies, it too must fall under 
beneficence.  This is because the only difference between the world of autarkies and the first 
formulation of the world of liberal trading societies is that the latter entails the potential to 
establish ties of trade, while the former does not.  As such, the first thing to note is that is no duty 
to trade with foreigners simply because they are relatively worse off—even if they are relatively 
worse off purely as a consequence of where they happen to have been born.  Because those who 
are relatively worse off have not been harmed by the affluent, and cannot claim to have been 
insufficiently benefited in cooperative relations with them, there is no basis on which someone 
who is worse off than a similarly endowed and motivated foreigner can claim entitlement to a 
trade opportunity. 
In the world of autarkies the only means to alleviate the needs of foreigners was via 
international aid.  In contrast, in the first formulation of the world of liberal trading societies 
there are two options for alleviating the needs of foreigners: besides transfer there is also the 
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option to trade.  The question, then, is the following: to the extent that we are required to 
advance the interests of the foreign needy—perhaps because few of our compatriots are needy, 
despite reasons to favour them when distributing a limited amount of assistance—is trade a 
permissible means to fulfil this duty?  After all, it might be thought that utilising trade as a means 
to alleviate the needs of others is inappropriate as an expression of beneficence.  After all, if you 
owe something to another person on the basis that that other person is entitled, by right, to have 
that thing, isn’t it impermissible to provide that thing only in exchange for a benefit to yourself?1  
To argue from analogy, consider a different obligation: the obligation not to violate the bodily 
integrity of others.  If such an obligation exists, it is, presumably, impermissible for me to 
demand payment from others—in what would amount to protection money—in return for not 
assaulting them. 
Running a protection racket is wrong on at least two grounds: first, it makes the 
fulfilment of an unconditional obligation conditional.  If an obligation to respect the bodily 
integrity of others is a binding constraint on what I may permissibly do, I may not assault 
anyone—including those who refuse to pay me protection money.  When I fail to respect the 
bodily integrity of those who refuse to pay me, I both sacrifice less than the obligation demands 
of me (assuming I gain from assaulting others) and distribute its fulfilment across persons in an 
arbitrary manner.  Second, running a protection racket wrongfully worsens the conditions of 
those who do pay up, even when their bodily integrity is not violated.  On one account they are 
harmed in a manner that constitutes an effective violation of bodily integrity (at least in the 
limiting case where they pay an amount equivalent to the disvalue inherent in being assaulted).  
                                                 
1 For circumstances in which conditional offers ought to be taken as “coercive” [I would often say “exploitative”] 
see Lyons (1975), Zimmerman (1981) , and Stevens (1988). 
90
On another account they may not have their right to bodily integrity violated, but they have 
another right violated that mutually supports the right to bodily integrity: the right against theft. 
So, one problem with expressing beneficence via exchange might be that doing so would 
entail making beneficence conditional.  Of course, often obligations are conditional by 
definition: consider an obligation of gratitude that requires expression only when one is benefited 
in the appropriate way (and not otherwise).  What exactly is required in expressing gratitude 
depends on how exactly one is benefited, and gratitude is only owed to those who provide a 
benefit (and not to others).  Indeed, even beneficence is conditional in a distributional sense: it is 
only owed to persons who are absolutely needy (and not others), with further reasons to favour 
some needy persons over others (as discussed in the previous chapter).  But, crucially, 
beneficence is not conditional in the sense of how much sacrifice it requires of us (as long as 
there are still some persons out there who stand in need).  The Principle of Sympathy does not 
permit one to sacrifice less, for instance, merely because one thinks that the needy are stubborn 
in refusing one’s offers to trade. 
Yet it is possible to admit both (a) that one may not limit the sacrifice entailed in 
fulfilling an obligation to others by attaching a condition to the fulfilment of the obligation that is 
not entailed by the obligation itself, and (b) that one may not leave another worse off than if one 
had fulfilled one’s obligation to that person unconditionally, while maintaining that beneficence 
can be appropriately expressed via trade rather than transfer, within certain parameters.  
Regarding proposition (a): it is perfectly possible to take part in exchanges with the needy, as 
part of a package of efforts to alleviate neediness, without making the extent of one’s sacrifice 
for beneficence in the aggregate conditional on receipt of benefits.  As long as one sacrifices 
sufficiently overall—filling out one’s bundle of efforts by providing transfer aid to the needy 
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where trade is not a possibility, and trading at “loss-making” prices if need be—one can still 
satisfy our the demands of the Principle of Sympathy. 
As regards (b): beneficence is owed to needy people in general—not to any particular 
needy person, at least before we take into consideration relational reasons to favour some needy 
persons over others (as when one owes someone who is, or would otherwise be, needy more than 
mere beneficence as a consequence of co-cooperation).  Not to advance the interests of a 
particular needy person because they do not have any good or service that you want to buy does 
not imply that, if one does not trade with them, one leaves them worse off than they would have 
been if you had done all that beneficence required of you unconditionally.  For if trade as a 
means for advancing the good of the needy was off the table entirely—and transfer was the only 
means to render assistance—there is no guarantee that they would be any better off.  Again, this 
is because beneficence is owed, in the first instance, to needy people as a whole. 
But having established that exchange is not impermissible as a means of alleviating need 
(as long as one does not use the refusal of exchange offers to unjustifiably limit beneficent 
sacrifice) an additional puzzle remains: how should the gains of trade be distributed when the 
needy are chosen as trade partners?  Say that, in an attempt to fulfil what beneficence requires of 
me—or, indeed, in pursuit of my self-interests—I purchase goods from needy people rather than 
others.  However, I do not pay these needy people a very good price, reasoning that more need 
can be alleviated overall if I transfer the gains I make in these exchanges to other needy people 
(say the most needy, or those who live in my community, or something of that sort).  Might it 
still be the case that I wrong those needy people whom I trade with?  In other words, does a 
needy party to exchange have a special claim on the mutual benefit generated in that exchange, 
or any other entitlement, that their exchange partner must satisfy before considering others? 
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In response to this query I would argue in the affirmative.  It is permissible to utilise trade 
in fulfilling beneficence, but one must show special concern for one’s needy trade partners.  This 
is for three reasons: first, even the non-needy are entitled to a non-exploitative return on trade (as 
I discuss in section IV below).  That one uses the gains from exploitation to assist others is not 
normally an excuse for violating another’s entitlement (just as stealing from someone in order to 
alleviate the need of someone else is not normally justified).  Second, when one’s trade partner is 
needy, a non-exploitative return is greater than it otherwise would be (as I discuss in section III 
below).  Needy persons have a special claim on the gains that they are partially responsible for 
generating that unrelated others do not.  Finally, reasons of efficiency justify favouring one’s 
trade partners over other needy strangers (discussed in section II below).  These reasons might 
provide some basis for rendering needy trade partners an even greater gain than the unusually 
generous non-exploitative return to which they are entitled because of their circumstances. 
So, it is permissible to utilise trade as a means to advance the interests of the needy as 
long as one does not use the absence of trade opportunities to arbitrarily limit one’s sacrifice and 
as long as those needy people whom one does trade with are favoured (over other needy persons) 
in the relevant way.  However this is putting it too mildly.  It is not merely permissible to use 
trade as long as these two constraints are satisfied.  The right interpretation of the Principle of 
Sympathy implies that one ought to utilise trade rather than transfer, just so long as this proves 
more effective at alleviating need for requisite sacrifice.  Now the extent to which trade is a more 
effective way of addressing people’s basic needs—within the two side-constraints just 
outlined—is an empirical question outside the remit of this project.2  Nevertheless, there are 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of this literature see Hassoun (2012, pp. 149–159).  Hassoun notes that there is scholarly 
disagreement about the extent to which free trade is good for poverty-alleviation, particularly when other ways of 
structuring trade are possible.  She also notes that regardless of what measure of poverty is used, the evidence 
indicates that the impact of trade liberalisation for the poor has been mixed. 
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some theoretical reasons to believe that there will be circumstances in which trade is preferable 
to aid. 
First, trade has a tendency to empower the poor in a way that aid does not.  Gaining via 
work rather than transfer (even if the net benefit in the short run is equivalent) provides the 
needy with practice at exercising their skills and tends to entail the transfer of norms and 
information that are conducive to productive efficiency.  It would also seem to be the case that 
gaining via work rather than transfer provides the needy with the fundamental good of self-
respect—a good without which they could not take pleasure in those projects that are expressive 
of them, even if they could be afforded.  Thirdly, to the extent that international aid must flow 
through potentially corrupt governments, advancing the interests of the foreign poor via trade 
better ensures that the gains are experienced by those who are directly entitled to them.  Finally, 
there is some evidence in behavioural economics to suggest that benefits received for a price are 
better protected by their recipients than benefits without a price, as people tend to perceive things 
that are “free” as lacking in value. 
It is also important to note that trade generates more resources to be dedicated to need 
alleviation.  Providing transfer aid to the needy inevitably eats into the fund at the disposal of the 
affluent to devote to their own projects, whereas providing help to the needy via trade does not.  
Even expressing beneficence by trading on non-exploitative terms—term that, as I argue in 
section II below, minimise need—does not draw on the background funds that the affluent 
possess.  This means that beneficence can stretch further. 
 
II. Trade and Distributing Beneficence 
In sections III and IV of this chapter, I argue that trade—voluntary and mutually beneficial 
exchange—itself grounds duties that would not otherwise exist.  When I trade with someone I 
94
establish a relationship with them that is closer than that which would exist if we were merely 
aware of one another’s circumstances and in a position to assist.  Persons whom I trade with 
benefit me.  Indeed, they do not merely benefit me.  They act so as to benefit me when—were I 
not to fulfil my end of the bargain—they would act in a different way.  In benefiting me, in other 
words, my trade partners act contrary to what they would otherwise will.  This immediately 
raises the worry that there might be circumstances in which I could rightfully be accused of using 
my trade partner.  Let us put to one side for a moment, however, the issue of what our trade 
partners—needy and non-needy—are entitled to.  Even if our trade partners did not have special 
entitlements on the basis that their cooperation with us is responsible for generating some social 
surplus, the scope of distributive concern would stretch further across the border in a world of 
liberal trading societies than it would in a world of autarkies.  This is because those reasons to 
think that it is normally most efficient to satisfy the needs of one’s compatriots first are 
counterbalanced by different reasons of efficiency. 
 First, “help those with whom one trades with first” would seem, on the fact of it, to be 
just as good a solution to the global coordination problem—the coordination problem that arises 
when there are many needy people and beneficence is owed, in the first instance, to them 
collectively—as any other.  Of course, a concern for efficiency in general might give us cause to 
adopt another rule for coordinative purposes.  Yet if we reflect on a relatively integrated world of 
liberal trading societies there is no a priori reason to favour “help the proximate first”.  If 
transaction costs—in transferring aid to a person entitled to assistance or otherwise alleviating 
their need—depend on proximity, they also depend on whether or not you are already in an 
economic relationship with that person.  Consider a case where an affluent person in the world of 
liberal trading societies purchases goods from a needy foreigner.  The fact that he or she is 
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already paying that foreigner implies that any additional transaction costs in paying that person 
more—in order to better address their needs—are negligible.  As such, paying them more may 
well mean a lesser lost in terms of efficiency than paying them less and instead providing 
transfer aid to those who are proximate.  Similarly, while it tends to be the case that one is better 
able to judge the needs of persons depending on how close they are to you—and to better ensure 
that their needs are actually met—this is not always so.  In our own world, it may well be that an 
executive of a multinational corporation who lives in New Jersey is in a much better position 
both to judge the needs of employees in Thailand, and to meet these needs, than he or she is with 
respect to a needy person in Pennsylvania.  Finally, if a certain sense of one’s own worth is to be 
counted among a person’s basic needs, and failing to be compensated in trade to a degree one 
thinks sufficient leads to a big enough loss in terms of this sense, then giving some extra weight 
to the interests of those with whom one trades is justified even if they are a member of a distant 
society. 
 
III. Favouring Needy Trade-Partners 
In section I of this chapter, I argued that trade potentially represents a permissible expression of 
the obligation of beneficence; indeed, an expression that there are reasons to favour on the basis 
that trade tends to empower the needy, and better increases the resources at the disposal of the 
fortunate to alleviate need in general.  However, I also argued that it is only permissible to 
include exchange in a bundle of efforts to help the needy as long as the following two conditions 
are satisfied.  First, one may not make the extent of one’s sacrifice to alleviate need as a whole 
dependent on the extent to which trade opportunities offered to the needy are taken up.  Even if 
one can achieve the same need-alleviation with lesser sacrifice by trading rather than providing 
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aid, this does not mean that one may cut back on one’s overall sacrifice as long as need persists.  
To the extent that exchange opportunities are absent, transfer continues to be the appropriate 
expression of beneficence, and one must sacrifice up to the maximum embodied in the correct 
principle of beneficence, unless all need is alleviated before one reaches this point.  Second, one 
must favour those needy persons one trades with over other needy people.  It would be wrong, 
for instance, to drive excruciatingly hard bargains with some needy people simply because more 
need could be alleviated if the gains of those bargains were transferred to others elsewhere.  For 
this would be to exploit the needy—to use them as mere means.3   
Why might it be necessary to show this favour?  In the previous section of this chapter, I 
provided one answer to this question, but the reasons I offered were conditional and not 
sufficient to justify favouring one’s needy trade partners in the full sense I mean to invoke here.  
Why might some needy people be entitled to something—as a matter of right—that other needy 
people are not?  And what would be the basis for a claim like this?  Part of the answer to this 
question was provided in the final section of the previous chapter and is reiterated in section IV 
below.  According to the position I seek to advance in this dissertation, when two actors 
cooperate with one another, each of them is entitled—in normal circumstances at least—to an 
equal share of the gains resulting from that cooperation.  This is as true with respect to a discrete 
trade—even if the duties grounded on this relation are often better delegated to institutions—as it 
is with respect to larger and on-going schemes of cooperation.  And it is equally true with respect 
to trade across borders as it is with respect to trade between compatriots.  Indeed, it is hard to see 
what other principle would reflect the equal moral worth of persons, even if there is likely to be 
                                                 
3 The term “exploitation’” is sometimes used to refer to harmful, fraudulent and/or coercive interactions.  However, 
here I use it to refer to exchanges that are both genuinely beneficial to both parties (relative to the status quo ex ante) 
and voluntary (once parties to exchange with greater power act on the understanding that any gains they might co-
generate in exchange must, morally speaking, be equitably divided). 
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reasonable disagreement about what would constitute an “equal” share that cannot be resolved 
prior to democratic deliberation. 
To the extent then, that the needy are poor because they receive a less than equitable 
share of the gains of trade, they are wronged even if they are benefited.  They are entitled to an 
equal share of the social gains that they are part-responsible for producing in the market.  To 
appropriate these gains in the interests of minimising need overall would be like stealing from 
one needy person to assist two others who are themselves in poverty.  Indeed it would be stealing 
from one needy person in order to help two others (albeit via exploitation rather than coercion as 
a means).  I take it that all but the most dedicated act-utilitarian admits that morality entails side-
constraints.  The libertarian, for example, is particularly concerned that no person be treated in 
way that they do not actually consent to—regardless of how much better the state of affairs 
might be if this constraint was violated.4  My account is not so different.  However, I do not take 
actual consent to be sufficient—at least when it comes to the weak—to establish that someone 
has not been treated wrongly.  One can benefit and still be wronged if one is exploited.  
Cooperative relations call into being an additional side-constraint: one that is violated if a party 
to cooperation does not receive an equitable share of the resultant gains. 
Now, there may be circumstances in which it is acceptable to exploit someone in order to 
assist needy strangers.  Say that you are very wealthy, and you do not live your life according to 
the Principle of Sympathy.  Indeed, you do not sacrifice anything for the needy.  It might be that 
in a case such as this it would be permissible for me to exploit you, at least if this would leave 
you no worse off than if you did sacrifice sufficiently for the needy (and I did not exploit you), 
and I transferred the benefits gained in exploitation to those needy people who were actually 
entitled to them.  But this non-ideal scenario is not the sort of situation we are dealing with here.  
                                                 
4 This is, of course, Nozick’s (1974) position. 
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When I trade with someone who is needy, they are under no obligation to help others, and ought, 
indeed, to be an object of beneficent concern themselves.  So it could never be claimed that 
exploiting them in order to alleviate greater need overall was merely a means to ensure that all 
persons sacrifice to the degree required of them. 
I will have more to say about what all individuals—whether needy or non-needy—are 
entitled to on the basis of the cross-border exchanges in which they take part in section IV below.  
However, the reader might wondered if the needy are entitled to more than merely an equal share 
of the gains of trade (accepting equality as the benchmark for the time being).  Say that I 
purchase something from someone who is in desperate poverty.  Mindful not to exploit, I pay 
them more than the minimum I would be able to get away with if I was only mindful not to 
violate their Lockean rights.  But what if this leaves them little better off than they were before?  
This might well be the case if what they provide me with—say a crudely made tourist trinket—is 
of so little value to me that I could do without any goods of a similar kind ever and not think 
myself more than infinitesimally worse off.  Further, because what I provide this needy person 
with is of such great value to them (say they would die without tourist dollars), an equal division 
of the gains of exchange would leave them little better off even if I valued the trinket more 
highly.  Sure, a concern for most efficiently meeting need for requisite sacrifice might justify 
prioritising this person over some other needy person.  But then again, it might not.5 
In response to this worry, I would posit that there may be grounds to think that, when one 
trades with someone who is needy, avoiding exploiting them requires more than it would if they 
                                                 
5 This is a particular problem with Bob Goodin’s account of exploitation, which he identifies as a situational wrong 
in which someone plays for advantage rather than responding to the vulnerability of another  in the appropriate way, 
as by rendering assistance—see Goodin (1985, pp.32–38, 1987).  Because Goodin argues from utilitarian premises, 
he leaves open the possibility that it is not wrong to fail to appropriately respond to the particular vulnerability of 
someone who is dependent on me if more need can alleviated overall in some other way—for instance, by exploiting 
one needy person in order to better assist two others in need.  For this and other criticisms of Goodin’s position, see 
Sample (2003, pp. 39–54). 
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were not in need.  Specifically, in the circumstances where one party to trade is needy—and 
would be needy even if gains were equally distributed—a more than equal return is necessary to 
avoid the charge that one is using one’s trade partner as a mere means.  Indeed, I think it 
reasonable to say that if an equal division of gain with one’s trade partner would still leave them 
needy, they are entitled to whatever further share of the gains of trade is necessary to minimise 
need. 
This principle proceeds from the judgement that needy people have a special claim over 
the gains that they are partially responsible for creating—via cooperation with others on the 
market—that non-needy others do not.  Imagine that you live in a state of nature, and cooperate 
with a number of others in farming a particular area.  Further suppose that each person in this 
group works a similar number of hours, and functionally differentiated tasks are rotated among 
the members of the group such that it cannot be said that one person’s work is more burdensome 
than that of any of the others.  Also suppose that, come harvest time, the grain that has been 
grown is equally divided among the group.  Now, normally speaking, I think, this would be fair.  
But what if you had an inherited illness, which meant that you needed much more grain to 
achieve the same level of functioning as your peers?  Indeed, what if you needed at least 
somewhat more grain to satisfy your basic needs? 
If the reader is tempted to think that anything that might be owed to a needy person in 
such circumstances would be owed on the basis of beneficence—and that an equal division of 
the grain would not be unjust in itself—we can accommodate this thought while still maintaining 
that a needy person has a special claim to any economic gains he or she is responsible for 
generating that outside others do not.6  Say that once the grain in our example is equally divided, 
all other members of the group—apart from yourself—are well enough off such that they ought, 
                                                 
6 This seems to be Jeremy Snyder’s (2008) position. 
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under the Principle of Sympathy, to give some of their grain to the needy.  Now imagine that 
there are two outsiders in the state of nature who are, through no fault of their own, just as badly 
off as you are with only your equal share of grain.  Further suppose that your partners in 
cooperation can either help both of these outsiders or help you; were they to do both they would 
sacrifice more than it is reasonable to demand of them.  I think there is a fair chance the reader 
will be tempted to think that your partners in cooperation should help you. 
When one’s trade partner is needy, then, they are owed more than merely the minimum 
price that they would acquiesce to.  And it is easy to see why people might frequently fail to 
fulfil this duty.  Needy people are uniquely vulnerable in their economic relations.  Their lack of 
resources places them in a position where they can ill afford to abstain from trade, either in a 
particular instance or good, or overall.  In contrast, the affluent can always walk away from a 
putatively beneficial trade opportunity, reasoning that enough of their wants are satisfied already.  
The needy are also in a weak bargaining position to the extent that their poverty impacts their 
market power.  Unlike the affluent, they cannot afford to delay in order to shop around amongst 
alternative opportunities, or in order to put pressure on potential trade partners to compete with 
one another.  Finally, the needy are uniquely vulnerable to the extent that their poverty is a 
consequence of their lack of alternative market opportunities.  This means they will acquiesce to 
exchange terms that do not reflect an even minimally equitable division of the gains that would 
be generated if they did trade.7 
 
  
                                                 
7 The point that market outcomes might be undermined by a deficiency in consent—within a particular transaction 
rather than over the social structure as per the social contract tradition— has often been made.  Debra Satz (2010) 
has labelled this the vulnerable objection.  Sandel (1998) calls it, less helpfully perhaps, the coercion objection. 
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IV Exploitation 
Thus far in this dissertation I have considered only cross-border obligations that are owed to 
those who are needy in absolute terms, and not obligations to anyone else—including those who 
are worse off merely because they happened to be a member of one society rather than another.  
This is because there are no obligations of the latter kind in either the world of autarkies or the 
first formulation of the world of liberal trading societies.  As I have noted previously, this is for 
three reasons.  First, in neither of these worlds do individuals or states exercise force across the 
border, or adversely impact other societies through negative externalities of an economic or 
environmental kind.  As a consequence, no person in either the world of autarkies or the first 
formulation of the world of trading societies is worse off than they would be if no other society 
existed, and therefore no one can justifiably claim to be owed anything by way of rectification.  
Second, in neither of these hypothetical worlds is there cooperation across the border, either 
between individuals—in the form of market exchanges—or between states.  Indeed, the latter is 
not even a possibility.  As such, there is no basis on which an individual or government might 
claim that, while they have not been harmed, they have been taken advantage of.  Finally, there 
is no comprehensive politico-legal system globally to ensure that people are legally deterred 
from committing wrongs.  The de facto global political order is self-sustaining, as it were. 
In the second formulation of the world of liberal trading societies, however, 
circumstances are different.  It remains the case that there is no comprehensive politico-legal 
system globally, nor any international institutions that might share relevant features with such a 
system.  However, there are cross-border interactions between individuals.  Specifically, and in 
contrast to the world of autarkies and the first formulation of the world of liberal trading 
societies, there is interpersonal trade between members of different societies.  In this context, 
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international inequalities are not purely a function of the separate development of separate 
societies.  How well off any particular individual is depends, at least in part, on the particular 
exchanges that that person has engaged it, and the terms of those exchanges. 
Now, there is no reason to think that, simply because there is now trade across 
international borders, some patterned conception of distributive justice ought to be implemented 
globally, as a Rawlsian cosmopolitan might maintain.  To see why, imagine that two societies in 
the world of liberal trading societies are extensively trade-integrated (indeed, fairly trade-
integrated, such that no person receives less than an equitable share of the gains of exchange).  
However, there is a minority in both societies who do not participate in trade.  Now, if we were 
to compare similarly endowed and motivated members of these two minorities, and were to 
happen upon putatively unfair inequalities, it is not clear how the fact that some other people 
trade with one another is meant to be morally relevant.  If, in other words, the fact that someone 
is worse off than a similarly motivated and talented member of another society does not 
represent an injustice in the world of autarkies, it is unclear why it would represent an injustice in 
a world in which some people trade across borders, but not the particular persons we are 
comparing. 
It is not clear, either, than the fact that two persons do trade with one another establishes 
some duty to neutralise brute luck.  Say that I employ in my business someone who is very 
similar to me, but, as a consequence of a sudden illness when they were younger, they had to 
drop out of university and never completed their degree.  Further, say that if they had completed 
their degree, they would have been a manager themselves.  However, as they did not, they are 
only qualified to work in a role that is normally less well-paid.  Now it doesn’t seem evident to 
me that simply because that person is no less motivated or (inherently) talented than I am—but 
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not in a position to effectively work in a greater role—I ought to pay them more than I otherwise 
would (indeed, more than me, presumably, given that they work in a less fulfilling role). 
However, I do think that trade grounds obligations that would not otherwise exist—
obligations that unite parties to trade even if they are members of different societies and even if 
no one is in absolute need.  I gave a sketch of these obligations and their basis both earlier in this 
chapter and in discussing duties among compatriots in the world of autarkies.  Specifically, I 
claimed that when two actors trade with one another, the gains of exchange ought to be equally 
divided, on pain of exploitation.  In other words, it is still possible to wrong one’s trade partner 
even if you benefit them just so long as they are not adequately compensated. 
Now, in one sense people who trade “use” or “exploit” one another whatever the terms on 
which they exchange.8  After all, by definition trade is a largely impersonal means by which 
strangers might advance their respective self-interests.  And it not as if the trade relation is 
something of value in itself, as personal relationships—as with family, friends, and even 
colleagues—might be thought to be.  But we usually distinguish between a transaction that is 
merely one of use and a transaction that is one of mere use (to employ the language of Kant’s 
categorical imperative).  Or we make a distinction between a transaction that is one in which I 
exploit an opportunity to trade, and one in which I exploit a person when trading with them.9  
The question remains, however, where to draw the line between the two. 
At first glance an appealing way to distinguish between the two is to say that as long as 
one’s trade partner voluntarily assents to particular terms, those terms cannot be wrongfully 
exploitative—whatever the background circumstances happen to be.10  But this is not adequate.  
                                                 
8 Sample (2003, p. 12). 
9 For distinctions of this kind, see O’Neill (1985), Goodin (1987), and Wood (1995). 
10 Alan Wertheimer (1996) claims that the competitive market price is necessarily non-exploitative—arguing that it 
is important to distinguish between exploitation and “background injustice”.  This approach is in obvious tension 
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Someone might assent to a particular trade and still be wronged.  Surely I wrong someone if I 
fail to net-benefit them when we trade—say because they are irrational or ill-informed—
regardless of whether the exchange was voluntary or not.  So, one might think that there are 
actually two conditions that must be satisfied if an exchange is to avoid the charge of 
exploitation: first, both parties must actually consent to the transaction; and second, both parties 
must actually gain.  I don’t take that this to be particularly controversial.  Indeed, it is a necessary 
first step in developing the account of the distinction between permissible exchange and 
wrongful exploitation that I offer here. 
Yet we are not all the way there.  Even a libertarian would accept a duty to fulfil 
whatever exchange terms parties to trade happened to agree to.  Indeed, they might also accept 
that one must actually benefit one’s trade partner, in the sense of leaving them better off than the 
status quo ex ante.  To the extent that a libertarian is concerned about blackmail they are 
concerned about this.  But the duty a libertarian would accept is not nearly as generous as the one 
I mean to invoke here.  If a duty to abide by agreed trade terms—whatever those terms happened 
to be—was all that trade grounded, it would not make much sense to say that trade-integration 
expands the scope of distributive concern.  There wouldn’t be any basis, for instance, on which 
we could criticise trade in our own world, except to the extent that it results in environmental 
damage or generates other harmful side-effects that ought to be rectified.  Yet besides a duty to 
abide by fair terms, there is the prior question of what counts as fair terms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the relational perspective I pursue here, according to which whether or not there is background distributive 
injustice is a function, in large part, of whether and the extent to which people are and have been exploited.  Hillel 
Steiner (1984, 1987) has argued for the market price (whether arrived at in a competitive context or not) on 
libertarian grounds.  He argues that exploitation occurs only if the price deviates as a consequence of violations of 
negative rights (as when, for instance, you are only able to employ me for a lower wage because you successful 
coerce your competitors into withdrawing their wage offers).  In response, I argue that the price is still exploitative if 
it deviates as a consequence of violations of “positive” rights grounded on relations.  David Miller (1987) argues for 
the market price on a conventionalist basis. 
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Where my account of the distinction between trade and exploitation differs from the 
libertarian account is in the baseline that I would use to determine whether, and the extent to 
which, each party gains from trade, and in the following additional stipulation: at least in normal 
circumstances, the gains from trade must be equally divided, even if there are some other terms 
on which both parties would agree.  Many scholars, not merely libertarians, tend to take the 
alternative course of events had a particular exchange not occurred—assuming that no one’s 
Lockean rights are violated during that course of events—as the appropriate baseline from which 
to assess trade gains.  They take, in other words, an actor’s actual reserve price or BATNA as the 
point from which to determine how much they would gain from exchange on a certain set of 
terms.  But for reasons first addressed in the previous chapter, this is inadequate. 
Consider again the example in which I work in your store for the market wage.  While I 
am undoubtedly better off than if I would be if didn’t have a job (the status quo ex ante)—and at 
least no worse off than I would be if I worked elsewhere (the alternative course of events)—it 
isn’t clear to me that you don’t exploit me.  Say that if you were prevented from employing 
anyone in your store, and had to undertake every task yourself, you would barely be able to 
cover your costs.   However, with me stacking shelves you are able to make a tidy profit.  Now, 
it isn’t clear to me that $10 is necessarily a reasonable return.  Although there is someone else 
out there willing to work for this wage—and in this sense you would be worse off if you paid me 
more—as long as I am the one stacking the shelves this seems beside the point.  The point is that 
even if you paid me more you would still be better off than if you employed no shelf-stacker at 
all. 
Now, when one looks at things this way, there is always going to be a range of potential 
treaty terms that are consistent with mutual benefit, and which might potentially be consented 
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to—even in a perfectly competitive market.  The question is, which of these terms represents 
equitable terms?  On the basis that persons are moral equals, the most reasonable thing to say is 
that those terms should be selected that represent an equal division of the net-gains of exchange, 
at least unless there are some special circumstances that would justify some other distribution (as 
would be the case if one party was needy, or so I argued above).11  Why should it be, for 
instance, that how much one party gains relative to the other depends on how aggressive that 
person is in bargaining?12  Or why should it be that one party reaps a greater share of the gains of 
exchange merely because they have relatively greater market power?  Indeed, even if neither 
party has market power—as the market in which they operate is competitive—why should it be 
that how much you or I gain when trading with one another depends on the worse terms that 
some outsider would accept?  Thus, at least when one views things from the perspective of the 
less-advantaged party to exchange, actual consent is insufficient to establish that a benefiting 
exchange is non-exploitative. 
I do not seek to definitively define what would constitute an equal division of the gains of 
private trade here.  Indeed, I suspect that this is not a matter that ought to be resolved prior to 
democratic deliberation in some appropriate forum.  Nevertheless, I do think it is important to 
say a few words concerning alternative interpretations of equality in this context, not least to 
remind the reader that accepting that trade gains should be “equally divided” is only a first step.  
First, we should be clear that we are taking about net gains.  When I work for you I endure the 
                                                 
11 That an equal division is that division that best reflects the moral equality of persons—rather than merely 
representing an obvious focal point in bargaining—may be so obvious as not to require a defence.  James (2012, pp. 
135–138) briefly discusses the appeal of equality on deontological rather than consequentialist grounds in Fairness 
in Practice. 
12 Even contractarians have resisted the thought that, when there is some social surplus to be divided—as, for the 
libertarian, in cases where there is imperfect competition, or market failure requires non-excludable goods being 
supplied in some other way—that a defensible bargaining outcome is whatever it happens to be.  An underlying 
concern for fairness, for instance, appears to motivate David Gauthier’s (1986) development of minimax relative 
concession.  A philosophical worry about interpersonal utility comparisons alone would be insufficient to justify this 
discussion given Gauthier’s central aim: to arrive at a moral theory on the basis of collective self-interest alone. 
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burden (presumably) of shelf-stacking.  But how much of a loss are we to consider this to be?  
The fact that there are likely to be some jobs that are more enjoyable and fulfilling than others—
indeed, perhaps some jobs that it might be worth paying to do—complicates matters 
considerably. 
Second, even were we to focus exclusively on the benefits of trade—those that must be 
weighed against costs (and contrasted with the baseline established above) to determine how 
much anyone net-gains in exchange—there would still be the problem of what metric to employ.  
Should we use the market value of these benefits, or some other metric?  Say that you employ 
me in your store and, at the end of the year, I take home $40,000 while you take home $60,000.  
Is this inevitably an unequal division?  Say that members of your close family live in a number 
of different countries, such that if you want to maintain the sort of close relationship with them 
as I do with my family, you have to pay out several thousand dollars each year to pay for flights.  
In a case like this you might argue that an unequal division in terms of dollars is actually an 
equal division in terms of welfare. 
On the other hand, say that even at the beginning of this year you were exceedingly 
wealthy, while I was rather poor.  As a consequence of diminishing marginal utility in income, it 
might be thought that a 40/60 division is an equal division even if I have less expensive 
preferences than you.  For every extra dollar that I get this year is worth less to me (on account 
of my already abundant wealth) as it is to you.  Considerations such as these would point towards 
using utility as the metric on which to equally divide trade gains rather than dollars (either by 
directly comparing persons’ wellbeing or via the method of David Gauthier’s minimax relative 
concession). 
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So, trade across international borders in the world of liberal trading societies expands the 
scope of distributive concern by grounding an obligation—incumbent on affluent parties to trade 
and owed to the particular foreigners with whom they trade—to equally divide the gains of 
exchange.  However, the reader does not have to accept that trade gains (i.e. gains relative to the 
baseline discussed above, not each party’s actual reserve price) have to be equally divided to 
accept that there is something about trade in our own world that is unjust.  Even if one thinks that 
various of one’s compatriots are fairly benefited in the market without receiving a return that 
reaches the threshold of equality I am in favour of, there would still be cause to wonder why is 
should be acceptable for foreigners to receive less than compatriots in otherwise similar 
exchanges.13  Why should it be, in other words, that a foreigner is paid less for the same work 
than an equally hard-working and talented compatriot, merely because there are fewer and worse 
alternative opportunities for a livelihood in the society in which he or she happens to have been 
born, or because that foreigner must compete with a multitude of others in a way that my 
compatriot does not?  Isn’t it wrong, in other words, that someone receive less than an equal 
share of the gains of exchange merely because of where they happen to have been born, even if 
such a shortfall on other grounds would pass muster? 
Consider again the case of two persons, equally talented and with the same desires and 
work ethic, but reaping unequal returns due to the fact that each happens to belong to a different 
society.  Perhaps this is because the return accruing to equivalent positions in the two societies is 
the same, but one society better approaches equality of fair opportunity than the other.14  Or 
                                                 
13 Simon Caney (2005, p. 123) has argued that there should be equal remuneration—if not equal pay (in US dollar 
terms say)—for equal work, regardless of where in the world that work is undertaken.  I am sympathetic to this 
position (see my discussion of equality of gain in terms of equivalency rather than identity below).  However, note 
that my principle only covers exchanges across borders.  And even then, what is equitable will depend on which 
particular border the exchanges cross (as the relevant comparison is between compatriot and foreigners).  For 
criticism of a position like Caney’s, see Lehman’s (1985) engagement of Henry Shue. 
14 On equality of fair opportunity: Rawls (1999, pp. 73–78). 
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perhaps both societies are equally just in this sense, but one is uniformly poorer than the other, 
such that each position in its socio-economic distribution receives a lesser return than that which 
accrues to the equivalent position in the wealthier society.  Either way, isn’t it unfair that one 
person receives less than another as a consequence of the morally arbitrary fact of societal 
membership, just as it would be unfair for one person to receive less than an otherwise similar 
other on account of race, gender, or sexual-orientation within the same society? 
While I have argued that an inequality of this kind can be unfair without being unjust, it 
would be wrong to take advantage of this unfairness merely in order to reap a greater share of the 
gains of trade for oneself.  And to the extent that persons fail to fulfil this obligation in 
international trade, it can no longer be said that unfair inequalities across international borders 
are not justice apt, at least in part.  To the extent that someone is worse off than an otherwise 
similar foreigner because they have been exploited, they have a claim to have been wronged that 
someone equally worse off in a world of autarkies would not. 
For illustration of this argument, consider the following analogy from the domestic 
context.  Imagine that you are an employer who needs to fill a position in your firm.  You have 
interviewed numerous candidates, and of the two you are considering for the position, one is a 
man, and the other, a woman.  Now, you are considering what wage to offer to each.  You realise 
that because of discriminatory conditions in your society as a whole—conditions that you have 
opposed, let us say, in the your capacity as a citizen—the woman’s bargaining position is worse 
than the man’s, such that she would accept a lower wage than the man for doing an equally good 
job.  Now, it seems to me that it would be wrong for you to take advantage of the woman’s 
bargaining weakness so as to employ her for a lesser wage than one would the man, the revenue 
of your firm held constant.  Even though you are not responsible for her bargaining weakness, 
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you would still do wrong to take advantage of it to benefit yourself at her expense.  Further, if 
you were to employ the woman instead of the man, and pay her a lower wage than you would the 
man, you could no longer claim that the fact that she was worse off than equally talented and 
motivated men in your society had nothing to do with you. 
The implication of this argument is that even if foreigners are not entitled to an equal 
share of the gains of exchange, they are, at a minimum, entitled to what would be theirs if only 
an accident of birth did not leave then with an arbitrarily worse bargaining position—all things 
being equal, at least.  Now, at first glance this claim might seem very unattractive.  For it does 
not dictate that foreigners who would otherwise be paid less must necessarily be made better off.  
As the duty is conditional on the tie of trade being in place, one does not violate it if one refrains 
from trade.  So it might be suspected that if the affluent were actually to live by this principle, 
relatively disadvantaged foreigners would not be made better off through higher returns, but 
worse off via fewer trade opportunities.  Even if we put to one side the fact that beneficence 
likely dictates that the affluent ought to trade with the poorest countries—even at “loss-making” 
prices—can a principle really be plausible that, if acted upon, would remove trade opportunities 
from the relatively disadvantaged?  Given the importance of trade to development, wouldn’t this 
like pulling out the rug from under the less affluent’s feet? 
There are a number of things to say in response to this objection.  First, and most 
obviously, there are greater costs involved in doing business across the border that must be 
factored into the analysis.15  When goods are traded across international borders, there are a 
variety of transaction costs that come into play, including duties, fees to exchange currencies, the 
risk of exchange rate fluctuation, and transportation costs.  As a consequence, it is not 
appropriate simply to contrast, for example, an American factory worker’s pay with a 
                                                 
15 R. Miller (2010, p. 64). 
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Vietnamese factory worker’s pay.  The former is located in the destination market (let us say), 
while the other is thousands of miles away in a different political and economic jurisdiction.  We 
must remember, in other words, that a non-exploitative return is one that equitably divides the 
net-gains of trade. 
Second, there are a variety of reasons that foreigners might be paid less than compatriots 
were (or would be, if trading with foreigners was out of the question) that are consistent with the 
right interpretation of this principle.  First, if there are no terms on which it is possible—or no 
longer possible—to trade with a compatriot that are compatible with mutual benefit, then it is not 
impermissible to pay a foreigner less.  If we were merely looking at trade in consumption goods, 
it would be difficult to envisage circumstances in which it would not be possible to find some set 
of exchange terms consistent with mutual benefit vis-à-vis a compatriot when some such terms 
could be found with respect to a foreigner (at least when benefits are calculated relative to the 
low baseline introduced previously for determining what constitutes exploitation).  However, 
much trade across international borders is in the form of inputs or intermediary goods.  How 
much of a surplus is generated in an exchange involving goods such as these—or directly in a 
labour contract—depends ultimately on what sort of return can be had in the market for the final 
output.  Now, in circumstances where there is no assurance that your competitors will abide by 
their obligation not to exploit, and they can use a cost advantage gained from exploitation to 
undercut you in the market for the final output, paying someone less than what would be non-
exploitative if there was such assurance does not mean actually exploiting them.  This is because 
when there is pressure from less scrupulous competitors, the gains of cooperation are not as great 
as they otherwise would be, even relative to the appropriate baseline. 
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In other words, when we see jobs move offshore, with foreigners doing work for lower 
wages than compatriots previously did—or would do if international trade was out of the 
question, perhaps—this does not necessarily mean that exploitation is occurring, even by the 
minimal standard where all that exploitation requires is that foreigners are not treated differently 
than compatriots.  If it is no longer possible for a business to survive employing compatriots at 
going rates, then there is little to object to (for where is the mutual benefit to be divided equitably 
here?).  If the choice, however, is between employing compatriots at a higher wage while reaping 
a lower profit, and foreigners at a lower wage while reaping a higher profit, then exploitation of 
foreigners is occurring.  Even when competition in markets for outputs is fierce, however, we all 
have a duty in our political capacity to push for a political order that provides assurance that no 
one will undercut other producers by exploiting workers or suppliers of inputs.  To the extent 
that there is trade across international borders, this is a duty to establish and/or support the 
appropriate sort of order globally. 
Third, it should be remembered that, at least in the world of liberal trading societies, 
compatriots still owe one another duties that foreigners do not, even if that world is densely 
integrated, at long as this integration is purely in terms of interpersonal trade.  For it is only 
domestically that there is a cooperative scheme for the provision of public or common goods.  
Now, what goods a state may or ought to supply directly—rather than being left to the market—
is outside the remit of this project.16  However, say that it is permissible for a society to provide 
unemployment benefits to its citizens, and one country does so as part of providing a bundle of 
goods that net-benefit each citizen equitably overall.  Further, say that as a consequence of these 
unemployment benefits, there are some occupations that persons in that society would never opt 
                                                 
16 For a position on one extreme of this debate, see Schmidtz (1991).  Schmidtz argues that even non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous goods might be supplied without state coercion via an assurance contract.  For positions at the other 
end of this debate, see Anderson (1993), Satz (2010), and Sandel (2012). 
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for.  Even if they could sell the goods generated in those roles on equitable terms, they would 
still be worse off than if they continued on unemployment benefits.  Now it doesn’t seem to me 
that if foreigners are willing to produce and trade the same goods on the same (again, equitable) 
terms that they are being exploited.  Even if it is unfair that foreigners don’t have these 
unemployment benefits themselves, one is not wrongfully leveraging this unfairness as long as 
foreigners are offered terms that equally divided the gains of exchange. 
The other thing to note about justifiable public-good provision amongst compatriots, is 
that it might be permissible to secure the equivalent of equal net-gains in public-good terms by 
ensuring that people who would otherwise be relatively disadvantaged are rewarded on the 
market (rather than directly in terms of public-good provision).  Picture a society in which a lot 
of taxpayer money is spend on infrastructure and public services, but as things stand, only those 
people who lives in or near cities really benefit from this expenditure.  People living in rural 
areas and remote communities still contribute an equal share in tax dollars, but don’t see much 
benefit in return. 
Now it seems to me that there are two ways in which the unfair division of public-good 
gain here might be made equitable.  One would be to extend public benefits to those living in 
rural areas and remote communities directly.  For example, the government could build railways 
in those remote areas and communities, and establish postal services there, despite the fact that, 
say, no private business would find it profitable to do so.  But another way to ensure that people 
living in rural areas and remote communities are not inequitably disadvantaged would be via 
measures to ensure that they receive higher market returns than they otherwise would.  Say that 
rural residents are not owed more on the grounds that otherwise they would be exploited within 
the market.  They might still be owed more overall on the basis that otherwise their compatriots 
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would exploit them, via the state, in terms of public-good provision.  In a case like this, for 
instance, a country might want to level tariffs in order to ensure that compatriots receive a better 
return on their goods.  (I discuss what might be problematic about this option in Chapter 4). 
Fourth, it is worth recalling, in this connection, the argument made in the previous 
chapter that merely because a foreigner is paid less than a compatriot in dollar terms, where 
output return and costs are otherwise equal, is no reason to think that they do not net-gain to a 
sufficient degree.  Even if it seems wrong to think that the right way of defining equality when it 
comes to dividing the gains of exchange is in subjective terms (rather than in terms of an 
objective currency)—on the basis that to do so would unfairly disadvantage those who are 
already relatively disadvantaged (as a consequence of diminishing marginal utility in income or 
due to adaptive preferences)—it may still be that dollar-value is not the right metric to go by.  It 
may be that the best basis on which to compare otherwise similar persons across international 
borders is not in terms of dollar gain—even at purchasing-power-parity, although this is a first 
step—but according to their position without the socio-economic hierarchy of their own society.  
If, for example, what is paid to workers in sneaker factories in America enables them to maintain 
a position in the middle class of their society, then, at a minimum, and all things being equal, 
sneaker workers in Southeast Asia should be compensated to a degree sufficient for them to 
achieve a similar position, albeit on the terms of their own society. 
Now, it might be that even once all these factors are taken into consideration, were 
people to fully integrate a concern for exploitation into the way they lead their lives, some trades 
would no longer take place that otherwise would.  A commitment to relational obligations 
necessarily entails this.  But I’m not sure there is reason to think that moving to a moral standard 
incorporating a concern for exploitation will systematically disadvantage relatively poorer 
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foreigners.  Notice that even if it is accepted that, at a minimum, I should not remunerate foreign 
exchange partners to a lesser degree than exchange partners who are my compatriots—all things 
being equal—this does not necessarily mean that I will only trade with my compatriots.  It is not 
as if I am permitted to exploit my compatriots, but not foreigners, such that all other things being 
equal, I will always trade with my compatriots.  A requirement not to exploit applies to each and 
every possible transaction that I might take part in, and so it can’t be escaped entirely as long as I 
rely on others to provide for my wants and needs.  When foreigners are in a position to offer 
goods that compatriots are not—as a consequence of their comparative advantage—or can offer 
similar goods of greater quality and higher value, trade opportunities will flow to them. 
 
V. Exploitation and Injustice Abroad 
In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that it is wrong to take advantage of the arbitrary 
difference in bargaining power that is societal membership in order to appropriate more than 
one’s fair share of the gains of exchange.  This extends not simply to cases in which the society 
of the relatively disadvantaged party to trade is poorer in general.  As noted in passing earlier, it 
also covers cases in which a party to cross-border exchange is relatively disadvantaged because 
his or her society does not approximate equality of fair opportunity (domestically) to so great a 
degree.  This is a necessary extension of my theory to the partially non-ideal circumstances in 
which foreign societies are unjust. 
But it is possible, of course, to envisage circumstances in which cross-border inequality is 
generated by conditions of injustice in poorer societies that go beyond a failure to ensure that 
positions are open to all on more than merely a formal basis.17  Consider, for example, societies 
in which there is formal discrimination on the basis of caste, race, ethnicity, or religion.  Or 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of this problem that leads to similar conclusions as mine, see Risse (2007, pp. 361–365). 
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consider countries governed by authoritarian regimes, in which leaders exploit their own people 
and/or violate their negative rights by appropriating their goods or enslaving them.  In cases such 
as these, oppressed people, whether members of minority groups or otherwise, will be 
particularly susceptible to being taken advantage of by affluent foreigners on account of their 
peculiar bargaining weakness. 
So, to be clear: the requirement not to engage in wrongful exploitation it intended to 
cover cases of these kinds—cases in which trade is being conducted with persons subject to 
injustice beyond mere unfairness in opportunity—as well as cases in which the relative 
bargaining weakness of the poorer party to cross-border exchange is purely a function of their 
being born into a society that is just, but happens to be poorer.  In other words, when trading with 
persons who are subject to injustice, one is not permitted to take advantage of their situation to 
pay them less than one would if their society was just, any more than one is permitted to pay 
them less on account of the fact that their society happens to be poorer in general (all other things 
being equal). 
 But a tricky problem arises when the affluent are in a position to trade with victims of 
injustice abroad, but conditions do not enable the affluent to avoid exploitation if they take 
advantage of this opportunity.  This is particularly likely to be a problem when disadvantaged 
foreigners are subject to oppression by their governments, rather than being discriminated 
against on the basis of their race or religion in the private sphere.  Consider, for instance, the case 
of affluent persons who are considering employing victims of injustice abroad, but the only 
cross-border labour contracts that are politically feasible lead to insufficient gains on the part of 
workers by the standard of non-exploitation outlined in the previous section of this chapter.  Say 
that the authoritarian regime that is responsible for the injustice in question—picture Burma or 
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even China—acts as a gate-keeper in transactions of this kind, only allowing terms of exchange 
that entail their skimming off some proportion of what the workers are ultimately entitled to. 
What are we to say in this case?  While troubling, there are reasons to believe that cross-
border trade with victims of injustice is not necessarily impermissible in this case.  First and 
foremost, to the extent that cross-border trade benefits victims of injustice—and exchange is 
certainly impermissible if this is not so—it provides them with a means to alleviate their 
situation.  Having said this, parties to trade with victims of injustice when there is gate-keeping 
behaviour of this kind may not engage in exchange if doing so empowers the authoritarian 
regime in the sense that it exacerbates injustice overall.  After all, even a gate-keeping contract 
that allows some gain to the particular victims of injustice that are implicated in that contract 
may exacerbate the situation of other victims to the extent that it provides the regime with more 
resources to prosecute wrongs. 
In addition, when the affluent choose to participate in gate-kept exchanges of this kind, 
they still have a responsibility to avoid wrongful exploitation to the extent that they are able.  For 
example, if the terms of a gate-kept exchange are such that the globally affluent accrue a greater 
gain than they are entitled to by the non-exploitative standard outlined in the previous section of 
this chapter, they have a responsibility to devote the proportion of the gain to which their trade 
partners are entitled to efforts to alleviate the relevant injustice, and/or to set aside those funds 
until such a time as they can be returned to those who are rightfully entitled to them. 
Thus far I have discussed cases in which there is potential for trade, directly or indirectly, 
with victims of injustice abroad.  But what about cases in which there is the potential for 
mutually beneficial cross-border exchange with members of unjust societies who are 
beneficiaries of that injustice?  Consider the case of authoritarian regimes that treat the country’s 
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natural resources like the private property of the favoured, selling those resources on the global 
market so as to profit the ruler and his supporters.18  Or consider the case in which what is 
offered by beneficiaries of injustice on global markets is the product of domestic exploitation, 
theft, or enslavement.  Trading with beneficiaries of injustice in cases such as these is surely akin 
to trading in stolen goods, and therefore impermissible? 
It would certainly be wrong to extend an exchange offer to a potential beneficiary of 
injustice abroad if offering that opportunity was what incentivised injustice.  Yet it is possible to 
envisage circumstances in which trading in a good to which one’s exchange partner is not 
entitled—that good being, rather, a benefit accrued from injustice domestically—does not 
facilitate wrongdoing in this way.  Say that the injustice in question was politically motivated, 
such that it would occur whether there was a potential for international trade or not.  Or say that 
there were less discerning trade partners out there, who would step in and purchase the goods 
gained wrongfully if you refrained from doing so (an assurance problem in non-ideal theory).  In 
a case like this, I posit that it is permissible to trade, but only on the right sort of terms.  These 
terms are those that would enable the affluent to set aside funds to compensate victims of 
injustice if and when this should be possible.  Indeed, I would have thought it is permissible to 
push for maximum advantage with the beneficiaries of injustice abroad—rather than abiding by 
the usual norm of non-exploitation—to enable this. 
 
                                                 
18 Wenar (2008). 
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Chapter 3 – A World of Protectionist States 
 
In the last chapter, I attempted to determine how both the potential and practice of interpersonal 
trade might call for pre-existing duties across borders to be reinterpreted, or generate new 
obligations that would not exist in the absence of trade.  In order to pinpoint the relevant moral 
intuitions, I re-modelled my hypothetical archipelago—an archipelago in which all societies 
were originally autarkic—so as to admit private exchange across borders, but exclude all other 
ties relevant in our own world, including those ties that might be generated by a state capacity to 
exercise commercial-policy choice.  In other words, I asked the reader to contemplate a world in 
which each state’s commercial policy was de facto laissez faire—on account of the primitive 
state of social-scientific knowledge and institutional development—but in which there was, 
nevertheless, cross-border trade between individuals.  I then asked the reader to consider whether 
affluent individuals in such a world would owe foreigners anything more than they would owe 
them even if every society was economically autarkic: namely the most effective assistance to 
alleviate absolute neediness—although not to reduce arbitrary inequality—up to a point where 
sacrificing more would mean going beyond would be too costly from the standpoint of the 
Principle of Sympathy. 
My own response to this amended hypothetical world—which I called the world of 
liberal trading societies—led me to claim that, indeed, the potential or practice of interpersonal 
trade across borders expands the scope of distributive concern.  First, to the extent that the 
potential for trade provides the affluent with a new means beyond transfer to advance the 
interests of the needy—by purchasing the goods they produce, for instance—the duty of 
beneficence must be reinterpreted.  As long as needy producers are not exploited (i.e. provided 
with less than that share of the gains of exchange that would minimise their need), trade should 
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be preferred to transfer as long as this enables more to be achieved, in terms of need alleviation, 
for requisite sacrifice.  Second, and more significantly, trade grounds an obligation incumbent on 
parties to private exchange to ensure that the gains of exchange are equitably distributed, on pain 
of exploitation.  This is a duty that would exist, of course, even if every society was 
economically autarkic, but it would naturally apply only between compatriots.  The advent of 
international trade generates, therefore, a new obligation in the international context. 
Avoiding exploitation is not merely a matter of ensuring that, when one’s trade partner is 
poor in absolute terms, the gains of exchange are distributed in such a way as to minimise need.  
This is because fairness is a value that applies to all cooperative interactions and endeavours, not 
simply those in which one or more of the participating parties is needy.  It is possible, in other 
words, to exploit someone in a market transaction even if they are not in need.  Now, in the 
previous chapter I noted that it is only possible to give a tentative account of exploitation in this 
dissertation.  Nevertheless, I provided reason to doubt that the market price, or competitive 
market price, is necessarily non-exploitative.  It is unlikely that actual alternatives to an exchange 
on particular terms—i.e. how well off a party would be if they traded with someone else on the 
basis of the best terms available to them (without violating anyone’s negative rights)—
determines what constitutes a fair price in that exchange. 
There doesn’t seem to be any good reason, for instance, why a foreigner should receive 
less than a relevantly similar compatriot—when the social surplus generated if trade occurred 
would be the same—merely because his or her society happens to be poorer in general, or 
because his or her society approximates equality of fair opportunity to a lesser degree.  Even if 
one does not accept that trade gains should be equally distributed, in other words, there doesn’t 
seem to be a basis on which one could argue that a foreigner is entitled to less than a compatriot, 
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all things being equal.  This does not mean that, in our own world, the mere fact that a foreigner 
who trades with our society is paid less in dollar terms that he would be if he was a member of 
our society is objectionable, but might well be a cause for concern.  As such, some individuals in 
a world of liberal trading societies would have an obligation to foreigners beyond an obligation 
of beneficence to assist the absolutely needy.  However, this obligation would only extend to 
direct trade participants in their role as parties to exchange.  There would be no wider obligation 
falling on non-trade participants, even if those individuals gained indirectly from their 
compatriots’ participation in trade—via gains from national specialisation or technology spill-
over, say. 
However, even in a trading world without the complex international political processes 
and multiple global institutions that characterise our own world, individuals might be obligated 
to foreigners in a different capacity.  As long as states have the social-scientific knowledge and 
institutional means to implement a commercial policy, such individuals may be obligated to 
foreigners on the basis of the role they play, politically, in determining their country’s trade 
policy stance.  After all, this stance bears on the interests of foreigners—it determines whether 
more or fewer opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange will be extended to them, and, 
potentially, the terms on which those trades will be concluded.  Further, any change in that 
stance—picture an abrupt raising of tariffs—has the potential to harm foreigners, especially 
those who are dependent on access to a particular state’s market. 
But what are the moral implications of the capacity to set a commercial policy?  Given 
the potential for trade policy to advantage compatriots—certainly employers and employees in 
protected industries, and potentially all one’s fellow nationals if the (perhaps non-monetary) 
gains of protection are justly distributed—is trade protection wrongly discriminatory against 
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foreigners and therefore impermissible?  Even if this is not the case, might some degree of trade 
openness ever be obligatory?  Or is it entirely within a society’s remit to determine, according to 
an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure, what its trade policy will be?  In 
the present chapter I seek to answer these questions. 
In order to isolate the relevant moral intuitions, I start by re-modelling my hypothetical 
archipelago to admit commercial policy, but exclude even the potential for diplomatic bargaining 
between states.  (The moral implications of trade policy bargaining and trade agreements are the 
subject of the next chapter.)  Most importantly, I relax the assumption that social-scientific 
knowledge is insufficiently advantaged to admit the efficacy of trade policy in pursuing goals of 
various kinds, but retain an assumption that this knowledge has not yet reached a level such that 
states entertain the good that might be gained through negotiating reciprocal adjustments in trade 
policy (or indeed by threatening trade partners with a damaging adjustment in trade policy). 
By way of a response to this scenario, I argue that the capacity for commercial-policy 
choice does indeed expand the scope of distributive concern.  But this is not because trade policy 
privileges domestic over foreign producers of the same economic good.  For a state to level a 
tariff—because it appropriately determines that this is in the interests of its citizens (and justly 
distributes the gain domestically)—is no more problematic than an individual deciding to 
consume a smaller quantity of an otherwise desired good in the interest of the whole person, at 
least as long as those outsiders denied opportunities thereby are not needy in absolute terms.  
Rather, it is because commercial policy has the potential to impact the terms on which 
international exchanges are concluded, as optimal tariff theory reminds us.1 
                                                 
1 Neoclassical economic theory admits the “terms of trade argument” as the only rational basis on which a country 
might level tariffs.  The argument is essentially that if an economy is large enough, it can push down the price of 
imports by levelling tariffs.  In the right circumstances, the gain from lower prices offsets the loss from suppressed 
trade (in terms of aggregate national surplus).  The theory dates to Edgeworth (1894) and Bickerdike (1907).  
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When a state determines a commercial policy that is binding on all its citizens, it is as if a 
share of producers and/or consumers across a variety of global markets had formed a set of 
cartels.  As discussed in the introduction, Rawls plausibly claimed in The Law of Peoples that 
fairness in international trade would require that “larger nations with the wealthier economies… 
not attempt to monopolize the market, or to conspire to form a cartel, or to act as a monopoly”.2  
This chapter represents the first step, therefore, in assessing this thought, and, to the extent that it 
is justified, determining its specific moral implications in terms applicable to those with the 
power to shape a state’s trade-policy stance. 
Not all states have the capacity to influence the terms on which international exchanges 
are concluded—at least not in all goods they might level tariffs on.  However, when the share of 
consumers or producers that a national market represents globally is sufficiently large, trade 
policy has a number of moral implications.  First, those responsible for determining a state’s 
commercial policy must be sure that they do not cause or exacerbate exploitation of foreigners.  
Exploitation would be a concern, of course, even if no state had the capacity to shape a trade 
policy, but the relevant obligation would fall only on direct trade participants.  In a world of 
protectionist states, in contrast, all those who part-author their state’s commercial policy bear a 
duty in their political capacity.  To the extent that my state’s policy stance ensures that 
foreigners receive a lesser gain than is equitable in trading with citizens of my state, I am 
implicated in their exploitation, at least if I live in a democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although there is limited empirical evidence that a desire to establish optimal tariffs motivates protectionism, or that 
protection tends to move as predicted by the theory, Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) have built an influential 
functionalist model of the WTO on its basis.  The argument is essentially that countries pursue optimal tariffs, but 
that all countries are worse off in Nash equilibrium when all behave in this way as per the prisoner’s dilemma.  The 
WTO is then a means to overcome a collective action problem. 
2 Rawls (1999b, p. 43). 
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Of course a state would need to be concerned about the potential to cause or exacerbate 
exploitation even if its citizens were entering international commerce for the first time, and it 
was seeking to determine what level of protection to adopt.  However, once a society has been 
bound to others via a network of private trade ties—and the economic structure of each has been 
moulded on the basis of that particular network of ties (moulded towards each society’s 
comparative advantage, at least in the absence of protectionist measures)—there are additional 
moral constraints that pertain to changing commercial policy.  Once societies are trade 
interdependent in this way, foreigners are vulnerable to being disadvantaged in ways that are 
more concerning than being denied an opportunity to benefit, or even being denied an equitable 
share of the gains of trade.  Most significantly, states that possess market power in their 
commercial-policy choice have the potential, if they raise tariffs—when trade previously took 
place against a lower tariff level—to harm trade dependents; to, in other words, leave foreigners 
regretting that our society was ever even somewhat open to trade.  For if our society had never 
been open, those foreigners would have specialised in a different good and catered to what would 
ultimately have turned out to be a more reliable market.  In other words, trade interdependence 
entails a vulnerability to having a right violated that I took as uncontroversial in introducing this 
project: the right not to be harmed. 
Further, once states have been trade interdependent for some period, it is possible for a 
state to exploitatively disadvantage foreigners.  Picture a European country that for a long time 
relied on imports of agricultural goods and raw materials as industrial inputs, and as a result had 
low trade barriers on those goods.  However, having experienced changes in its economic 
structure over a number of decades, that country now determines that it has more to gain from 
joining the European Union, which would entail an effective increase in trade barriers for outside 
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producers.  Might not foreign farmers—whose prior cooperation was necessary to put that 
country in a position to benefit from EU membership in the first place—have some moral claim 
to have their disadvantaging limited, even if that effective raising of trade barriers did not reach 
the threshold of net-harm?  In section V of this chapter, I claim that actors such as these might 
well have such a claim, on the basis that fairness in cross-border trade requires more than that 
immediate and prospective gains be equitably distributed, on pain of exploitation, but that 
unforeseen benefits also be distributed equitably when they arise.  This is true even when these 
benefits include other market opportunities. 
That a capacity to determine a commercial policy grounds a society-wide concern not to 
exploit—a concern that would otherwise be restricted to direct trade participants—and that trade 
interdependence brings with it vulnerabilities to be harmed or unfairly disadvantaged are the 
most important claims of this chapter.  They are the obligations that are grounded on a capacity 
to determine a commercial policy, in the sense that in the absence of this capacity they would not 
exist.  However, there is also reason to discuss how pre-existing obligations might need to be 
reinterpreted in light of such a capacity.  As such, this chapter is structured as follows.  First, 
after outlining the relevant hypothetical world, I discuss the way in which pre-existing 
considerations of beneficence might play into commercial-policy choice.  I argue that unilateral 
trade-opening—to facilitate market entry by needy producers—may, in fact, be required of a 
society, and that states should be alert to the impact a change in trade policy might have in 
inducing neediness abroad, even amongst non-trade partners.  I also discuss the issue of how the 
benefits and burdens of unilateral opening in the interests of the foreign needy should be 
distributed domestically.  Although it is beyond the remit of this project to outline and defend a 
particular view on distributive justice within the state, it would be remiss of me to pass over one 
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of the most significant moral controversies in globalisation ethics.  Second, I discuss the extent 
to which a state nevertheless retains discretion over its trade policy, arguing that there is no 
obligation to have lower trade barriers than would otherwise be preferred merely to reduce 
arbitrary inequality between societies or otherwise similar individual across borders.  In the third, 
fourth, and final sections of the chapter, I turn to my core claims: that the capacity to determine a 
commercial policy grounds a society-wide concern not to exploit, and that the vulnerabilities 
arising from trade interdependence ground requirements not to, first, net-harm and, second, 
exploitatively disadvantage, when altering trade policy. 
Before turning to these matters, a final point of clarification is necessary.  The reader may 
be wondering what actor I intend to focus on in the current chapter, as well as future chapters in 
which I turn to political relations between societies.  Am I still concerned with individuals—and 
the obligations incumbent on them—or is my unit of analysis the state?  In a sense I am 
concerned with the latter rather than the former, and will often speak in these terms in this and 
future chapters, claiming that “a state should pursue commercial policy X”, or “a state should 
avoid commercial policy Y”.  However, this is not meant to imply that, somehow, states have 
something akin to moral personhood.  Rather, when I speak of a state being obliged to do X or 
avoid doing Y, I am really using shorthand: I am referring to the political obligations of persons 
within that state, given their effective political power justly exercised.  In a democracy, of 
course, the role of citizen is the ultimate political office, so to claim that “a state should adopt 
commercial policy X” is to claim that citizens should promote this policy—in exercising their 
vote for example—and adhere to it in their own lives—by, for example, refraining from 
smuggling goods or purchasing smuggled goods.  As my analysis is primarily intended for an 
audience in the developed world, I will often speak as if the states I am concerned with are 
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democracies.  But the prescriptions I arrive at are not meant to be restricted to democracies.  
Even in non-democracies, commercial policy is authored.  As such, the duties I specify should 
guide anyone who plays a role in authoring a state’s trade policy, whether that state is a 
democracy or not. 
 
A World of Protectionist States 
The hypothetical world that the reader should envisage for the purpose of isolating those moral 
intuitions specifically pertinent to a capacity to mould a commercial policy is similar, in a 
number of respects, to the world of liberal trading societies.  Most importantly, just as in the 
world of liberal trading societies, and in contrast to the world of autarkies, the waters that divide 
the island-societies in this hypothetical world are sufficiently narrow and calm to admit traverse.  
Further, the state of technology—in boat construction and navigation, say—is sufficiently 
advanced to facilitate cross-border trade between individuals who are members of distinct 
societies. 
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between these two hypothetical worlds.  
For the purposes of the previous chapter, I asked the reader to imagine a world in which 
intellectual and institutional development was not sufficiently advanced for any state to establish 
a trade policy.  As such, every society’s policy stance (to the extent that it even makes sense to 
speak of such) was de facto, although not de jure, laissez faire.  In contrast, for the purposes of 
the present chapter, the reader should take it that this somewhat awkward assumption has been 
relaxed.  In the world of protectionist states, the state of social-scientific knowledge is taken to 
be sufficiently advanced that political decision-makers realise that their goals—whether 
economic or political, and whatever their shape—might potentially be pursued via the tools of 
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commercial policy.  Further, state institutions are sufficiently developed such that were decision-
makers to wish to adopt protectionist measures, these measures could be effectively 
implemented. 
 Of course, in our own world the commercial policies that states adopt are, in part, a 
function of trade-treaty bargaining between governments—either bilaterally or in a coordinated 
setting, as in the World Trade Organization.  As such, whatever political obligation we 
ultimately have as actors with a capacity to shape state policy must be additionally applicable to 
bargaining positions and responsive—in the sense of being shaped as a relational duty—to 
bargaining outcomes.  Yet the role of bilateral and globally-coordinated trade-treaty bargaining 
are matters for future chapters.  In the world of protectionist states there is no bargaining in either 
of these senses or, importantly, the potential for it, and in this sense every state’s trade-policy 
choice is autonomous. 
In envisaging this world, therefore, the reader should picture an archipelago in which the 
governments of the island-societies have no on-going diplomatic relations.  Let us say this is 
because the state of social-scientific knowledge, while sufficiently advanced to accommodate the 
efficacy of trade policy, is not yet developed to the extent necessary to recognise the potential for 
mutual gains through the reciprocal adjustment of trade policy, so no state has even attempted to 
establish diplomatic contact.  This is not so implausible: picture a world in which states are 
persuaded by Hobbes’s argument that covenants made in an anarchic social environment—one 
lacking a sovereign with coercive power, as in the international realm—are liable to be broken, 
and thereby treat the economic circumstances to which their trade policies represents responses 
as akin to facts of nature. 
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That states determine their commercial policies in what game theorists would call a non-
cooperative context does not mean, of course, that they are not politically interdependent in some 
sense.3  When a state is considering what commercial-policy strategy to pursue given prevailing 
economic conditions, and with a view to how those conditions might change as a consequence of 
that strategy, its choice is inevitably conditioned by the political strategies of other states, albeit 
indirectly via the impact of those strategies on economic conditions.4 
However, more direct forms of political interaction are ruled out in the world of 
protectionist states.  Most obviously, the use of trade policy for coercive purposes is out of the 
question, as there is no diplomatic relations between states.  No state can hope to compel or deter 
other states by threatening to adjust its own commercial policy—even if such a self-abrogating 
move could be made credible—because there is no avenue to communicate the intention of such 
a move or to specific what precisely must be done in order to avoid it.5  But more importantly, 
no state can trade an adjustment in commercial policy for some reciprocal adjustment in the form 
of a trade treaty.  As such, there are no possible circumstances in the world of protectionist states 
where it would make sense to be concerned that one state is dealing inequitably with another in 
their trade-treaty relations. 
Yet it is in large part because states are political interdependent via their commercial-
policy choices—even when they do not have obligations to one another grounded on the treaty 
tie—that warrants the current chapter.  As our own world is one in which there is both the 
potential to bargain internationally, and a multitude of trade agreements—including quasi-global 
                                                 
3 Nash (1951).  
4 To the extent that I still talk of a capacity to determine a trade policy as implicating a relationship to foreigners, I 
differ from Frank Lovett (2010, pp. 34–36).  Lovett writes that “even when some significant outcome is the joint 
product of many people’s actions, however, the individuals involved still might not be engaged in a social 
relationship.  A classic example is the so-called tragedy of the commons scenario…”  While, like Lovett, I am 
primarily concerned with cooperative relationships (as in exchange and treaty), I use the term more widely. 
5 Schelling (1956; 1960, p.195). 
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treaties regulated by the WTO—the reader might be tempted to skip over the current chapter in 
search of policy prescriptions of more immediate relevance.  This, however, would be a mistake.  
Even in a world with the potential for trade treaties, the duties derived in this chapter persist.  For 
instance, to the extent that an otherwise equitable trade treaty (as delineated in the next chapter) 
would require a state to violate the obligations derived here—either with respect to other treaty 
members or outsiders—the terms of that treaty would be wrong. 
Another point of clarification is necessary.  By styling the present hypothetical world “the 
world of protectionist states”, I do not mean to imply that a “protectionist” trade policy—as 
opposed to a “liberal” trade policy, perhaps—represents a superior policy stance.  The reader 
would be right to suppose that simply because states have the capacity to depart from laissez 
faire is no reason to believe that it is in their best interest to do so, or that they would prefer 
protective measures over laissez faire if the decision was left to an appropriately democratic and 
rights-respecting procedure within that society.  Nevertheless, if our own world is any guide, 
most states will prefer some protection on some goods to laissez faire.  Indeed, if we define trade 
policy as widely as the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism has in recent years—to include 
even domestic regulation that is not motivated by trade concerns, but nevertheless tends to 
“distort” trade—we should take it that a non-laissez-faire trade policy is effectively unavoidable. 
Indeed, if reflection on the world of protectionist states is to provide policy guidance in 
our own world, it may be helpful for the reader to assume that circumstances in this hypothetical 
world are much as they are in our own: there is division of opinion—both across individuals 
globally and societies (even if all were democratic)—regarding the appropriate role of 
government, including in exercising commercial policy.  This division is partially a consequence 
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of conflicting values, and partially a consequence of disagreement within social science, in 
particular over the best means to promote economic development in the long term. 
To sum up what I have said so far: societies in the world of protectionist states have the 
capacity to mould a commercial policy, and as such are more than merely trade interdependent.  
They are also politically interdependent, at least to the extent that their commercial-policy 
choices have external effects.  Nevertheless, societies in this world are not politically 
interdependent in the deeper sense that their trade policies might be shaped by international 
bargaining between governments, as diplomatic contact between states is not even a practical 
possibility in this world.  It should also be noted that, as in the world of liberal trading societies, 
the world of protectionist states contains no politico-legal order globally. 
 
I. Beneficence and Trade Policy 
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I developed an account of our obligation of 
beneficence—the natural duty on each of the affluent to assist those who are needy, even if we 
share no closer relationship with them than that of common humanity—that was, nevertheless, 
sensitive to the potential for, and practice of, interpersonal trade.  In Chapter 1, I argued that 
there is a limit on what any of us can reasonably be expected to sacrifice on behalf of the needy, 
but that until this point is reached, each of us has a duty to assist the poor as effectively as 
possible.  In Chapter 2, I argued that it is permissible to utilise trade as a means to advance the 
interests of the needy as long as the following two conditions are met.  First, and most obviously, 
one must still sacrifice to the same extent as long as need persists.  That needy people refuse 
opportunities to trade is no reason to limit what one sacrifices overall.  Respecting others means 
taking their refusal of trade offers as evidence that an exchange on those terms would be 
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worsening, at least when they are already in need.  Second, one must not exploit one’s trade 
partner when they are needy.  While avoiding exploitation normally requires that the gains of 
exchange be equally divided, when it comes to the needy these gains ought to be divided in such 
a way as to minimise need.  Indeed, there may be reasons of efficiency to pay the needy a still 
greater amount, at least as long as minimising need would not be sufficient to render them non-
needy. 
The demands of beneficence—and the limits on those demands—obviously have 
repercussions for commercial-policy choice.  Consider first the partly non-ideal circumstances in 
which individuals cannot be relied upon to do what is required of them to assist the needy, 
especially with respect to foreigners.  In this context, a state may have to do what it can to ensure 
that its citizens—certainly its affluent citizens—act so as to benefit the needy abroad.  One way 
to do this, of course, is to adopt low trade barriers on goods that needy foreigners produce, or 
would otherwise produce.  Just as individuals can further the interests of the foreign poor by 
purchasing the goods they produce, as well as by providing them with transfer aid, a society can 
further the ends of needy foreigners by facilitating market entry, as well as via tax and transfer. 
 Nevertheless, for an open trade policy to be an appropriate expression of beneficence, 
two conditions must be met.  These conditions are analogous to those that limit trade as a private 
expression of beneficence.  First, a society may not use a failure on the part of the foreign needy 
to take up opportunities supposedly extended as an excuse for limiting sacrifice.  Say that a 
society opted for a perfectly liberal commercial policy, but that despite this stance no trade ties 
were established with the foreign needy, perhaps because needy persons were not in a position to 
offer members of that society anything of value to them.  It would be unreasonable, surely, for 
members of that society to say, “Collectively, we need do no more to help you”.  Second, the 
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state should seek to ensure that its citizens not engage in wrongful exploitation.  In the previous 
chapter I argued that dealing fairly with one’s trade partner requires, on pain of exploitation, that 
they receive an equitable share of the gains of exchange.  However, avoiding exploitation of the 
needy may require more than merely an equitable or equal share of these gains.  As barriers to 
trade have the potential to impact the extent of exploitation—as discussed in section III of this 
chapter below—affluent states must be cognisant of this potential in formulating their beneficent 
posture. 
Of course, once a state is trade integrated under a given commercial policy—even a 
commercial policy that is consistent with what beneficence demands of its affluent citizens on 
aggregate—it must consider the impact that a change in its trade policy might have in terms of 
inducing neediness abroad.  When a society has market power in the sense of optimal tariff 
theory, a raising of trade barriers will disadvantage all those who supply the relevant good—even 
persons who are not trade partners of anyone in that society, but supply other national 
markets—by driving down the world price of that good.  In the absence of alternative markets 
that can take up the slack, needy foreigners will either receive a lesser return or be driven out of 
business altogether.  Indeed it might be thought that a society has a special duty to favour 
foreigners vulnerable to being made needy by a change in trade policy, even if they are not direct 
trade partners. 
It is also important to remember, too, that it is not only the needs of impoverished 
foreigners that states must countenance when seeking to ensure that trade policy satisfies the 
demands of beneficence, all things considered.  States must also take care to ensure that, 
ultimately, the burden of assisting the foreign needy is distributed fairly across citizens 
domestically.  The danger of adopting low barriers to trade as a means to assist needy 
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foreigners—or removing trade barriers when they were previously in place—is that it threatens 
to lead to an inequitable distribution of sacrifice domestically. 
Picture a society that is entering international trade for the first time.  Further suppose 
that there are no needy people in this society, and that it is internally just both in the sense that 
members of that society receive an equal share of any value they co-generate on the market, and 
in the sense that all members of that society net-benefit from public goods to an equal degree.  
Now, imagine what might happen if that society decided, upon entering international trade for 
the first time, not to adopt any trade barriers—in order to maximise opportunities for the foreign 
poor.  It is entirely possible, of course, that more advantaged members of that society will use the 
bargaining leverage that they gain from entering international trade to depart from justice.  
Business owners, for instance, might be able to push wages lower—despite revenues being 
equal—because domestic workers must compete, directly or indirectly, with foreign ones.  Now, 
as long as domestic workers receive a less than equitable share of the market gains they co-
generate, they are wronged.  But they are doubly wronged if they are disadvantaged to a degree 
where they must sacrifice more than is required of them by the Principle of Sympathy.  Having 
one’s wages significantly cut—or losing one’s job—is much more than virtually anyone (besides 
a saint) would be required to sacrifice under this principle to assist needy strangers. 
Now, it might be pointed out that in discussing how much any of us are required to 
sacrifice in order to advance the interests of needy strangers, I have had little to say about what 
baseline sacrifice is to be computed from.  (My brief comments on this in Chapter 1 are clearly 
inadequate).  This leaves open the possibility that persons disadvantaged by the entry of their 
society into international trade on laissez-faire terms—or the failure of their society to protect 
them from pressures arising from being trade integrated, even for period)—may not be 
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sacrificing more than beneficence requires of them, because their preferences have adapted to 
their circumstances.6  In other words, despite their relative deprivation in comparison to their 
compatriots, they cannot be said to be sacrificing more than beneficence requires of them 
because they are still relatively content.  Yet is it possible to accept this inference while still 
believing—on the basis of the right understanding of beneficence—that it would be wrong for a 
society to fail to protect its less advantaged members against the pressures of trade openness, 
whether directly via trade barriers, or more appealingly, via other compensatory measures. 
Compatriots are owed, as a matter of right, both an equal share of the gains they co-
generate on the market and an equal share of public goods.  To the extent, then, that their more-
advantaged compatriots exploit them—even to advance the interests of the foreign needy—they 
do wrong irrespective of whether this would impose excessive sacrifice on the domestic 
disadvantaged or not.  Even Singer’s Strong Principle concedes, implicitly at least, side-
constraints on what we might do to advance the interests of the needy.  Even if I must sacrifice 
from my own projects in order to advance the interest of the needy, I may not normally steal 
from others in order to do the same. 
 
II. Commercial Policy Right 
The demands of beneficence obviously constrain what trade policy a state may adopt, even were 
that state entering international commerce for the first time.  Commercial policy choice in the 
context of trade interdependence—with its attendant potential for exploitation and 
vulnerabilities—is a different matter, as I discuss in sections IV and V below.  However, even a 
                                                 
6 As Amartya Sen (2009, pp. 282–283) puts it, “the utilitarian calculus based on happiness or desire-fulfilment can 
be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived, since our mental make-up and desires tend to adjust to 
circumstances, particularly to make life bearable in adverse situations.  It is through ‘coming to terms’ with one’s 
hopeless predicament that life is made somewhat bearable by the traditional underdogs, such as… sweated workers 
in exploitative industrial arrangements…” 
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state entering international commerce for the first time need not seek to reduce putatively unfair 
inequalities—either between societies or between otherwise similar individuals across borders—
and this preserves for it a certain range of commercial policies between which it may choose 
(according to an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure) at its discretion.  
Here, I depart from the cosmopolitan view on trade policy.  Although protectionism considered 
in isolation has received scant attention from cosmopolitan theorists of global justice, Darrel 
Moellendorf has the following to say in Cosmopolitan Justice: 
 
Protectionist policies violate a principle of fair equality of opportunity.  Such 
policies create different sales conditions for producers of equivalent goods, 
thereby affecting their ability to succeed.  If this were to occur between two 
different domestic producers, it might be described as a failure of equal protection 
under the law.  Since one’s place of birth is morally arbitrary, it should not affect 
one’s life prospects or one’s access to opportunities.7 
 
To claim that there would be no injustice if similarly endowed but culturally and 
institutionally distinct societies in a world of autarkies were unequally wealthy—were we to take 
per capita income as a measure, say—is not, I take it, particularly controversial.  As I argued in 
Chapter 1, given the differential weight that different societies might place (democratically) on 
aggregate wealth vis-à-vis other cultural, social, and distributional goals, there is no reason to 
expect that all societies will be equally wealthy, even if all had equivalent opportunities and were 
equally prudent in exercising social choice.  Further, even if there was no guarantee that all 
societies would be equally prudent, it would be unfair to ask societies who were prudent to share 
the burden of those who were avoidably foolish, and inconsistent with upholding equally dignity 
to require compensation for those who could not help their imprudence.  The advantage of a 
view of justice that does not seek to distinguish brute from option luck is not merely that it 
                                                 
7 Moellendorf (2002, p. 55). 
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rescues that theory from unresolved metaphysical questions concerning free will, but that it 
necessarily refrains from judging who was more or less foolish, thereby protecting the dignity of 
actors both in their own and others’ eyes.8  Finally, in the absence of cooperative ties across 
borders—either between individuals or states—or a common politico-legal order globally, any 
putatively unfair inequality that might exist between societies could not be attributed to 
exploitation in trade or treaty, or justifiably claimed to be undermining the equal standing of 
societies or persons under that order. 
The claim, on the other hand, that there is no injustice if identically endowed and 
equivalently motivated individuals receive differential returns on account of their societal 
membership is more contentious.  What of the individual who systematically dissents from his or 
her society’s determination of its collective ends, or the means to those ends, even when that 
determination is via an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure?  What of the 
individual who is not insulted by the insinuation that that his or her compatriots are apt to make 
foolish political choices, because that individual does not identify strongly with his or her 
nationality?  Would it not be unjust if such a person received a lesser return than they would if 
they were a member of another society—in part, let us say, because that other society levelled 
trade barriers that prevented that person from competing on equal terms with domestic 
producers? 
Yet, as I argued in Chapter 1, international inequalities of this kind are not unjust, even if 
potentially unfair.  They are, rather, akin to the unchosen economic inequalities that arise in the 
market—even when the range of those inequalities is limited in some way, as under the 
difference principle (or, presumably, under a market-friendly standard that nevertheless bars 
exploitative prices).  What one receives in a market, given one’s natural talents—indeed, what is 
                                                 
8 Anderson (1999). 
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to count as a talent amongst what one is endowed with, and to what degree—depends on others’ 
preferences over the contribution that that talent might make, and the relative scarcity of that 
talent (at least when actors tend to exploit each other)—both of which are entirely outside of the 
individual’s control.9  Even if the position of those who end up worst off is bolstered, in absolute 
terms, by provisions required by the difference principle, they are still unlucky to the extent that 
their talents (rather than somebody else’s) happen to be the ones that are valued and distributed 
in such a way that they must be compensated for.  Obviously, it would be much better for people 
like this if their talents happened to be valued and distributed in such a way that they were 
positioned higher in the (albeit limited) socio-economic hierarchy permitted by the difference 
principle. 
Something analogous can be said about international inequalities between ostensibly 
similar persons, even when these inequalities are in part a function of states’ trade-policy 
choices, rather than a purely a function of natural conditions—such as how rocky their coastlines 
happen to be.  Allowing societies the freedom to determine their own trade policy—even if the 
cumulative consequence of this happens to be that some people receive less than similar others 
as a consequence of their national origin—is no more objectionable that permitting individuals 
the freedom of choosing how much of which goods to purchase in a market (let us say at non-
exploitative prices). The claim that there is nothing objectionable about societies possessing the 
freedom to decide how much they will trade (the prices on which they exchange to one side) is 
even more closely akin to claiming that it is within the rights of members of a small-town 
community to “buy local” even if the ultimate effect of everyone doing so would be to arbitrarily 
disadvantage some producers at the expense of others. 
                                                 
9 Anderson (2007); Seligman (2007). 
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One reason why inequalities that might arise in a market may not be thought 
objectionable—even if they are not range-limited, as under the difference principle or according 
to a standard that bars exploitative prices—is that they are not chosen or imposed, but are rather 
the by-product of actors pursuing their interests in an non-coordinated fashion.  After all, 
permitting each person the freedom to choose how much of what to purchase in the market is 
procedurally consistent with a variety of different distributional patterns and, indeed, the absence 
of putatively unfair inequalities entirely.  And for the state to mandate that artists will receive 
less than comparably talented and motivated athletes—to draw on the example from Chapter 1 
again—certainly seems worse than such an inequality arising spontaneously in a free economic 
order.  Similarly, reserving for states the right of self-determination in trade-policy terms is 
procedurally consistent, at least in theory, with the absence of putatively unfair inequalities 
between individuals who are members of different societies.  Even if states permitted their 
citizens to exploit foreigners (although not to harm them in a sense deeper than this) in addition 
to determining their trade policy purely with a view to the national interest, it might so happen 
that things balanced out so that no person was worse off than a similar other in another country. 
There is certainly something to this view.  Indeed, according to the perspective on 
distributive justice I offer in this dissertation, the primary reason that inequalities that might arise 
in a market (domestic or transnational) should be restricted is to avoid exploitation, not to 
compensate people for being unlucky not to have as much as others to offer on the market 
(unless they fall below the threshold defining absolute need, that is).  This is not quite enough, 
however, to justify unrestricted freedom of choice in an inequality-range-restricted market and, 
analogously, unrestricted freedom of trade-policy choice within the constraint of not causing or 
exacerbating exploitation.  After all, it seems as if there are certain preferences that it would be 
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wrong to pursue in one’s choice of what and how much to purchase—even if, were everyone to 
act in that way, no one would be systematically disadvantaged.  Surely it would be wrong, for 
example, for an individual to purchase from producers who are white rather than producers of 
identical products who are black purely in order to additionally satisfy a racist preference, even 
if, as it happened, the consequence of permitting everyone this freedom did not lead to unfair 
disadvantaging of blacks overall (perhaps because an equal number of consumers preferred to 
support black rather than white producers).10  Indeed, wouldn’t it be wrong not to purchase 
something from someone on the basis of their race—when you would purchase that thing if it 
were not for their race—even if you didn’t end up purchasing that same thing from someone 
else? 
In other words, it might be thought that there are similar constraints on what states might 
do in exercising their commercial-policy choice.  Because one’s place of birth is as arbitrary as 
one’s race—in the sense that one did not, and cannot, exercise any choice over it—a preference 
for one’s compatriots’ good that would see one purchase their products over identical, or even 
somewhat better, products produced by foreigners is a wrongful preference.  As such, it would be 
wrong for a state to seek to satisfy this preference on the part of its citizens in its commercial-
policy choice—or to seek to advance an analogous collective interest as determined by an 
appropriated democratic and rights-respecting procedure. 
The basic point is that, to the extent that putatively unfair inequalities across international 
borders are a consequence of protectionist policies by states, it is not even possible to say that 
these inequalities are no worse than the arbitrary inequalities domestically that even a Rawlsian 
would tolerate.  Although the difference principle normally permits the distribution of 
                                                 
10 Michael Blake (2006) has argued that it is wrong to discriminate on a basis that will contribute to the 
stigmatisation of some group in society. 
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preferences combined with the distribution of purchasing power to determine what will count as 
a talent, the principle of equality of fair opportunity takes lexical priority over the difference 
principle, and prevents arbitrary characteristics such as race as being factored as talents.  In other 
words, when a state gives domestic producers a competitive advantage over foreign producers it 
is not like athletes getting paid more than comparably talented artists, but rather like identically 
talented (and motivated) artists reaping differential returns on the basis of some factor that has 
nothing to do with their office. 
Yet there are a number of reasons to think that, nevertheless, a society has considerable 
license in (democratically) determining the extent to which it is trade integrated with other 
societies, obligations not to exploit to one side.  For one thing, nationality—or national 
location—can count as a productive talent in way that race as such seemingly never can, even if 
we rule out a preference for the good of one’s compatriots are an appropriate interest for the state 
to be promoting.11  When a country levels trade barriers as a means to, for instance, shape its 
comparative advantage and increase its developmental prospects, a producer’s nationality does 
bear on how much others gain purely in terms of their economic self-interest.  While a foreigner 
might be equally well-placed to supply a particular product, they are not equally well-placed to 
play a role in promoting the economic development of that society, at least according to the view 
motivating the policy here (let us say that the infant industries argument is doing the motivating 
work).  Trade barriers are therefore justified on the basis that foreigners and compatriots are not 
identically endowed, even if what they are offering for sale appears the same. 
Indeed, trade protection might advance cultural, social, or political ends that foreigners 
are not in a position to contribute to even if we rule out all external preferences as illegitimate.  
                                                 
11 Let us rule out, for the time being, so-called “external preferences”.  Preferences are necessarily self-preferences, 
but they are not necessarily self-regarding or selfish.  External preferences are preferences concerning the good of 
others.  See Dworkin (1977, pp. 234; 275). 
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Say that a country protects is agricultural sector in order to preserve its indigenous culture.  One 
might say that such a policy wrongfully discriminates between agricultural producers with 
identical offerings.  But this would be wrong.  Only domestic producers are in a position to 
contribute to the perpetuation of that small society’s culture; foreign producers of identical 
agricultural products are not.  To be a member of that small society is, in that sense, rightly 
counted among a producer’s talents. 
Finally, sometimes it clearly is the case that we shouldn’t rule out external preferences—
preferences concerning the good of others—as something that it is appropriate for the state to 
seek to satisfy.  Even in the trade-integrated world of protectionist states, it remains the case that 
only members of the same society are in a position to provide one another with public goods.  
Only they share, therefore, an obligation to seek to ensure that the public goods are equitably 
distributed—or, at least, that no citizen is worse off in relative terms than they would be if public 
goods were equitably distributed.  An individual preference for the fulfilment of this obligation is 
clearly not a wrongful preference, therefore, and the levelling of high barriers to trade in order to 
promote its satisfaction may well be permissible.  Indeed, such a policy might be morally 
required as long as there is no other feasible way of ensuring that all citizens of that society net-
gain equally from the state scheme of public-good provision. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that even if states were obligated to do something about 
putatively unfair international inequalities in their trade policy capacity, it would not be to 
unilaterally lower trade barriers when they would otherwise keep them in place.  It would rather 
be to push for a global economic regime to regulate each and every state’s trade policy in such a 
way as to ensure that a comprehensive luck-egalitarian pattern is achieved globally.  Unilateral 
efforts to tackle putatively unfair inequalities across borders via trade policy—or indeed in our 
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individual choices as consumers—are likely to be self-defeating.  Imagine that wealthy-country 
A lowers trade barriers on good X purely in order that foreign producers of that good not be 
unfairly worse off than domestic producers of the same good.  Further suppose that other wealthy 
countries do not extend similar concessions to analogous foreigners, either because they wrongly 
believe that their current trade stance is sufficient to ensure that arbitrary inequalities across 
international borders are addressed (there is no political coordination between wealthy countries 
in planning these efforts, after all) or because—moving into non-ideal theory for a moment—
their citizens are not guided by a concern for the entitlements of outsiders in democratic 
deliberation (a particular sort of assurance problem).  In a case such as this, A’s efforts will 
inevitably be self-defeating from the luck-egalitarian perspective, because they will serve to 
open-up unfair inequalities between citizens of A and similar citizens of other wealthy countries, 
and, perhaps, between foreign producers of X and their compatriots. 
 
III. Exploitation and Trade Policy 
The degree of discretion over trade policy that any state has a right to is, however, diminished 
once that state is trade integrated.  This is because that state must be sure not to cause or 
exacerbate exploitation in private exchange via its commercial policy—even of the non-needy—
and not to harm or unfairly disadvantage foreigners via a change in that policy.  As I argued in 
the previous chapter, foreign parties to trade are exploited if they do not receive an equitably 
share of the gains of trade.  My own view is that an equitable share is an equal (in some sense) 
share of the net-gain created in exchange, but I also offered a more limited view according to 
which a foreigner should receive an equivalent return to a compatriot, all things being equal.  In 
cases, then, when a state’s commercial-policy stance has the potential to impact the terms on 
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which cross-border exchanges are concluded, all those who play a role in determining that 
commercial policy bear a responsibility not to exploit. 
 A state only has the power to influence the terms on which cross-border exchanges are 
concluded—or indeed to harm or exploitatively disadvantage foreign parties to trade via a 
change in trade policy—if it possess market power.  Basic economic theory tells us that if a small 
economy levies a tariff on a good, the burden of that tariff will have to borne by members of that 
society.  They must either pay a price sufficient to cover the cost of the tariff, or substitute for 
consumption of other, less desirable, goods.  Foreign producers need not bear any burden, 
because there are alternate national markets still willing to pay the pre-tariff price.  However, an 
insight of optimal tariff theory is that large economies have the potential to impact the world 
prices of goods via their trade policy.12  If, for instance, a state’s consumers represent a large 
enough share of the purchasers of a good globally, then that state has at least a degree of 
monpsonistic power.  Were it to level a tariff on that good, the impact globally would be akin to 
a fall in demand.  Not only would the quantity of the good traded fall, but the price received by 
producers would drop too. 
 In this dissertation I do not seek to prescribe states’ goals or assess the choices they might 
make in pursue of their goals, at least as long as they fulfil their obligations.  As such, I admit the 
possibility that societies might pursue non-economic goals via protectionist policy, or choose a 
degree of protectionism despite their economic goals, given their view of what best promotes 
development over time.  Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that, according to optimal tariff 
theory, a state possessing monopsonistic power can gain if economic terms by levelling a tariff.  
                                                 
12 It is important to note that this is true regardless of what might motivate, or otherwise determine, trade policy, as 
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) remind us. 
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If this power is great enough, the losses entailed by a diminishment in the number of cross-
border exchanges will be offset by an improvement in the terms of trade. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I term those foreign parties to trade liable to be 
impacted by a society’s commercial policy choice—either via an impact on the terms on which 
those exchanges are concluded, or being driven out of the market entirely—as trade 
dependents.13  In future chapters I also describe states analogously vulnerable using the same 
term.  A producer, for instance, is dependent on a consumer—or, more likely, group of 
consumers (if they have the capacity to act together, as when united by a government exercising 
the commercial policy of a “large economy”)—when the latter has the ability to impact the terms 
on which a trade is concluded alone: to, in other words, impact its price. 
Consider, then, how a state possessing market power might cause or exacerbate 
exploitation of trade dependents.  This requires, of course, that we engage in non-ideal theory for 
a moment.  Consider first a case in which a commercial policy might cause exploitation.  Say 
that members of a society in a world of liberal trading societies were cognisant of their 
responsibility not to exploit, and therefore paid foreign producers of a valued good a price 
sufficient to ensure they received an equal share of the gains of trade.  But that once that society 
evolved a capacity to exercise commercial policy—moving to the world of protectionist states—
the government imposed a tariff on that good in pursue of the “national interest”, thereby driving 
down the return of dependent producers abroad.  As long as consumers continued to pay the 
same price, it is plausible to say that, in this case, the state is responsible for exploitation, and 
every person who plays a role in determining that policy ought to push for rectification. 
                                                 
13 Not in the sense of dependency theory, but in the basic structural sense that one actor is dependent on another if 
exit from the relevant relationship is costly.  See (2010, pp. 38–40; 53) and Hirschman (1970, pp. 21–29). 
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Now consider a case that more closely reflects the conditions of our own world.  Say that 
individual citizens of a country in the world of liberal trading societies could not be relied upon 
to deal fairly with their trade partners, and that as a consequence many cross-border exchanges 
were exploitative.  Were a capacity to exercise commercial policy to evolve, which trade policies 
would be impermissible?  Which, if any, would be obligatory?  Consider the former question 
first: clearly, if a society drives down the price of a good whose producers are already exploited, 
it is exacerbating the situation.  To the extent that that society is a democracy, furthermore, all its 
citizens are now implicated in exploitation—even those who are not direct participants in 
relevant cross-border exchanges—and thereby bear a responsibility to rectify the situation.  
Indeed, were a democracy to disadvantage dependent producers in this way, non-trade-
participants would no longer be able to claim that any spill-over gains they might acquire from 
their compatriots’ trading as windfall benefits made at no one’s expense. 
In a world of liberal trading societies, were non-trade-participants to gain indirectly from 
their compatriots’ participation in trade—via technological development induced by trade, say—
it seems as if they would be entitled to any gains they might happen to make.  This is because 
those gains would arise from what Joel Feinberg calls “harmless parasitism”.14  Even were non-
trade participants to benefit from their compatriot’s trade in circumstances in which their 
compatriots exploited foreigners, it doesn’t seem as if they would owe anything to the foreigners 
who were wronged.  If those foreigners would be no worse off if these non-trade-participants did 
not exist, it is unclear just how they can be held responsible for the wrong.  However, when a 
state plays a role in determining the terms on which international trades are concluded, everyone 
who plays a role in shaping that state’s policy has a responsibility to ensure that that state not 
cause or exacerbate exploitation.  To the extent that non-trade participants benefit from, for 
                                                 
14 Feinberg (1988, p. 209). 
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instance, the developmental gains that accrue to the whole society as a consequence of a 
protectionist trade policy that drives down the price of traded goods—where those gains could 
not be achieved without protection—they are also liable to the charge of exploitation. 
 Indeed, it might even be the case that citizens of a democratic society should push for 
negative tariffs (import subsidies).  Consider a case in which a country has the capacity to adopt 
any trade policy it should wish to adopt, but nevertheless opts for laissez-faire.  Now imagine 
that some citizens of that country cannot be relied upon to do what is morally required of them, 
and take advantage of the bargaining weakness of their foreign trade partners in exploiting them.  
In circumstances like this, it may well be the case that their compatriots bear a responsibility to 
push for negative tariffs to ensure that foreigners receive an equitable return when they would 
otherwise be exploited. 
 Some theorists of global justice have argued that wealthy economies ought to make 
market access conditional on certain minimum labour standards being secured.  Given that I have 
argued that societies have a responsibility, if they are to be trade-integrated, not to exploit 
foreigners, this is a proposal that my perspective is sympathetic towards.  However, it is 
important to note that that such a practical proposal would have to be fine-tuned in the right way 
to meet the ideal that I seek to defend in this dissertation.  First, because my standard of 
exploitation applies even in exchanges with the non-needy—and requires that trade gains be 
equitably distributed—merely minimum wages and conditions may be insufficient to ensure that 
foreigners are not exploited.  Second, if these standards and wages are not sensitive to the extra 
costs entailed in trading with poorer countries, the competitive pressures that might result in even 
equitable gains in transnational exchange being lower than one might otherwise expect, and the 
view that equivalence rather than identity may be the right way to compare returns between 
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countries, these standards and wages may, in fact, be too demanding.  Finally, imposing these 
standards in circumstances in which wider duties of beneficence and non-exploitation are neither 
recognised, acted upon, or enforced, may not improve things overall.  Say that multinational 
corporations substituted exploitative trade in some middle-income country for non-exploitative 
trade with members of societies that would otherwise fail to meet minimum wages and labour 
standards.  Or say that consumers purchased fewer goods than they otherwise might because they 
did not realise that beneficence might demand trade with the needy on “loss-making” prices.  
Given the range of such considerations, it would be important to pursue the ends of linkage via 
comprehensive reform of the global trade regime rather than unilaterally.15 
 None of what I have said above is mean to imply, of course, that is it always wrong to 
impact the world price of goods in exercising trade policy.16  The point is not that any such use 
of trade policy is an abuse of power—a procedural wrong not matter what its effect.  Rather, it is 
that a state may not use its otherwise legitimate power wrongfully.  What this means, of course, 
is that is perfectly within the rights of poorer countries to seek to influence their terms of trade as 
long as their citizens are exploited by affluent foreigners.  The smaller size of many poor-country 
economies will often, of course, hamper these efforts—although not always, of course: think of 
China.  But poorer countries do possess market power if they act together, as they increasingly 
have within the WTO. 
 
IV. Trade Policy and Vulnerability to Net-Harm 
In prior sections of this chapter I have argued that a society is under no obligation to adopt low 
barriers to trade merely to advantage someone who would otherwise be worse off as a 
                                                 
15 For an argument of this kind, see Barry and Reddy (2008). 
16 Or, indeed, via “manipulating” the exchange rate, as in China’s case. 
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consequence of where they happen to have been born.  Just as an individual employer has no 
obligation to employ someone who has, in their view, lesser talents—even though those talents 
are an accident of birth—no society need permit the extension of exchange offers that it 
appropriately determines are not in the common interest of its citizens.  There might be an 
obligation to maintain low trade barriers to ensure that those private exchanges that will 
inevitably occur are not exploitative, but no obligation to maintain low trade barriers merely so 
that foreigners will be extended trade opportunities that they would not otherwise have access to. 
Yet it is not inconsistent to claim that there is no duty of this kind, while also maintaining 
that there are circumstances where it would be wrong for a society to raise existing trade 
barriers, even if no one would be exploited thereby, at least as long as the resultant 
disadvantaging of foreigners would be excessive.  This claim, and its intuitive basis, is analogous 
to the claim that an employer with monopsonistic power in the labour market might be under no 
obligation to hire anyone—at least were beneficence satisfied—yet face constraints in terms of 
the circumstances in which it might justifiably fire workers. 
 It is a commonplace of international relations theory that trade interdependence provides 
states with a new power capability.  In National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 
Albert Hirschman notes that trade interdependence provides states with a means to disadvantage 
other states besides military force—namely via raising trade barriers—and therefore with a new 
means to threaten or punish in pursuit of the national interest.  At least when market power is 
asymmetric—as when on state relies on bilateral trade to a much greater extent than its trade 
partner—this capability can be ominous.  In this context, raising trade barriers will, at a 
minimum, oblige one’s trade partner to “find alternative markets and sources of supply” and, at 
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most, “force upon them economic adjustments and lasting impoverishments”.17  Similarly, 
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane note in Power and Interdependence that trade ties not only 
ensure that trends in one economy are sensitive to trends in others—such that, for instance, 
economic cycles in one economy ripple into others—but additionally entail political 
vulnerability.  States can be dependent on their particular network of trade ties, such that a shift 
in those ties would necessitate a burdensome adjustment to the structure of their economy.18 
Of course, raising trade barriers as a tool of international statecraft is largely a matter for 
future chapters.  It should be remembered that a parameter of the world of protectionist states is 
that states do not have diplomatic contact with one another, or even the means to establish such 
contact.  Nevertheless, the fact that trade interdependence renders foreign dependents vulnerable 
to be disadvantaged, does raise the question of whether such a disadvantaging might be wrong, 
even in the absence of direct diplomatic intercourse between states. 
 Most people thing that it is worse to harm than to fail to assist, even if the outcome for 
the other party would be the same.  Virtually everyone thinks, for instance, that it is worse to 
push a toddler into a pond, thereby causing the child to die, than to fail to pull a drowning toddler 
from a pond, even if he or she would drown if you did not.  Indeed, in many cases it seems that it 
is wrong to harm, but not wrong to fail to assist.  It would be wrong for me to burgle someone’s 
house, but not wrong for me to fail to pay for the homeowner to install a security system that 
would prevent an inevitable burglary by someone else.  But even if we accept that harming is 
worse than failing to assist, what counts as a harm?  Perhaps it is the case that, according to the 
right account of harming, we should consider any disadvantaging of foreigners brought about by 
a raising of trade barriers as merely the diminishment of a benefit, and therefore permissible? 
                                                 
17 Hirschman (1945, p. 15–16). 
18 Nye and Keohane (1977). 
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Yet there are changes in commercial policy that would be designated wrong under even 
the most permissive account of the distinction between harming and failing to assist—where 
permissive is taken to mean affording a license to disadvantage if we take it that harming is 
worse than failing to assist.  This is the counterfactual account.19  On this account, an employer 
does not harm an employee by cutting their wages if the employee is still better off than they 
would have been if the employer had never existed.  Say that, for instance, the employee had 
already received high wages for a number of years, and being employed by someone else was 
never really a viable option.  Were this the case, the employee would not be harmed by having 
their wages cut.  They are still better off than they would have been if they had never 
encountered their employer.  On the other hand, if that employee’s wages were only marginally 
higher than if he or she had taken up other employment options previously available, and those 
employment options are no longer available, then the employee is harmed by having their wages 
cut.  He or she is left regretting ever having encountered our employer. 
Something similar can be said about the raising of trade barriers.  If we accept a natural 
duty not to harm, then it is wrong to raise barriers to trade if this would leave dependent 
foreigners worse off than they would have been if our society had never existed.  To give an 
example: say that country A and country B are closely trade interdependent.  Country B supplies 
A with most of its agricultural goods, in particular bananas and coffee.  However, one day A 
determines that it wishes to grow these sectors of its economy, and as a consequence, levels new 
tariffs on both bananas and coffee.  It would seem that producers of bananas and coffee in 
society B might have a claim to have been wronged even if what little trade continues in these 
goods is conducted on non-exploitative terms.  Say that there is a third country in this world, 
country C, whose people desire mangoes and tea.  Further suppose that, had producers of 
                                                 
19 Kagan (1989, p. 94). 
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bananas and coffee in B specialised instead in mangoes and tea—which they would have had, let 
us say, if A had never existed—they would be much better off than they actual are given that A 
has raised barriers to trade.  In a case like this, it would seem that A has net-harmed producers in 
B, and owes them something by way of rectification. 
It might be thought that the natural duty not to harm others is a duty not to appropriate 
what they are entitled to (not to refrain from leaving others worse off than if you did not exist).  
And is not clear that producers are entitled to future trade offers or opportunities except in 
special circumstances (if, for instance, they have been promised them).  It might also be thought 
that when we trade with someone—even on equitable terms—there is an assumed risk that the 
exchange might not be repeated.  I do not seek to reply to either of these objections in full here.  
But I do suspect that one reason why we might not think that actors within a market should show 
special concern for dependents—even when market power is significant and the wrong we are 
concerned with is a plausible interpretation of harming—is that we when reflect on this matter 
we are, consciously or unconsciously, assuming background circumstances in which there is 
some institution to protect people against relationships of exchange coming to an unforeseen end.  
It is entirely possible that in a state of nature, or the anarchical international order that is the 
world of protectionist states, there would be a natural duty not to leave others worse off than if 
you did not exist, but that this duty is better delegated to a risk-sharing institution when this is 
possible.  Within one society, that institution is the state. 
It is also worth pointing out that even if we think that, in the right context, individuals 
and firms should bear the risk that some mutually beneficial relationship of on-going exchange 
will come to an end, it is not clear that the world of protectionist states is that context.  
Remember that there might well be putatively unfair international inequalities in this world that 
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will mean that otherwise similar persons face different pressures to take risks.  Consider again 
our example of banana and coffee farmers in country B.  If these persons were equally well-off 
as comparable members of country A, maybe it would be the case that, were A to net-harm B via 
a raising of trade barriers, producers in B would have no claim of injustice against A.  But what 
if farmers in B are already unfairly worse off than comparable others in A, and believe that the 
best way to close this gap is to specialise in goods that members of A demand, even though this 
leaves them more vulnerable than they would be if they hedged their bets (continuing to grow 
some mangoes and tea for consumers in C, just in case)? 
Finally, even if it were true that what counts as harming is not leaving another worse off 
than if you did not exist—but rather appropriating something to which they are entitled—and 
that no one is entitled to future trade opportunities merely because they are available at the 
moment—even if one is entitled to equitable terms when they are utilised—it might turn out that 
some global regime that shares the risk of being disadvantaged by other states raising trade 
barriers happens to be in every society’s interest—or hypothetical interest in some more morally 
defensible choice situation (perhaps one in which representatives of societies behind a veil of 
ignorance know their comparative advantage, but do not know the probability that the goods they 
might produce will be subject to adverse adjustments in the trade policies of other states).  If this 
is so, we might define harm as that level of disadvantaging that would trigger a need for 
compensation on contractualist grounds, with every society then bearing a responsibility to push 
for a global regime to prevent such harms and/or to compensate for them when they occur. 
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V. Trade Policy and Vulnerability to Exploitative Disadvantaging 
Now, one might reject the view that a society wrongs foreign dependents if it net-harms them via 
a raising of trade barriers—as long as they were not led to believe that there was no risk of this—
and still accept the claim I advance in the following section.  Indeed, one might accept that a 
society wrongs foreign dependents if, via a raising of trade barriers, it leaves them worse off than 
they would have been if that society had never existed, and still suspect that there might be cases 
in which a disadvantaging of dependents that falls short of this is wrong. 
 Consider again the hypothetical example raised in the introduction, of a European nation 
that previously had little or no barriers to agricultural imports, but subsequently joined the 
European Union, thereby necessitating an effective raising of such barriers via subscription to the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy.  Now it seems to me that were foreign producers 
disadvantaged by such a move—which would necessarily be the case as long as they could be 
classified as dependents, on my definition—there might be circumstances in which it could 
justifiably be claimed that those producers were wronged even if their disadvantaging fell short 
of net-harm (as would be the case if the raising of trade barriers set back their interests, but not to 
such an extent that they ended up worse off than they would have been if our European society 
had never existed). 
Say that, previously, our European society was less developed that most EU members, 
and thereby had little to offer them in accession negotiations.  Further suppose that it eventually 
reached a position where it could successfully negotiate admission only because it had pursued a 
successful developmental strategy that relied on agricultural imports.  Say that this development 
strategy was one of rapid structural change from a relatively-more to relatively-less agriculture-
intensive economy, and that foreign suppliers of agricultural goods were critical to the success of 
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this strategy, providing food and raw materials for the rapidly expanding industrial sector.  In a 
case like this, it seems as if foreign suppliers who were disadvantaged when our society joined 
the EU might have a claim to having been wronged even if they were not net-harmed. 
Now, it might be objected that as long as foreign suppliers received a non-exploitative 
return on their goods while our society was undergoing its structural transformation, there can be 
no claim of injustice.  In response, I would say that this might indeed be the case.  For my point 
here is essentially about what we should count among the gains of exchange—what we should 
count among those benefits to be equitably divided in order to avoid the change of mere use.  
Now it seems to me that future market opportunities—even unforeseen opportunities to pursue 
goods of a different kind—ought to count about the gains of trade. 
Sometimes this is obvious.  For example, in seeking to determine what would be an 
equitable salary for a business school professor it seems sensible to count the new earning 
opportunities that an MBA affords among the gains generated by, the albeit indirect, economic 
exchange between professor and student.  My point, however, is that we should count future 
economic opportunities in other cases too.  Just so long as they came into being as a result of the 
cooperation of others, they are to be counted among the net-gains to be divided equally. 
For further illustration, consider the case of a widget-producing factory that possesses 
monopsonistic power in the labour market.  Now imagine that the owner of that factor is 
relatively benevolent, and seeks to evenly divide the gains of that business among all who make 
a contribution to its success.  Further suppose that among the costs that he discounts in 
calculating the net-gain to be equitably distributed are expenditures on updating capital 
equipment.  Each year, the factory-owner spends on new machines and parts in order to maximse 
the business’s productive efficiency.  Now, imagine that during one year there is a dramatic 
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technological improvement in widget machines—a labour-saving improvement that enables the 
factory owner, when he comes to update his equipment that year, to lay off the majority of his 
workforce.  Because the factory is a quasi-monopsonist, remember, the workers cannot easily 
find other work in which they are trained, and so losing their jobs represents a significant loss.  
Nevertheless, say that these workers are not so badly off that they are worse off than they would 
have been had they never worked in the factory, instead specialising in some other occupation.  
Their wages were good enough over the years that they did have jobs that they do no regret their 
decision to become widget workers overall. 
Now, it seems to me these workers might nevertheless have a justified claim to having 
been wronged, even if they do not have this specific regret.  Suppose that without the hard work 
of his employees that year, the factory owner would never have been able to afford the labour-
saving machines.  Further suppose that, now he has drastically reduced his labour force, he earns 
a return several times greater than he did before, even once his remaining employees are paid 
their equitable share.  It seems to me that to the extent that the cooperation of his original 
workforce was necessary in order for the opportunity to invest in labour-saving technology to 
arise, a standard of exploitation that requires an even division of all the gains of trade would give 
the workers some claim over the gains arising from that technology, at least in circumstances 
where they were previously paid a share that was equitable only on the basis that no such 
opportunity would ever arise. 
All I am claiming is that a state may not behave in an analogous fashion with respect to 
trade dependents abroad—or to compensate them if it does.  To the extent that a society is 
presented with a previously unforeseen developmental option—in circumstances where this 
options is only available because of what foreigners have supplied in trade—and taking 
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advantage of this option (by adjusting trade policy) would represent a loss to those very same 
foreigners, it is not sufficient merely to refrain from net-harming them.  Ultimately, foreigners 
must be equitably rewarded for all the benefits that proceed from their cooperation—including 
benefits in the form of new market opportunities and developmental options. 
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Chapter 4 – A World of Bargaining States 
 
According to the argument I made in the previous chapter, there are various moral constraints on 
a state’s commercial-policy choice that are grounded on this choice capacity, given its 
implications for the economic prospects of foreigners.  Specifically, I argued that, firstly, states 
must take care not to cause or exacerbate exploitation of foreign parties to trade through the 
leverage of market power.  When a society is sufficiently large relative to the global market in a 
given good, it has the capacity to influence—via its tariff-level choice—the prices at which 
transnational trades in that good are concluded.  Further, when a society is considering raising 
trade barriers above existing levels, it must take care not to harm foreign trade dependents—
leaving them regretting that our society was ever open to trade—nor to exploitatively 
disadvantage them in making use of a developmental opportunity whose availability depended 
on their prior trade-cooperation. 
However, the cross-border obligations entailed by these constraints are not the only 
relational obligations incumbent on states in our own world, and therefore not the only moral 
considerations that might need to be borne in mind when determining state policy concerning 
trade.  This is because our own world is characterised by a multitude of transnational ties beyond 
those entailed by private exchange and commercial-policy choice.  Any one of these might 
generate additional moral demands that are appropriately fulfilled via this policy.  In this chapter, 
I focus on one of these ties—the tie entailed by diplomatic intercourse between governments in 
the domain of trade. 
I am particularly concerned with the tie of treaty partnership.  In revealing respects, 
treaties are akin to market exchanges.1  Indeed, at least if we put to one side their domestic 
                                                 
1 Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, pp. 28–29). 
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determinants and implications (particularly in distributive terms), they are analogous to bartered 
service exchanges.  When two states sign a trade treaty, they commit themselves to a particular 
commercial policy in return for a similar commitment on the part of their treaty partner.  Just as 
with a bartered service exchange between individual persons, such a commitment entails a cost: 
the state must sacrifice policy options that it would otherwise avail itself of, now or in the future.  
However, as with a bartered service exchange, treaties also proffer rewards.  When a society 
seeks, for instance, market access to other societies, a treaty offers the prospect of a reciprocal 
commitment on the part of its partner that will enable such access. 
It is on the basis of this analogy—between treaty and trade—that the key claims in this 
chapter are derived.  Just as the tie of trade between private actors grounds a requirement to 
fairly distribute the gains of exchange—on pain of exploitation—the tie of trade between states 
grounds a requirement to ensure that the gains of treaty are equitably distributed.  Indeed, it does 
not seem inconsistent with ordinary usage to talk of unfair treaties being “exploitative”.  Given 
the role that commercial policy might play in promoting the common good and developmental 
goals, these gains are not reducible to private benefits of particular cross-border exchanges.  
Indeed, at least in our own world, it might be better to think of the set of commercial policies 
emerging from the network of treaties between states as establishing the background 
circumstances against which private exchanges might or might not take place. 
And just as a private actor possessing market power would face a duty not to net-harm or 
exploitatively disadvantage trade partners by ending a relationship of recurring exchange, states 
must take care not to net-harm or unfairly disadvantage erstwhile treaty partners when, for 
instance, treaties come up for renewal or a secondary trade agreement is in prospect.  No state 
should be left regretting it ever signed a particular treaty, and no society should be made worse 
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off for making available—via a period of trade on a given set of treaty terms—even better treaty 
options for its erstwhile treaty partner. 
What this means, for our own world, is that each of us might be obligated to foreigners 
on more than the merely the basis that we play a role in shaping a commercial policy that 
determines the extent to which they might be exploited.  Say that, as a consequence of market 
power, my state has the potential, via its commercial policy choice, to cause or exacerbate 
exploitation of members of society X.  Even if I am not a trade participant myself, I owe 
foreigners who trade with my society a duty to seek to ensure that my society’s policy choice 
does not lead to their exploitation.  Now, additionally suppose that my country is in the process 
of negotiating a trade treaty, or is considering failing to renew a treaty, with X.  In cases such as 
these, I do not merely have a political duty to those particular members of X who are tied to my 
society by trade, but to everyone who resides X.  Given the role that commercial policy might 
play in promoting the common goals of a society as a whole—whether cultural, distributional, or 
developmental in nature—I have an obligation to push my government to adopt a position in 
trade negotiations that appropriately weighs the interests of everyone in a potential or erstwhile 
treaty partner. 
However, the tie of treaty does not merely expand the scope of distributive concern in the 
sense that it entails covering even those members of treaty partners who do not themselves trade.  
In the non-ideal circumstances where one cannot rely on one’s treaty partner to fulfil its 
obligations, the scope of distributive concern is expanded still further—specifically to cover 
foreigners in third-party societies who are dependent on one’s treaty partner.  The relevant 
concern is not to induce one’s treaty partner to violate the moral constraints on commercial-
policy choice outlined in Chapter by 3, by requiring such a violation as a treaty concession. 
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The claims that (a) states should ensure that any treaties they do sign are non-
exploitative, (b) no state should net-harm or unfairly disadvantage treaty-partners who are 
dependent, and (c) states ought not to induce their treaty partners to violate the moral constraints 
on commercial-policy choice outlined in Chapter 3 constitute the core claims of this chapter.  
However, in this part of the dissertation I am not merely concerned with the moral implications 
of treaty cooperation.  After all, diplomatic contact between states might be used to cajole as 
much as cooperate.  Once countries have diplomatic contact, they can, for instance, threaten a 
damaging adjustment in commercial policy with a view to forcing a trade partner to either alter 
its trade policy or refrain from a desired alteration.  They can threaten, in other words, trade 
sanctions.  And they can make clear to their trade partners when a commercial-policy adjustment 
constitutes avoidable punishment, and what must be done for the punishment to be lifted.  Even 
though this project puts to one side the negative externalities arising from trade integration—
taking a natural obligation not to harm as established and instead looking to determine what 
duties beyond this there might be—we cannot ignore what David Baldwin has called economic 
statecraft.2  This is for the simple reason that it is possible for two trade-integrated societies to be 
net beneficiaries of their relationship—each would be worse off, in other words, if the other had 
never been open to trade—while economic statecraft plays a role in how the gains of that 
relationship are distributed.  Is it permissible, for instance, for a state to threaten a commercial 
policy adjustment that was within its rights in a world of protectionist states in order to secure a 
greater share of these gains?  Yet in this chapter I argue that successful threats of this kind—or 
actual sanctions—are wrong when if they leave another society worse off than it would have 
been in the world of protectionist states.  Specifically, I argue from an analogy with blackmail, 
                                                 
2 Baldwin (1985). 
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which is normally considered wrong even within a relationship that is mutually beneficial 
overall. 
By way of a brief outline, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows.  After the 
introduction, I outline the dimensions of the world of bargaining states—the hypothetical world 
that the reader should picture for the purposes of isolating the moral intuitions that are pertinent 
to the subject of this chapter.  Then, I turn to my normative claims and their basis.  I first discuss, 
in sections I and II, how the moral demands of beneficence, and those constraining trade-policy 
choice in the world of protectionist states, should be reinterpreted in light of political intercourse 
between societies.  In section III, I examine economic statecraft, arguing that it is often wrong to 
use sanctions or threaten sanctions to redistribute the national gains of trade between two 
societies.  In section IV, I discuss what scope states retain to pursue their interests via trade 
agreements, even given the moral limits already discussed.  In sections V and VI, I turn to duties 
grounded on the treaty relationship.  I argue that treaties ought to be fair, and offer a particular 
interpretation of what this requires.  I further argue than states should (a) not net-harm or (b) 
exploitatively disadvantage dependent treaty partners via a change in policy, as might be the case 
when the gains of an existing treaty are undermined by a secondary deal with a third party.  
Finally, I discuss what duties states bear when their treaty partners cannot be relied upon to fulfil 
their obligations to dependents abroad. 
 
A World of Bargaining States 
The world of bargaining states is identical to the world of protectionist states in all but two 
respects.  In the world of protectionist states, the reader will remember, the state of social-
scientific knowledge was such that states realised the variety of goals that might be pursued via 
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commercial policy, and the range of plausible views about how to best promote those goals.  
States realised, for instance, that protectionist policy might be used to bolster economic sectors 
deemed of cultural significance—say traditional agriculture and cottage industries—or to limit 
income or occupational inequality, as well as to promote economic development.  And they were 
aware of both developmentalist and neoclassical arguments for and against protectionism.  
Further, countries in the world of protectionist states possessed the bureaucratic potential to 
implement a commercial policy entailing a great or lesser degree of protectionism.  They 
possessed the institutional capacity to, in other words, monitor and tax imports at the point of 
entry, and effectively prevent smuggling.  Nevertheless, societies in the world of protectionist 
states still faced limits on knowledge and bureaucratic capabilities.  In particular, they lacked an 
awareness or understanding of what might be achieved by attempting to influence, politically, 
the trade-policy choices of other states—involving either threats or offers—and faced 
communicative and other hurdles to establishing diplomatic contact.  In contrast, there are no 
such limits on awareness or capabilities in the world of bargaining states.  Governments realise 
the potential of economic statecraft, and recognise that mutual gains might be made via trade 
treaty.3  In addition, states have on-going diplomatic ties with one another, facilitating direct and 
rapid communication between governments. 
Nevertheless, societies in the world of bargaining states do not possess the full social-
scientific knowledge of our own world.  Most importantly, they lack an understanding of what 
                                                 
3 While my analysis in this chapter and Chapter 5 tends to presume that the treaties being discussed are liberalising 
treaties, I do not mean to imply that these are the only sorts of potential trade agreements.  I suspect that my analysis 
could also be adapted to a treaty between two states in which each offers export restraint.  It is certainly intended to 
be able to cover such an agreement.  Also, whether societies believe there is a potential for mutual benefit through a 
reciprocal lowering of trade barriers obviously depends on the ends they subscribe to, and well as their views 
regarding effective means.  From a certain perspective, of course, unilateral liberalisation is always the best course 
of action, rendering the gains that might be made via trade agreements puzzling—see Krugman (1997).  Also, note 
that even if there is a potential for trade agreements only because special interests domestically must be placated—
an obvious departure from a democratic ideal into the realm of non-ideal theory—my claims as regards cross-border 
obligations are unaffected. 
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might be achieved by expanding the reach of trade treaties so as to simultaneously include two or 
more treaty partners, and of the pitfalls of bilateral bargains made without an understanding of 
these benefits.  Besides easing the administrative burden on customs agencies, which might 
otherwise have to treat similar goods differently (depending on their country of origin) 
multilateral and coordinated treaties proffer at least two advantages over bilateral deals.  First, 
the gains they proffer are less able to be undercut by secondary treaties.  Unless a bilateral trade 
agreement contains something like the WTO’s most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause, there is 
always a danger that the benefits it promises will not be realised if one or other party signs a 
secondary agreement with another country.4 
Say that my country currently has a trade deal with country A, under which bananas from 
A are only subject to half the regular tariff.  Now say that my country signs a new preferential 
trade agreement with country B, under which B’s bananas are only subject to a third of the 
regular tariff.  Although my country is fulfilling its treaty obligations to A to the letter, the 
benefits to A are diminished to the extent that producers in B now have a relative advantage in 
market access.  Yet the greater the scope of a multilateral deal across countries, the fewer 
opportunities there will be for such undercutting deals, even if that treaty does not include a 
most-favoured-nation clause.  This is simply because, the greater the scope of a treaty, the 
smaller the pool of third-party states with which secondary agreements might be made (at least 
while treaties remain in force).  At the margin—as is almost the case with the WTO—there is no 
potential for deals of this kind. 
                                                 
4 The danger that bilateral bargains are susceptible to “concession erosion” or “concession diversion”, and that this 
danger might explain the advent of the MFN, as well as the multilateralisation of trade agreements, has received 
surprisingly limited attention in the economic literature on international trade—see Schwartz and Sykes (1997, p. 
62) and Ethier (2004, pp. 313–314).  But its bearing on ethical concerns is obvious.  In general, what economic or 
other strategic reasons there might be for an MFN provision is still poorly understood (Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2009, p. 43), although trade negotiators have long taken it to be important, perhaps in part for reasons of fairness. 
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The second benefit of multilateral treaties, of course, is that they marshal a greater 
enforcement potential.  It is obviously much more costly to be sanctioned by a multitude, or even 
all, of one’s trade partners, than to be sanctioned by merely a single trade partner.  As such, 
multilateral agreements that specific a punishment strategy—or, at least, a punishment strategy 
of this kind—are more likely, all things being equal, to secure compliance with treaty 
commitments.  Even if no state would cheat on a fair trade agreement merely because they could 
get away with it—all having an effective sense of international justice say—it is the threat of 
punishment that provides assurance that other states will fulfil their commitments, thereby 
providing even right-motivated states with a reason to abide by their treaty commitments.5  
Further, to the extent that the institution charged with executing the punishment strategy is 
regarded as legitimate, punishments tend to carry greater weight because of the disvalue they are 
taken to convey.6 
Because social-scientific knowledge in the world of bargaining states is not sufficiently 
developed to admit these two potential benefits of multilateralism, there can be no regional or 
quasi-global trade agreements—like those of the EU and WTO—in this hypothetical world.  The 
world of bargaining states, is other words, is a world with the potential for bilateral bargains 
only.  Further, because societies in the world of bargaining states lack this knowledge, the reader 
should exclude from his or her mind bilateral bargaining process or outcomes that might arrive at 
the benefits of multilateralism indirectly.  The reader should not consider, for instance, bilateral 
bargains that include a most-favoured-nation clause, or a set of bilateral bargains between each 
                                                 
5 Rather than modeling the WTO as a solution to a prisoner’s dilemma, as is usually the case, this approach models 
it as an assurance game.  For the WTO as a solution to a prisoner’s dilemma, see Trebilcock and Howse (1999, p. 7) 
and Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, pp. 146–149).  For the problem of assurance in international politics see James 
(2012, pp. 103–112). 
6 Note that we tend to regard a “fee” as very different to a “fine”, and react to these differently even when the 
monetary cost is identical.  See Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Sandel (2012, pp. 64–76). 
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and every state in the world concluded simultaneously.  These are matters that are better left to 
Chapter 5. 
For the purposes of assessing the normative claims that I make in this chapter it might 
actually be helpful—given the analogy between trade and treaty—to think of the similarities 
between the world of bargaining states and a state of nature admitting the possibility of trade 
between individual persons.  Given the limited number of countries in our own world, and the 
relative uniqueness of every country’s comparative advantage, picture a relatively sparsely 
populated state of nature, in which individual people have something more or less unique to 
offer.  Some people are good at fishing, say, while others are good at gathering fruit.  Some are 
clever, and can offer productive advice to others, while others are physically strong and skilled.  
Then, when I make some claim about what constitutes a fair deal between states, or would 
constitute wrongful action vis-à-vis an erstwhile treaty relationship, test this claim first against 
one’s intuitions governing interpersonal relations in this setting. 
 
II. Beneficence and International Bargaining 
Merely because a society has diplomatic contact with others does not, needless to say, relieve 
affluent members of that society of their duty to help those foreigners who fall below some 
absolute level of neediness—should they already have this obligation—either via transfer aid or 
non-exploitative trade.  However, the potential to sanction other states, or to arrive at mutually 
beneficial trade-treaties with them, does raise the question of whether these tools might—or 
ought to be—used to alleviate neediness; and, to the extent that they are, what the implications 
might be for the way need-alleviation should be distributed.  These questions are analogous to 
those we asked of private exchange in Chapter 2. 
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Further, the potential to impact the lives of needy people via the ending of an existing 
treaty relationship, or by undercutting a treaty with a significantly needy country by signing a 
secondary deal that gives a third party even better market access, raises the question of how a 
change in a country’s treaty stance might be constrained by the demands of beneficence.  
Finally, there is reason to wonder how beneficence constrains a state in its trade-treaty 
bargaining given the potential to impact third parties.  Just as one might need to be cognisant of 
the impact that the terms of a private exchange might have on the terms of exchanges between 
others—say the impact that the wage I pay my employees might have on what employees of 
others can expect to receive—states have cause to worry about the impact that the terms of its 
treaties have on the terms that third party states are likely to get. 
 Let us first consider sanctions as a means to further the alleviation of needs.  Picture two 
states—already, say, with the trade policies that represent their best strategies in a non-
cooperative context like the world of protectionist states—that have newly established 
diplomatic contact with one another.  Further suppose that one of these states—state B—contains 
a significant number of needy people, and that the other state—state A—believes that the 
government of B would better serve its poverty-stricken citizens by altering its trade policy.  Let 
us say that the political elite of A, which is a democracy, are almost all convinced that B should 
liberalise its commercial policy, on the basis that to do so would better promote economic 
growth.  If it is able to do so, might it be permissible for A to compel B to alter its commercial 
policy via a threat to raise barriers to trade? 
 In many circumstances, this sort of behaviour in international politics is impermissible 
(see my discussion of economic sanctions below).  After all, if a group of people determine—
according to an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure—a way of ordering 
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their common life that is different from that of a group of which I am a member, that is no reason 
to seek to alter that determination.  Indeed, respecting that group’s political autonomy requires 
abstaining from doing so.7  This is true, it would seem, even if my group is merely proposing to 
incentivise a change in that other group’s determination via otherwise permissible means, as by 
external economic policy rather than force.  Consider the following analogy from interpersonal 
relations.  Say that I am a shop-owner in a majority Christian country, and decide to convert to 
Islam.  Further suppose that a major customer, whose business ensures that my shop is profitable, 
threatens to stopping shopping at my store unless I convert back to Christianity.  Most people, I 
think, would say that this customer does wrong, even if it would be permissible for him to shop 
elsewhere for other reasons, say because an equivalent store opened up closer to where he lives.  
In seeking to blackmail me in this way, he fails to respect to my autonomy. 
Now something similar can often be said of analogous cases in international relations.  
Say that a country determines—according to an appropriately just and democratic standard—that 
it will protect agriculture and those industries that make use of traditional production techniques 
from foreign competition.  These sectors produce goods deemed to be of cultural value, and 
provide the material basis for social practices of significance to many people in that society, such 
as festivals and sports.  It would surely be wrong for another society to compel that country to 
reduce its protection of these sectors, at least if this were done purely on the basis that that other 
society considered the sectors being protected of no cultural value, or believed that privileging 
cultural over economic goals was irrational. 
Yet there are cases, I would posit, where seeking to compel other states is permissible, or 
even obligatory.  Say that a foreign society has a multitude of people in dire poverty.  Further 
suppose that that society is not a democracy, and is ruled by an unrepresentative and repressive 
                                                 
7 Walzer (1980). 
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regime.  Also imagine that our society is a democracy, and almost all of the people in our society 
with relevant expertise believe that that foreign society could alleviate the burdens of its worst 
off citizens by altering its trade policy.  Assuming that it was possible to induce that foreign 
society to alter its trade policy via a threat to do the same, wouldn’t it be permissible to do so?  
Indeed, it would seem that beneficence would require such a move—as long as it was 
permissible—as it would entail the alleviation of additional need for no additional sacrifice on 
the part of the affluent. 
Now consider trade agreements as a potential means to advance the interests of the 
foreign poor.  Just as affluent individuals might further the interests of needy persons via trade 
rather than transfer, richer states might promote the interests of the foreign poor via treaties with 
their governments rather than via, for example, unilateral opening of their market.  Say that a 
certain lowering of tariff barriers by the United States and European Union would advantage 
generally needy societies abroad, by providing market access to their agricultural producers and 
workers in textile factories.  Might the demands of beneficence be violated if this lowering were 
made conditional on generally needy states adjusting their commercial policy in some way? 
While furthering the interests of the foreign needy via treaty is not impermissible—and 
may indeed be required if more can be achieved for requisite sacrifice thereby—I would argue 
that affluent countries have moral reason, in general, to be cautious when attempting to utilise 
treaties to further the interests of the foreign needy.  Given the similarity between public treaty 
and private trade, there are analogous moral constraints on the former as the latter.  First, an 
affluent society may not use the refusal of treaty offers as an excuse for limiting what it 
sacrifices on aggregate, even if it believes that the terms it prefers are such that the foreign needy 
would benefit to a greater degree thereby. 
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Second, affluent societies must ensure that any treaties they do sign with generally needy-
countries are not exploitative.  Importantly, this does not merely mean that affluent societies 
must ensure that any treaties they do sign not give rise to private exchanges that are 
exploitative—private exchanges that, in other words, render poor trade-participants with a lower 
share of the gains of trade than that which would minimise their needs.  As trade treaties bind 
entire societies to one another—via the role that trade policy places in shaping the prospects of 
everyone in a country—they ground obligations to more than merely trade participants. 
Picture a prospective treaty between a generally rich and generally poor country entailing 
trade liberalisation on both treaty partners’ parts; and which would thereby, let us say, enable 
needy exporters in the latter to escape absolute poverty.  Such a treaty may nevertheless be 
exploitative if it would limit the poor-country government’s discretion in such a way that it could 
not serve other of its needy citizens.  Say that—to give an example that is pregnant with 
implications for our own world—that poor country’s bureaucratic potential was limited such that 
raising revenue via taxes rather than tariffs was impractical.  And that without sufficient tax 
revenue, it couldn’t invest in health and education—those services of vital interest to the poor in 
general.  In such a case, a treaty might be exploitative even if no individual transaction across 
borders was. 
In a world of international bargaining, however, states do not merely need to be 
concerned about the ability of their current treaty partners to meet the basic needs of their 
citizens.  They also have cause to be concerned with erstwhile and former treaty partners.  When 
two countries are party to an international agreement for some period, there are inevitable 
structural implications for their respective economies.  To the extent that dependencies develop, 
a country has cause to be concerned—on the basis of beneficence alone—with how the severing 
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of that relationship would impact the poor.  Indeed, given the potential for the gains made under 
bilateral bargains to be eroded by secondary deals, beneficence would also demand that states 
worry about how any prospective deal would impact need alleviation in current treaty partners 
(again, regardless of the extent to which needy persons themselves participate in trade; treaty 
commitments mould a state’s basic structure, thereby implicating all its citizens). 
Finally, picture circumstances in which a state possesses market power not merely in the 
sense that its commercial policy will mould the world price of traded goods, but in the sense that 
its treaty stance shapes the terms on which other states conclude bilateral deals.  Beneficence is 
a duty that, in the first instance, is owed to the poor in general—whether one is tied to them 
cooperatively in some way or not.  As such, a powerful state has reason to be concerned if by 
negotiating one or more treaties on a given set of terms—even if these terms are not exploitative 
of its treaty partner or partners—suppress the “price” of trade treaties in such a way that third-
party states face a diminished capacity to meet the needs of their worst-off citizens. 
 
II. Trade Policy and International Bargaining 
Merely because a state has diplomatic contact with other states—and might sanction or sign trade 
treaties with them—is no reason to think that the moral constraints on commercial-policy choice 
outlined in the previous chapter no longer apply.  While there are moral demands grounded on 
political intercourse—or so I argue in the core of this chapter—that is no reason to believe that 
states which are bound in this way are only constrained by these demands.  To the extent that the 
cross-border ties examined in previous chapters are in place, the obligations grounded on these 
ties pertain regardless of what other ties there might be.  As such, the constraints on a state’s 
commercial-policy choice that are grounded on this choice capacity—given its external effects—
172
still pertain in the world of bargaining states, establishing a minimum threshold to govern state 
policy in international bargaining.  No state, in other words, may be party to a treaty under whose 
terms it must make concessions that would violate its obligations in a world of protectionist 
states. 
But what exactly does this mean?  Consider, first, sanctions, which I discuss at greater 
length in section III below.  Here, I argue that it is often wrong to threaten an adjustment in trade 
policy—or to act on such a threat—in an attempt to compel or deter other actors in their trade-
policy choice.  For to do so, when it is wrong, is akin to blackmailing someone who is merely a 
“harmless parasite” (to use Joel Feinberg’s terminology)—someone who is an innocent 
beneficiary, via a positive externality, of the pursuit of one’s self-interest.  However, even were 
the analysis in this section of the chapter wrong, it might still be the case that to sanction another 
state is impermissible (even if threatening such might not be).  For the argument I made in the 
previous chapter implies that it is wrong to adopt a trade policy that would cause or exacerbate 
exploitation, leave trade-dependent persons abroad regretting that our society was ever trade-
open to them, or exploitatively disadvantage them given the role they have played—via their 
trade to date—in putting my society in a position to, in this case, successfully sanction.  It is 
normally wrong, in other words, to commit wrongs like this in implementing a sanction, or as 
punishment for failing to heed a threat. 
Consider, also, trade treaties.  Say that society A is considering signing a particular treaty 
with society B.  Although the change in trade policy entailed by the relevant treaty commitment 
would not disadvantage B as a whole—at least not on the view of its government—A might still 
have reason to be concerned that it would violate the constraints on commercial-policy choice 
outlined in Chapter 3.  This is for two reasons.  First, these constraints embody obligations to 
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individuals abroad, not societies.  Even if, in other words, B determined—whether via an 
appropriately democratic process or not—that a particular treaty would be beneficial overall, A 
might still need to amend its terms to ensure that it does not violate obligations owed to 
particular citizens of B (if the treaty is to be signed at all). 
More importantly, selective or preferential changes in trade policy—as when market 
access is extended to a treaty partner, but denied to others—might lead to the obligations 
outlined in the previous chapter being violated vis-à-vis third parties.  Say that A is considering 
a treaty with B that would entail a lowering of tariffs with respect to goods or services from B 
only.  Even if this agreement would be to the benefit of B—and would not entail exploitation of 
trading members of B—exporters in society C might be disadvantaged via trade diversion, even 
though the tariff rate on their goods remains the same (in absolute terms at least).  In an global 
context that allows for international treaties, in other words, states might fail to fulfil the duties 
grounded on a capacity to exercise a commercial policy even if they do not, for instance, raise 
trade barriers, but merely lower them selectively.  As such, when a society is considering signing 
a bilateral trade agreement, it must ensure that the terms would not require a change in trade 
policy that would net-harm trade dependents in third-party states (leaving them worse off than if 
that society was, and had always been, closed to trade) or exploitatively disadvantage them 
(given the role they have played in placing that society in a position to treaty in the first place). 
 
III. Economic Sanctions as Blackmail 
It might be thought that the use of trade policy for coercive purposes, or as a means to influence 
the commercial-policy choices of other states, is impermissible under all circumstances.  If there 
is a natural duty to refrain from harming, or induce compliance by threatening such, then surely 
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levelling economic sanctions, or threatening to do so, is always wrong.  However, it would be 
incorrect to reason thus.  Even given a natural duty not to harm, it does not follow that sanctions 
are always impermissible.  First, there are obviously likely to be non-ideal cases—i.e. cases in 
which other actors cannot be relied upon to do the right thing—where it is likely to be 
permissible to threaten harm as a means to incentivise compliance, or to level proportionate harm 
by way of punishment.  (I briefly discussed how sanctions might be used to further the interests 
of the foreign needy above.)  More importantly, however, even if we restrict our focus to ideal 
circumstances for a moment, it is clear that there might be cases of sanction where the relevant 
disadvantaging of foreigners would fall short of entailing net-harm or exploitative 
disadvantaging.  And the reader will recall that, in the world of protectionist states at least, it was 
permissible to adjust trade policy if it didn’t have these consequences (worries about exploitation 
prices in private transaction to one side).  It is an open question, in other words, whether seeking 
to influence other states by threatening to adjust trade policy in a way that would otherwise be 
permissible—or acting on that threat—is wrong. 
For illustration, consider the following scenario, in which trade policy is used in an 
attempt to compel.  Picture a pair of trade-integrated states that have just established diplomatic 
contact with one another.  Further, suppose that both states, having just exited a relationship of a 
form modelled by the world of protectionist states, have the commercial policies that represent 
their best strategies in this world.  Now, imagine that state A threatens to raise barriers to trade 
with respect to B, unless B lowers its own barriers.  Perhaps A threatens to level higher tariffs on 
wine unless B lowers its tariffs on wheat.  Such a move would be sub-optimal for A—at least if 
could not induce B to change its own choice thereby—given that it already has the trade policy 
that represents its best strategy in a non-cooperative environment.  Nevertheless, B might find 
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this threat credible, for a variety of reasons.  It would certainly be credible if the costs to B of this 
move would be such that—were A’s threat carried out—B would face critical pressure to relent 
before A would.  Yet also imagine that A’s threat would not, if acted upon, cause or exacerbate 
exploitation of trade-dependent persons in B, or leave them regretting that A was ever open to 
trade.  Imagine, in other words, that what A is threatening is a change to its trade policy that 
would be permissible in the world of protectionist states.  Is it wrong for A to make this threat, or 
to carry it as part of a process of wrestling a greater share of the gains of trade from B? 
Yet even if this move on A’s part would be permissible in a world of protectionist states, 
it would be wrong to threaten such a move merely in order that A gain a greater share of the 
gains of trade, unless, that is, A is already owed this greater share (which we have already 
supposed is not the case).  Of course, merely because states have diplomatic contact with one 
another is no reason to think that some policy choice, which would otherwise be within a state’s 
right, is impermissible.  As such, A may still, in the world of bargaining states, raise trade 
barriers in the way identified above should it appropriately determine that this would be in the 
best interests of its citizens.8  If, in other words, A would have made a trade policy adjustment of 
this kind even where A and B still in a world without the potential for diplomatic contact, then it 
may proceed with the adjustment.   But to threaten such an adjustment or carry it out merely as a 
means to manipulate B’s policy would be wrong on the basis that to act in this way would 
constitute blackmail.9 
                                                 
8 That the motive for an action in international politics might be thought to play a key role in determining how we 
ought to see that action from a moral point of view is a relevant thought.  For example, Ruth Sample (2012, pp. 105–
107) has argued that whether the conditions that the IMF attaches to its offers/threats are coercive or otherwise 
wrongful depends in part on whether the conditions go beyond “safeguarding the use of IMF resources”.  Dietsch 
and Rixen (2012) defend that view that what motivates a policy that attracts (“poaches?”) capital from abroad 
matters in terms of justice. 
9 Whether blackmail is wrong is, of course, itself open to dispute.  Libertarians argue that two rights (i.e. permissible 
acts) cannot make a wrong.  How could it be permissible to disadvantage someone in a certain way, yet not to 
demand payment not to disadvantage them when it would be permissible for them to gift you the money?  On the 
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Consider an analogy.  Say that I have a wonderful view from the window of my house.  
In part, my view is so good because of my neighbour’s beautiful garden.  I am clearly, therefore, 
a beneficiary of my neighbour’s love of gardening.  I am, in Joel Feinberg’s terms, a harmless 
parasite.  But my view is further enhanced by the mountains that I can see beyond.  Now, 
imagine that one day my neighbour knocks on my front door, and threatens to plant a tree in his 
garden obscuring my view of the mountains unless I agree to mow his lawn for free every 
Saturday.  He would prefer, on his own part, not to plant the tree.  He likes his garden best 
exactly as it is.  But planting a tree on his own garden is clearly within his rights.  And he 
realises that doing so would seriously worsen my view, giving him significant leverage over me.  
Further suppose that I would be better off allowing him to blackmail me in this way—despite no 
longer being able to see the mountains—than I would be if, in a fit of pique at my refusal of his 
demand, he decided to move house, leaving his garden to go to seed.  Now, surely my neighbour 
wrongs me if I am induced to mow his lawn for free every Saturday, at least as long as there is 
no other basis on which I might already owe my neighbour assistance of this kind. 
This is analogous to our scenario involving A and B above.  Both societies benefit one 
another, in the sense that each would be worse off if the other did not exist, regardless of the 
policy terms that determine how benefits are going to be divided between persons and societies.  
But as long as gains of interpersonal exchange are equitably distributed, and even if there is no 
treaty commitment between the two states, seeking to shift the terms of trade in your favour 
without offering anything in return manipulative. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
paradox of blackmail, see Feinberg (1988).  Economists and legal scholars in the economics and law movement 
have argued that permitting blackmail incentivises people to seek opportunities for blackmail rather than engaging in 
genuinely productive activities.  However, a deontological argument of relational form can also be offered: 
blackmail is an even purer form of mere use than exploitation. 
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IV. Trade Agreement Right 
As long as the demands of beneficence are satisfied, and the constraints on commercial-policy 
choice discussed in the previous chapter and in section II above are not be violated, a society in 
the world of bargaining states is free to pursue whatever trade deal or deals it holds to be in its 
best interest.  Some potential deal terms will be off limits, so to speak, on the basis that such 
terms would be exploitative (as discussed in section V below).  And whenever a state is 
considering signing a new trade deal, or failing to renew one, it must be sure that is does not 
harm or exploitative disadvantage existing treaty partners who are dependent (as discussed in 
section VI below).  But this does not mean, needless to say, that it would be wrong for a society 
to shop around in order to find those (equitable) deals that are to its best advantage. 
There is no duty in the world of bargaining states to, for instance, opt first for a treaty 
with that other society which is most disadvantaged on some metric, so as to reduce inequality 
between societies.  For this would be analogous to making the implausible claim that, for 
instance, employers domestically are under an obligation not merely to pay their workers an 
equitable wage—given the value they generate for the business—but, when hiring workers, to 
start with that individual who is the most disadvantaged, regardless of how well-suited that 
person might be, given their talents, to the relevant employment.  But just as no employer is 
obliged to act in this way (at least as long as the demands of beneficence are satisfied)—and, 
indeed, no individual is obliged to purchase a less preferred good or service merely on the basis 
that the provider would otherwise be relatively disadvantaged—no state is obligated to opt for 
one fair treaty over another merely on the basis that doing so would reduce inequality between 
societies. 
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 It might be objected that while we do not commonly think that individual persons or 
particular firms have an obligation to act in this way, we are all nevertheless under a political 
obligation to push for an order that does not allow for economic inequality as a consequence of 
morally arbitrary factors.  For instance, while I am under no obligation to frequent a less well-
stocked grocery store merely because the proprietor of that store would otherwise be less well-
off than an equally motivated and (inherently) talented proprietor of a better-stocked store, I am 
under a political obligation to support and uphold a political order that does not allow an 
inequality between these persons.  Yet I replied to these objections as extensively as I was able to 
in chapters 1 and 2, and there is no reason to think that merely because states might bargain with 
one another (but have not as yet) things might be different.  I therefore refer my reader back to 
the relevant passages of these chapters. 
 
V. Exploitative Trade Agreements 
In Chapter 2, I argued that an exchange between private actors generates a duty incumbent on the 
more powerful party to that exchange to ensure that its terms are fair.  Merely because terms 
were or might be consented to that would render less than an equitable division of the 
cooperative surplus is no justification for exploitation.  This is true, I argued, even if there are no 
natural or other relational duties that have gone unfulfilled; for exchange brings into being a 
relation of usage—a relation that has the potential to be wrongful—that would not other 
otherwise exit.  I further claimed, in Chapter 3, that states should not cause or exacerbate 
exploitation in cross-border exchange via their commercial-policy choice.  In practice, this 
obligates members of affluent democracies (even if they would not themselves trade with 
foreigners under any commercial policy) in their political capacity. 
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In a world in which states sign trade agreements with one another, however, fairness 
concerns are not restricted to private exchange.  This is because treaties might themselves be 
exploitative.  It is important to specify at the outset what I mean here.  I do not merely mean that 
it is impermissible for an affluent state to sign a treaty that would lead to a change in its 
commercial policy that would, given that state’s market power, cause or exacerbate exploitation 
in private exchange.  This much I have said already, and there would be no need to repeat it here.  
Rather, my concern here is with exploitation between societies. 
 Say that (democratic) country A is considering signing a trade agreement with country B.  
As this is a liberalising agreement, ties of exchange between members of A and members of B 
will come into being—were that trade agreement signed—that would not otherwise exist.  Now, 
citizens of A, or their representatives, obviously must seek to ensure that its treaty commitment 
not lead to exploitation of dependents.  This is likely to be a particular concern with respect to 
dependents in third-party societies, as a lowering of barriers to trade for members of B may well 
entail an effective raising of barriers with respect to trade dependents in other societies (as 
discussed under II above).  And to the extent that the new trade ties between members of A and 
members of B that would be called into being under that treaty ground obligations, in and of 
themselves, they are obligations to trade-participants in B only. 
But this is not all citizens of A have reason to be concerned about.  To the extent that a 
state’s treaty commitments limit the tools at the discretion of that government to serve domestic 
goals (whatever they may be)—and shape the structure of its economy, in particular what might 
be called its specialisation profile (the relative size of different sectors in that economy and the 
number of people they employ)—these commitments are part of a society’s basic structure.10  
And the basic structure of a society, by definition, has implications for all of that society’s 
                                                 
10 James (2005). 
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citizens.  As such, citizens of A have reason to be concerned not merely with the impact that a 
prospective set of treaty terms would have on trading members of B, but on everyone in that 
society. 
A trade agreement is unfair, and thereby exploitative, if it maldistributes—from the moral 
point of view, that is—the national gains of treaty.  In the first instance, I am concerned with 
how these gains are to be distributed across treaty signatories.  But what constitute “national 
gains”?  When a state signs a trade treaty, some of its citizens might profit, but others will bear 
costs—at least in the absence of compensation or assistance.  When, for example, the United 
States lowers tariffs on manufactures, consumers profit via access to lower-cost goods, but the 
wages of factory workers stagnate.  Given the differential effect of a treaty commitment on 
distinct citizens, does it even make sense to speak of national gains? 
For the purposes of this project, I take it that we can speak of such gains—or, indeed, 
losses.  However, we have reason to be cautious.  Merely because the actual government of a real 
country would consent to a treaty with a given set of terms should not be taken as implying that 
that treaty would even be beneficial to that country as a whole (let alone equitable in dividing 
treaty gains).  After all, that government’s determination—and/or the process by which it arrived 
at that determination—may not have been right in the relevant sense.  It may not, in other words, 
have taken into consideration the interests of each and every of its citizens in quite the right way.  
Yet it would be presumptuous to assume some metric of treaty gain—say national income, 
community surplus, or the rate of economic growth, as welfare economists do.  Not only is there 
reasonable disagreement about which of these measures best reflects whatever economists 
happen to be concerned about.  In addition, none take into consideration the distribution of 
benefits.  To the extent that citizens owe one another an equitable net-gain from public goods (as 
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discussed in Chapter 1), or choose to limit inequality democratically, these measures will be 
inadequate.  Further, none take into consideration cultural reasons that a country might seek to 
limit trade.  Say that a particular treaty would promote national income, and any gainers 
domestically would compensate the losers.  This does not necessarily mean it would be worth the 
cost to economic sectors of cultural significance.  Nor, more importantly perhaps, does it 
necessarily mean that it would be worth the adverse effect on the socio-economic distribution. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, the reader should take it that what would 
constitute a gain via treaty, and what would constitute a loss—both in the world of bargaining 
states and our own—is not prescribed.11  It is, rather, up to every society to decide for itself what 
would constitute the benefits and costs of a treaty, as well as how to balance these benefits and 
costs—both internally and against each other, given the fact of their distribution across 
persons—according to an appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure.  For much 
of this section of the chapter I will take it that the societies I am considering are democratic.  
This is not because I think that this best represents the countries of our own world, but to enable 
me to talk coherently about distributing treaty gains across societies at all. 
 Before moving on to a discussion of what an equitable division of treaty gains would be, 
there is one finally thing to note about the nature of benefits accrued under a trade treaty.  Even if 
we were purely concerned with economic benefits, it would remain the case that the gains of 
trade-treaty are not reducible to the private gains of particular transactions that would come into 
being under that treaty.  This is for two reasons.  First, in international trade theory, free trade is 
                                                 
11 Here, I differ from Aaron James (2012, p. 167), who sees trade agreements as inherently about increasing national 
income.  I differ from James for the following reasons.  First, while augmenting national income is often the prime 
concern in trade negotiations, this is not necessarily the case.  What we need is analysis that can equally be applied 
when what motivates trade treaties is political (securing international peace, for instance).  Second, even to the 
extent that augmenting national income is the primary concern in trade negotiations, it is not the only concern 
(particularly on the cost side).  There are also cultural and distributional concerns that may or must factor into a 
country’s determination. 
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seen as beneficial primarily because it allows for national specialisation—according to 
comparative advantage, at least under laissez faire—not because it allows persons to exchange 
who otherwise could not per se.  The shift in an economy’s specialisation profile that would 
occur under a treaty, in other words, accounts for most of what economists would consider 
beneficial from liberalisation, not the facilitation of whatever exchanges would occur in the 
absence of such a shift were it not for trade barriers.  And a country’s specialisation profile, of 
course, has significant implications for its growth prospects.  Some sectors and goods have 
demonstrated greater potential for total factor productivity gains via technological uptake than 
have others.  Second, international trade has a tendency to facilitate technology transfer.  To the 
extent, then, that a liberalising treaty would increase such flows, there would be economic gains 
to the economy as a whole.  In each of these ways, then, the gains of treaty are not reducible to 
the sum of the gains accruing to traders under that treaty, and when a state signs onto a trade 
treaty has reason to be concerned for its implications for its treaty partner as a whole. 
 Now, what would be an equitable division of the gains of treaty?  Here, I offer an 
analogous answer to the answer I offered with respect to private exchange in Chapter 2.  The 
gains of treaty must be divided equally, unless some special consideration (such as the extreme 
poverty of one treaty partner’s citizens) warrants a departure from that standard.12  When my 
government signs a trade treaty with another country, in the common interests of myself and my 
compatriots, I indirectly enter a cooperative relation with citizens of that country.  Part of how 
well my life goes, and that of my compatriots, is a consequence of the restraint of foreigners in 
supporting and adhering to that part of their political order that represents a treaty concession—a 
treaty commitment—to us.  (Indeed, they are similarly situated with respect to me.) 
                                                 
12 Loriaux (2012, p. 31); James (2005, p. 549); Moellendorf (2005, pp. 149–150). 
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Now, this is clearly a relationship of use, under the common understanding of that term.  
However, not all relationships of use are problematic, as I have discussed previously.  I only 
wrong another if I use them as a mere means, failing to recognise their interests adequately when 
I do cooperate with them.  As long as my compatriots and I cannot be accused of exploiting 
them, but merely exploiting the opportunity to cooperate, there is nothing problematic about that.  
As long as we are to be considered moral equals then, an equal division of the gains of treaty is 
appropriate. 
 As in the case of private exchange, it is important to remember that what is to be divided 
equally is net gains, not merely benefits were costs ignored.  And because it is up to the 
government of every country to determine what is to be considered costs for it—according to an 
appropriately democratic and rights-respecting procedure—it might even be the case that a 
country gains significantly in national income terms but is nevertheless exploited.  Say that a 
country’s government reluctantly signs onto a trade agreement, seeing few alternative avenues 
for advancing its interests, but is nevertheless worried about what the implications of that treaty 
will be for its most vulnerable people and cultural vitality.  Even were that country to gain 
significantly in national income terms, its treaty partner might still exploit it as long as it did not 
factor those costs into the equation. 
 Second, net gains are to be assessed by contrasting how well off a country would be 
(according to its own democratic determination) under a given set of terms with how well off 
that country would be at the right baseline.  And as long as one accepts that the “market price” 
(in terms of trade-policy concessions) might itself be exploitative, a country’s actual BATNA 
may not be—and is unlikely to be, in our own world—the right baseline to invoke.  The basic 
thought here is that when a country is negotiating a treaty, it ought not to consider the best terms 
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it could get in a deal with another country as necessarily its threat point (the point at which it 
would exit negotiations), as this alternative option might itself entail exploitation. 
The best way to explicate this point is by way of analogy.  Consider interpersonal trade 
again.  In this context, it is often assumed that the range of mutually beneficial prices amongst 
which a fairness principle is to choose is necessarily delimited by the parties’ respective reserve 
prices—the threat points that members of homo economicus would choose.  Say that I am in a 
second-hand bookstore and spy a title that I mean to purchase.  However, I know that I can get 
this particular text for $10 on Amazon (including shipping!).  Ten dollars is, thereby, my reserve 
price, at least if I am a good member of homo economicus.  I would be prepared to purchase the 
book in the store if it were priced $10 or less, but not if it cost more.  Now say that the owner of 
the bookstore knows that he will make a loss if he prices the book at less than $10.  Then his 
reserve price is $10 too: he would be prepared to sell for any price $10 and above, but not for 
anything less.  Now, on this account, the range of prices at which a mutually beneficial deal 
might be concluded—and between which a principle of substantive fairness is to choose—is the 
range between $10 and $10.  In other words, there is no such range, and talk of what would be 
an equitable division is beside the point, even if it is of philosophical interest. 
But notice that this account ignores the possibility that the alternative options associated 
with the respective reserve prices would themselves, if chosen, entail unfairness.13  Say that 
buying the book for $10 on Amazon would entail exploitation of that seller, or, less plausibly 
perhaps, me.  If the former were the case, then a comprehensive account of substantive fairness 
in exchange would specify a higher reserve price, whereas if the latter were the case, such an 
account would specify a lower reserve price.  Or say that instead, or in addition, for the owner of 
                                                 
13 A need for an alternative account of fairness in dividing the gains of cooperation that takes account of this 
objection is implied, I think, by Gauthier (1993). 
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the bookstore to sell the book for $10 to someone other than me would entail exploitation of that 
person, or, indeed, of the seller.  If the former were the case, then a comprehensive account of 
substantive fairness in trade would specify a lower reserve price for the seller, whereas if the 
later were the case, such an account would specify a higher reserve price for the seller. 
Now, the international market for trade treaties—even if bilateral treaties were the only 
possibility (which is not the case, of course, in our own world)—is not perfectly competitive.  
There are only 195 possible treaty partners that any one country might engage with, not an 
infinite number of such countries.  Further, given the more-or-less unique specialisation profile 
of every country in the world, the number of other states than any one country might profitably 
treaty with is likely to be much smaller still.  This will mean that when any two countries are 
negotiating a treaty with one another, there will always be a range of terms on which they might 
benefit one another.  This gives us some range over which to talk about equitably distributing 
gains.  Nevertheless, there is still reason to think that this range might not be great enough still. 
In Chapter 2 I briefly offered a view of what I thought would be the right baseline to use 
when computing gains in private exchange.  I argued that the right baseline is not one’s actual 
reserve price, but the reserve price that one would adopt if one’s prospective exchange partner 
was the only actor (besides, perhaps, oneself) in a position to provide you with the relevant 
good.  This leaves a lot of very difficult matters to be determined.  Most importantly, what are 
we to count as the “relevant good”?  Say that, returning to my original example, you are 
considering hiring me to work in your store.  Say that this store is a convenience store and my 
job would be stacking shelves.  Even if it is not necessarily fair to weigh my gain relatively to the 
best set of work terms I could get elsewhere, am I to consider the gain that I would get working 
at any given wage relative to the case where there is no work at all (I must work for myself), or 
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merely relative to the case where there is not store-work?  Or perhaps the relevant good is work 
in convenience stores only?  Or, indeed, shelf-stacking jobs in convenience stores?  The more 
narrowly we define the good, the closer the baseline will approach the market price. 
This is a very difficult issue.  Nevertheless, I am tempted to say that in the international 
realm we should say that the relevant good is a trade treaty, not some particular sort of trade 
treaty—say all trade treaties that would entail an adjustment in a country’s specialisation profile 
of a similar kind (say towards agriculture), but not trade treaties that would entail an adjustment 
of a different kind (say towards mining).  And so the baseline we should consider as appropriate 
for a country to adopt as its threat point in international negotiations is not the best set of treaty 
terms it could get elsewhere (except via coercion or trade-sanction blackmail), but rather how 
well it would do were it not to treaty with anyone.  The appropriate baseline, in other words, for 
computing treaty gains in a particular bilateral treaty is how well off that country would be in the 
world of protectionist states (although not under economic autarky as such).  And, when 
negotiating a treaty, countries should take this as their threat point, and should not seek to play 
off countries against one another in order to reap a greater share of the gains of treaty than they 
otherwise might. 
Picture, then, two countries negotiating a treaty with one another.  Each adopts as its 
threat point not the best set of terms (even non-exploitative terms14) that it could get elsewhere, 
but rather how well off it would do under political (although not economic) autarky.  How 
should these gains be distributed?  It might be tempting to leave it entirely open how the gains of 
treaty ought to be divided, or to say that equitable terms are whatever terms happen to be agreed 
                                                 
14 According to the view offered here, non-exploitative terms that might be arrived at with others may not be used as 
the baseline from which to assess what would constitute the gains of a particular treaty, as this may skew the 
division of treaty gains away from what would be an equal division properly considered once that treaty is actually 
signed.  Nevertheless, beneficence to one side, no particular treaty is obligatory.  So, if better non-exploitative terms 
can be found elsewhere, it is permissible to opt for that deal instead. 
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to.  But this wouldn’t be adequate.  Even if we level the bargaining inequality that arises when 
states possess an unequal capacity to trade potential treaty partners off against one another, there 
might remain a bargaining advantage.  And it is difficult to see how taking advantage of this 
leverage, when it would enable a country to skew the division of treaty gains away from 
substantive equity, rather than towards it, can be squared with a fundamental commitment to 
treating persons as equals. 
Say that one of our two countries would do much better under political autarky than the 
other.  It might use this advantage to its benefit in treaty negotiations by threatening to end the 
negotiations if it doesn’t get exactly the terms that it wants.  Strictly speaking, of course, a threat 
to exit negotiations purely because you don’t get the terms that you want, when any terms within 
the relevant range would benefit you, ought not to be credible.  To the extent that treaty 
negotiators cannot be sure of the “rationality” of their negotiation partners, however—and given 
behavioural evidence that persons are willing to walk away from being benefited if they don’t 
benefit sufficiently—this might indeed be used to skew the distribution of treaty gains. 
Indeed, no other advantage that one set of negotiators might have over the other seems to 
justify an unequal division of the social surplus arising from treaty.  Say that one set of 
negotiators are better trained and aggressive, and are aware of what psychological tricks might 
be played to gain an advantage.  Or say that one set of negotiators is better resourced and 
informed about all the implications there might be of a concession under every conceivable set of 
terms (there is certainly an inequality of this kind among representatives of countries at the 
WTO, where some countries have been unable to afford permanent representation).  None of 
these grounds seem relevant.  Indeed, it might even be thought that utilising psychological tricks 
to ensure that one’s society receive an equitable share of the gains of treaty—in the non-ideal 
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circumstance where one’s treaty partner cannot be trusted to afford you this otherwise—might be 
though morally suspect despite its worthy objective.  It seems then, that treaty gains ought to be 
distributed equally (relative to the baseline in which both treaty partners have no political 
relations with one another—although there might be ties of interpersonal trade) and that any 
bargaining advantage that one side might have over the other can only be utilised to achieve an 
equitable division, and even then this is hardly ideal. 
Now, it might be objected that prescribing equality threatens to obviate democratic 
deliberation between parties to a trade agreement.  But this is far from the case.  For a start, 
saying that gains ought to be distributed “equally” leaves a lot to be determined.  In Chapter 2 I 
noted that even if we were merely talking about dividing economic gains—which in this context 
might mean increases in income per capita, or the growth rate—there is going to be disagreement 
on what metric to use.  Indeed, there is the question of whether we should use an objective metric 
(like per capita income gain at purchasing-power-parity) or seek to secure, as best we are able, an 
equal division in subjective terms (of utility gains, or proportionate utility gains, say). 
In the context of international trade negotiations, however, there is the added 
complication of non-economic costs, political benefits, and distributive obligations among 
compatriots, all of which societies have a right to determine themselves.  And this is merely on 
the philosophical side of the equation.  There are going to be very real divisions in social-science 
about what the impact of any particular treaty concession might be in terms of the all the range of 
things treaty negotiators will, and ought to be, concerned about.  These divisions are magnified 
to the extent that determining the impact of a treaty means attempting to predict, rather than 
merely seeking to explain after the event. 
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What this points us towards is a standard according to which negotiations abide by an 
appropriate norm of public justification—within the bounds set by how well each society would 
do in the world of protectionist states (no negotiator need justify a set of terms that wouldn’t 
address a pre-existing inequality, beneficence to one side)—where “equality of gain” is the 
premise from which negotiators develop their arguments rather than the trump card that 
precludes discussion. 
 
VI. Concession Erosion and Dependent Societies 
In Chapter 3, I argued that when a society is considering raising barriers to trade, it must take 
care not to harm foreign trade-dependents—those individuals abroad whose wellbeing depends 
on maintaining their trade ties with that society.  Here, harming is defined as more than merely 
disadvantaging relative to the status quo ex ante, as this would entail a general prohibition on 
raising trade barriers, which is implausible.  If it is not wrong for me purchase less from some 
store than I previously did—in most circumstances at least—why would it be wrong for a society 
to act analogously?  Rather, to harm is to leave persons with whom a society previously traded 
worse off than they would have been if that society was, and had always been, closed to trade.  
Given the opportunities that foreigners forgo—either entirely (due to economies of scale or a 
high minimum efficiency scale in a sector where an opportunity was located) or partially (given 
a lost chance to have become more efficient in an alternative role that is, nevertheless, still 
available)—when they decide to specialise in a good that makes them dependent on my society, 
my government should ensure that any change in trade policy not leave foreigners worse off than 
they would have been if they had taken the best of these alternative opportunities instead.  
Indeed, I further claimed that there might be disadvantagings of dependents via the raising of 
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trade barriers that might be wrong even if they fell short of net-harm.   Specifically, I argued that 
it is wrong to disadvantage dependent foreigners without compensation by taking advantaging of 
an unforeseen developmental option that was only available because of their prior trade-
cooperation.  (For simplicity’s sake, I will consider only the first wrong in this section, but an 
analogous argument can be made with respect to the second.) 
 Now, in the world of protectionist states, these constraints on adjusting trade policy only 
encompassed the interests of foreigners directed tied to my society by trade.  They did not 
encompass, significantly, the interests of foreigners who were not themselves party to trade, even 
if they shared the same nationality as trade dependents.  In other words, in the world of 
protectionist states, a prospective raising of trade barriers could not be ruled out, morally 
speaking, merely because it would disadvantage non-trading foreigners—even if they would end 
up worse off than if our society was, and had always been, closed to trade.  After all, 
disadvantaging someone—even leaving them worse off than if you did not exist—is not 
normally thought wrong in the absence of the right sort of tie.  Were a new and superior diner to 
open up in Ithaca, and drive the State Diner out of business, it is clear that the owner (and 
perhaps employees) of State Diner would be better off if that new diner had opened in Cortland 
instead.  But in the absence of some tie between the new diner and State Diner—perhaps one of 
usage that could be deemed coercive or exploitative—few would see anything objectionable 
about that. 
In the world of bargaining states, in contrast, there is a constraint on adjusting trade 
policy that encompasses the interests of members of foreign societies who are not direct trade 
participants themselves.  This constraint is not grounded on the treaty relationship in one sense, 
being rather a reincarnation of the duty not to harm.  Yet a trade-treaty relationship of 
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dependence entails a vulnerability to be wronged that would not otherwise exist.  To illustrate 
this constraint, consider the following scenario.  Say that developed-country A has a treaty with 
country B that extends preferential market access to B.  B is primarily a banana-producing 
economy, and the treaty specifies that bananas from B are only subject to half the normal tariff.  
Now imagine that the treaty is coming up for renewal, and A is considering cancelling it.  Or 
imagine that A is thinking of signing a secondary deal with C that would entail C’s bananas 
being subject to only a third of the normal tariff.  Although A would not be violating its treaty 
commitment by making either move, might one or the other nevertheless be wrong?15 
 On the argument I seek to advance, A does wrong if it leaves B regretting that it was ever 
party to a trade agreement with A—according to its democratic determination—even if it does 
not leave trade-dependent members of B worse off than if A was, and had always been, closed to 
trade.  Indeed, A does wrong on these terms even if B is better off as a whole than if A was, and 
had always been, closed to trade (just not as well off as B would have been if there was no 
potential for diplomatic contact with A, as in the world of protectionist states). 
But how might B be vulnerable to being disadvantaged to this extent?  Say that, had B 
never signed a treaty with A, its economy would have been much more diverse, in the sense that 
the degree of national specialisation would have been limited.  Further suppose that, had it been 
more diverse—diverse enough such that it would not have relied only on cash crops—its 
economy would have experienced greater growth gains via technological development in capital-
intensive sectors.  In a case like this, B may be extremely vulnerable to being harmed.  Indeed, if 
B already regrets having specialised in a cash crop—but is unable to easily shift to a different 
pattern of national specialisation given the strictures of path dependence—any disadvantaging of 
                                                 
15 As noted previously, the WTO’s most-favoured-nation clause effectively combats concession erosion—
particularly why multilateralised. 
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B caused by a failure of A to renew a trade treaty will constitute a wrong, at least to the extent 
that B was not already on the path to a cash-crop specialisation at the time when the treaty was 
signed.  Or imagine that, had B never agreed to this deal, it would have opted for a trade 
agreement with country C, who proffered market access for coffee.  Further suppose that, had it 
originally specialised in coffee, it would now be a highly efficient coffee producer—so efficient 
that, were it induced to shift to a coffee specialisation latterly by A’s failure to renew a treaty, it 
could not be efficient enough not to leave it regretting the lost opportunity to have developed a 
national expertise in coffee from the beginning. 
 Notice that as the duty in both these cases is owed to B as a collective, A must take into 
consideration the interests of non-trading members of society B in addition to those of direct 
trade dependents.  But this does not mean, of course, that it is up to members of A to 
determine—by weighing the private interests of various members of society B in the way that it 
sees fit—what is to count as a harming of B.  At least when B is a minimally democratic society, 
what is to count as harmful should be assessed relative to the national priorities that members of 
B have determined for themselves.  In theory at least, it might be the case that trade dependent 
members of B do not regret—on the basis of their private preferences at least—that their country 
was ever party to a treaty with A, while it is nevertheless that case that B is harmed.  Imagine 
that, if A failed to renew its treaty with B, farmers in B could shift from banana- to coffee-
production for sufficiently low cost.  It might nevertheless be the case that B is harmed because, 
for example, B has determined that bananas proffer greater developmental gains over time, or 
banana-production has a cultural significance for that national community that coffee-production 
does not. 
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 Now, it might be thought that when two countries sign a trade agreement, there is always 
some assumed risk that when the treaty comes to an end it will not be renewed.  And if that 
treaty does not entail something like a most-favoured-nation clause (which we have put off 
considering until the next chapter) there is an assumed risk that the relevant concessions will not 
turn out to be as beneficial as initially thought as they are eroded via undercutting agreements 
with third-parties.  But the argument I sought to advance here is merely analogous to the 
argument I made with respect to dependent foreigners in the previous chapter.  If there are duties 
to individuals tied to my society in trade—not to exploit, net-harm, or exploitative 
disadvantage—there must be analogous duties to societies tied to mine via treaty, given the 
relevantly similar structure of trade and treaty.  
And it would seem that the responses I offered in Chapter 3 to the objection that 
individual actors ought to bear their own risks is equally applicable here.  Most importantly, 
there is the following consideration: even if we think that, normally speaking, actors ought to 
bear the risks to which they voluntarily commit, we might not think that “normal” circumstances 
ought to cover cases where actors face unfair inequalities in pressures to take risks.  Picture two 
countries in the world of bargaining states that are equivalently endowed in terms of their natural 
resources, have similar national cultures, and are almost identical in political and legal terms.  
Now imagine that one is better off than the other.  Perhaps this is because one society has been 
beset by a natural disaster, or must suffer the legacy of decisions made by previous generations 
under a prior regime that was undemocratic.  Or, indeed, perhaps both countries have had very 
similar historical trajectories, with their governments assuming almost identical risks; it just so 
happens that one country struck the lucky side of these risks while the other did not.  Now, 
further suppose that these countries are in a trade agreement with one another, and that the more 
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fortunate country is considering failing to renew the treaty—or to sign a secondary agreement 
that would undermine the gains to the less fortunate party.  Now it seems to me that the fact that 
that poor country faced greater pressure to enter such an agreement constrains what the more 
fortunate society might do, even if it was never under an obligation to neutralise that unfair 
inequality in the absence of the treaty tie. 
 
VI. Treaties that Incentivise Wrongdoing 
Thus far in this chapter I have shown how the tie of treaty expands the scope of distributive 
concern to include all citizens of treaty partners, not merely direct participants in cross-border 
exchange.  As a citizen of a democratic society tied to others via treaty, I have duties beyond 
those to persons with whom I am directly tied via trade, and to persons with whom my 
compatriots are so tied.  As the treaty concessions that other states might make for the common 
good of myself and my compatriots shape the prospects of everyone living in that state, I have 
duties to non-trade-participants in that state too.  These are not duties to weigh their interests 
equally in every way (much of their political order still generates and distributes benefits 
between them only) but they are significant. 
However, this does not exhaust the extent to which being party to a trade agreement 
expands the scope of distributive concern.  When my government signs a treaty with another 
country that entails concessions in terms of their trade policy (remember that, in our own world, 
concessions in some other domain might be sought instead) we must be satisfied that these 
concessions not entail violation of the moral constraints on commercial-policy choice outlined in 
Chapter 3.  To this extent at least, societies in the a world of bargaining states must consider the 
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interests of (some) individuals who are members of third-party societies, even if these 
individuals are not bound to my society via trade, but rather to the society of my treaty partner. 
 In section II above, I argued that no state may offer a concession to another state in trade-
deal negotiations that would entail violations of the moral constraints on commercial-policy 
choice outlined in the last chapter—obligations that are owed, the reader will remember, to 
individuals abroad who are dependent on their trade ties to my society.  Picture, then, the 
partially non-ideal circumstances in which one’s treaty partner cannot be relied upon to fulfil the 
very same obligations.  It would be wrong, in such circumstances, to be party to an agreement 
that would require an adjustment in one’s treaty partner’s trade policy that would net-harm, for 
example, individuals dependent on that society. 
This doesn’t seem to me to be sufficiently controversial to need much of a defence.  It 
would be outrageous to suggest that, in the everyday circumstances of interpersonal relations, 
incentivising wrongdoing by others—in circumstances where those others would otherwise have 
avoided wrongdoing—is not in itself wrong.  Say that my employees are often late for work, or 
not as early as they could be, because they are frequently forced to stop at a school crossing.  It 
would be appalling for me to offer them a raise if they promised to ignore the crossing guard’s 
instructions and speed dangerously past when they would otherwise stop.  And it would be idle 
of me to object that my employees need not have accepted my offer, so only they ought to bear 
responsibility for the unacceptable risks borne by the children. 
196
Chapter 5 – A World of Coordinated Bargaining 
 
Just as private exchange grounds a duty incumbent on the individual to equitably distribute the 
gains of trade, bilateral trade agreements ground a duty incumbent on states to equitable 
distribute the gains of treaty across signatory-societies.  When this duty is not fulfilled, a treaty is 
exploitative even if it is voluntary and mutually beneficial.  Furthermore, when a state is 
considering failing to renew a bilateral treaty, or negotiating a secondary trade deal that would 
reduce the gains accruing to its treaty partner under the first treaty, it must be sure not to net-
harm or exploitatively disadvantage its erstwhile treaty partner overall.  Finally, bilateral trade 
agreements ground an obligation to ensure that the terms of each and every agreement not induce 
one’s treaty partner to adopt a trade policy that would violate the moral constraints on 
commercial-policy choice outlined in Chapter 3.  For example, if adherence to a trade agreement 
necessarily entails a treaty partner adopting a commercial policy entailing exploitation of persons 
who are trade-dependent on that society, one is partially responsibility despite no direct tie to 
those wronged.  These are the moral constraints generated by diplomatic intercourse on a 
bilateral basis, or so I argued in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, we do not yet have sufficient analytic resources to enable us to interrogate, 
in moral terms, our own trade-integrated world.  This is because, needless to say, there are no 
barriers to multilateral trade agreements in our own world.  Indeed, in taking advantage of this 
fact, states in our own world have formed an organisation of near global scope to coordinate 
treaty-bargaining across all of its member-states simultaneously—the WTO.  There are also a 
number of preferential trading blocs, most notably the European Union.  We have cause to 
consider, therefore, a final hypothetical world: a world of coordinated bargaining.  It is in 
reflecting on this world—and testing our intuitions regarding acts and omissions in this world 
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against our intuitions about analogous acts and omissions in the everyday circumstances to 
which we are better attuned—that we will arrive at the final set of moral considerations of 
relevance to our own world. 
Yet the reader may wonder what reason we have to think that deals involving more than 
two states might ground additional moral demands beyond those that are grounded by bilateral 
deals.  If we wish to speak to a world of states in which such treaties are a reality, surely all we 
need to do is rearticulate the principles derived in the previous chapter to suit these 
circumstances?  So, if a treaty includes more than two parties, fairness requires an equitable 
division of the gains of treaty across all parties to that treaty, not merely any two.  And if a group 
of states is considering signing a trade agreement that would undermine the gains accruing to 
existing treaty partners—picture a subset of multilateral treaty members entering into a 
preferential trade agreement to the exclusion of others, as when the European Economic 
Community was formed from a subset of contracting parties to GATT—they must be sure not to 
net-harm or exploitatively disadvantage any of those prior treaty partners.  And, if a society is a 
member of a multilateral treaty, it has reason to be concerned if that agreement’s terms induce 
any of its treaty partners to violate the constraints on commercial policy choice discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
It is certainly true that merely applying the moral demands derived in previous chapter to 
a multilateral context goes a long to explain why, in our own world, the advent of the WTO has 
expanded the scope of distributive concern.  Indeed, it is important that the reader note the 
following: once these rearticulated obligations are taken together, it is no longer the case that any 
foreign individual’s or society’s interests drop out when a state is determining its external 
economic policy.  The reader will recall that in Chapter 3 I argued that even if a society 
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possesses the power to alter the world price of a good via its trade-policy choice, it need only be 
concerned if it exploits, net-harms, or exploitatively disadvantages those particular foreigners 
with whom it is directed tied via trade.  At least in the absence of a global treaty, resulting 
exploitation, net-harming, or exploitative disadvantaging of other foreigners is properly the 
responsibility only of those states that wrongly utilise the bargaining leverage extended to them 
by that trade-policy choice. 
Analogously, I made the argument in Chapter 4 that, when concluding a trade treaty, a 
state need only be concerned not to exploit its treaty partner.  It need not, in contrast, be 
concerned if, by concluding a treaty on those terms, it depresses the terms of treaties amongst 
third-party states.  For this represents, again, a wrong on the part of those third-party states who 
need not have taken advantage of the increase in their bargaining power attendant on that treaty.1  
But notice that, given a trade agreement to which all states are party (as agreements embodied by 
the WTO nearly represent), it is no longer the case that a state need only consider certain trade-
dependent individual’s interests in determining its external economic policy.  Given the duty not 
to induce a treaty partner to violate its obligations, discussed in the final section of the previous 
chapter, a society acquires, via its membership of a globally-comprehensive treaty, reasons to be 
concerned about the impact of that treaty as a whole. 
Yet there is something structurally distinct about a world in which coordinated bargaining 
is a possibility, at least as I specify such a world here.  The reader will remember that, when I 
                                                 
1 It may be that states have some license to use the bargaining advantage extended to them as a consequence of the 
treaty activities of others.  Say that a security competitor gets an equitable trade deal that is very favourable to it, in 
circumstances where if my state was to conclude a trade deal on equitable terms with some other party, my state 
would be at a competitive disadvantage.  Further suppose that because my state’s competitor has already concluded 
a deal, other societies are more eager to sign a treaty than would otherwise be the case.  In circumstances like this is 
may be permissible to sign a trade deal that proffers fewer advantages to one’s treaty partner.  Indeed, such a deal is 
not exploitative as long as security is considered one of the gains of treaty to be equitably divided (see Gilpin, 2001, 
pp. 78–80).  This is analogous to the argument that firms can pay their workers less in the non-ideal circumstances 
where rival firms cannot be relied upon not to exploit their workers. 
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specified the dimensions of the world of bargaining states, I indicated that the reader should 
consider the state of social-scientific knowledge in that world insufficiently advanced to admit 
treaty provisions that would prevent new deals from undercutting existing agreements.  But, as I 
outline further in the next section of this chapter below, this implausible assumption is now 
relaxed.  In picturing the world of coordinated bargaining, therefore, the reader is not merely to 
imagine circumstances in which multiple states might arrive at trade agreements analogous to 
those that were restricted to two parties in the previous chapter.  Rather, the reader should 
envisage a world in which those trade agreements arrived at might additionally restrict what 
further trade treaties parties to that agreement might negotiate, at least as long as the agreement 
is in effect.  Indeed, the reader should not only picture formal treaties entailing such restrictions, 
but informal agreements with the same effect (picture a coalition of states forming a united front 
purely for the purposes of bargaining within the WTO).  This is why the hypothetical world the 
reader should imagine for the purposes of this chapter is called the world of coordinated 
bargaining, rather than the world multilateral bargaining.  We are not merely concerned with 
treaties arrived at involving more than two parties, but that societies might unite for strategic 
purposes, including informally. 
For a multilateral trade agreement to be restrictive in this sense, it must either (i) restrict 
future deals amongst any subset of signatories that might disadvantage other signatories (as per 
WTO regulations on preferential trade blocs) and/or (ii) restrict future deals between any one 
signatory and a non-signatory that would reduce the gains of that agreement accruing to current 
signatories (picture a single member of the European Union signing a trade deal with a non-
member entailing a reduction in agricultural protection, thereby undermining the EU’s common 
agricultural policy).  The WTO’s most-favoured-nation principle is restrictive in both these 
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senses.  By requiring that market access extended to one foreign society—whether another 
member of the WTO or a non-member—be extended to all members, the MFN provision dis-
incentivises secondary agreements (either with other members or outsiders), at least as long as 
unilateral liberalisation it taken as a cost. 
The remainder of this chapter is, then, structured as follows.  After outlining the world 
with coordinated bargaining, I discuss the merits of the MFN principle.  As previously noted, this 
principle has obvious fairness appeal.  Besides ensuring that countries that supply very similar 
goods are not subject to very different tariffs (although this can, in fact, be in the importing 
country’s economic interest), this principle mitigates against concession erosion.  In section II, I 
move on to a discussion of the WTO in light of the claims I made in the previous chapter about 
using one’s trade policy strategically.  I raise the possibility that the WTO—or indeed other 
coordinated deals that share relevant features with the WTO—may not merely be inequitably 
distributing treaty gains, but blackmailing weaker members in bargaining rounds and accession 
negotiations.  In section III I discuss what would be necessary in order that the WTO—or more 
advantaged members of that club—not exploit existing members in trade negotiations or 
prospective members in accession negotiations.  Then, in section IV, I return to the “coercive 
claim”.  I argue that it may be the case that richer members of the WTO owe poorer members 
more than merely an equal net-share of treaty gains, which they would be owed on the basis of 
cooperation alone.  Finally, I reflect on a few common criticisms of the WTO.  While my project 
aims to derive a fair trade ideal, not to contrast our own world with this ideal, it might be useful 
to offer a few tentative thoughts on such a contrast.  I largely put to one side, for present 
purposes, beneficence and the constraints on commercial-policy choice outlined in Chapter 3.  
These duties would still apply in a world with coordinated bargaining, of course, but the reader 
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can relatively easily determine how they would apply by extrapolating from sections I and II of 
the previous chapter. 
Before moving on, it may be helpful to contrast the approach I have taken in this chapter 
with other approaches by political philosophers to similar matters.  The following chapter is 
concerned with coordinative trade treaties (treaties that include provisions restricting what 
further agreements are likely to be arrived at) in the whole, not merely with the WTO.  The fact 
that I often use the WTO to illustrate the claims that I am making, and reflect on what the 
implications might be for the WTO of the arguments that I advance, needs no explanation.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to those few political theorists who have concentrated on the trade 
regime in their writings, I am not merely concerned with the WTO.  I seek a standard that could 
guide negotiators in plurilateral or other multilateral settings too. 
More importantly, perhaps, I seek to break down what coordinative deals imply in 
relational terms.  This is in contrast to most existing accounts.  To date, philosophers who have 
argued that the WTO grounds some sort of distributive requirement that would not otherwise 
pertain have argued that, quite apart from the fact that the WTO is a cooperative venture, and 
one that might be characterised as coercively enforcing its rules, it is inescapable.  In other 
words, the costs of not being a member of the WTO are too great for us to assess the WTO as if 
it were merely a voluntary club.  As such we should look at the WTO as we do the state—in 
relation to which, of course, many people believe that there are grounds for distributive concern.  
For example, Pietro Maffettone writes that: 
 
Members in the WTO system are normally seen as participants in a voluntary 
scheme of trade relations.  I think, however, that this is a partially misleading 
reconstruction of reality...  The bottom line is that the contemporary WTO system 
is almost inescapable with 151 members (including all large markets) out of 192 
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trading nations…  If an organization (or a regime) enjoys the quasi-monopoly in 
its sector, non-membership ceases to be a practicable option.2 
 
But from the perspective of this project, this argument proceeds too quickly.  First and foremost, 
the de facto global order (or “arrangement”, if “order” is to be restrictively defined) is 
inescapable regards of what it looks like.  Indeed, just so long as there are no other planets or 
alternative universes into which individuals or societies unhappy with our own world can 
costlessly jump, the global arrangement is literally inescapable, rather than merely being costly 
to escape (as in the case of the state and the WTO).  If avoidability were all that mattered, in 
other words, relations would be irrelevant, and people would be entitled to the same holdings 
regardless of what cooperative relationships they chose or happened to find themselves in.  For 
the set of effective options and their value that each and every individual would be faced with 
even in the world of autarkies is equally as inescapable as the set of effective options and their 
value that each and every individual might face in a world with coordinated bargaining.3 
Darrel Moellendorf has (unsurprisingly, given his cosmopolitan perspective) implied this 
criticism in discussing the WTO.  Moellendorf notes that: 
 
…although state leaders are formally free either to deepen engagement with the 
world market or not to do so [emphasis added], if they have no reasonable 
alternative path to development—as appears to be the case—then the moral 
significance of this area of choice is slight. Moreover, in many cases citizens of 
countries that choose such a development path effectively have no choice in the 
matter. The burdens of unequal life prospects and the constraints on domestic 
                                                 
2 Maffettone (2009, pp. 253–254).  See also Cohen and Sabel (2006, p. 168), Sangiovanni (2007, pp. 18–19) and 
Loriaux (2012, p. 28).  Note that it might be thought that it is the inescapability of a society’s basic structure that 
grounds egalitarian distributive requirements within the state, rather than some other feature of the domestic order 
(Rawls, 1999, pp. 6–10; Pogge, 1989, p. 247). 
3 This objection could be levelled at Laura Valentini (2011, pp. 212–214), who defines “systemic coercion” in such 
a way as to rule no one’s set of options as even partially non-coerced.  Valentini writes that “a system of rules is 
coercive if it foreseeably and avoidable places nontrival contraints on some agent’s freedom” where those rules do 
not need to be authored or enforced by a “group agent”, and the baseline for determining whether anyone is 
constrained (rather than enabled) is, seemingly, how well off they would be under a feasible alternative set of rules. 
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policy of the global market are not, therefore, in a morally relevant sense 
voluntarily assumed.4 
 
In other words, even if the WTO didn’t exist, and there was merely a global market formed by 
cross-border exchange—as in the world of liberal trading societies—there would be grounds to 
think, from this perspective at least, that distributive duties across borders ought to be equally 
demanding.  But from the perspective that I have adopted in this dissertation, it is not only what 
set of options each and every person and society is faced with that matters, but also what 
relationships shaped these options, what kind of relationships these were, and whether any of 
these options might themselves lead to new relationships being formed. 
 It is also worth noting that even if it is true that egalitarian distributive obligations of 
some kind are owed between fellow members of some cooperative club just in case the cost of 
exiting that club is sufficiently great, this tells us nothing about what might be owed to outsiders.  
To the extent that I argue that outsiders ought not to be harmed via blackmail (imagine non-
WTO-members being denied trade-policy concessions merely to pressure them to enter the 
WTO), I have something to say where alternative accounts must remain silent. 
 
A World of Coordinated Bargaining 
The hypothetical world that the reader should envisage when reflecting on the normative claims 
that I make in this chapter is closely akin to the world of bargaining states.  States in the world of 
coordinated bargaining are aware of what might be gained via international treaty, and possess 
the institutional capacity to maintain on-going channels of diplomatic communication with one 
another, as well as to attempt to enforce whatever commitments they have made.  Nevertheless, 
the world of coordinated bargaining is closer to our own than the world of bargaining states in 
                                                 
4 Moellendorf (2005, p. 149). 
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the following respect: states realise what might be gained via coordinated, as opposed to 
bilateral, deals.  For the purposes of this chapter, coordinated deals are defined as treaties that 
both involve more than two parties and entail restrictions on what secondary agreements parties 
might be signatory to. 
 A coordinated agreement is taken to be more attractive than a bilateral deal—or even a 
series of bilateral deals that, in cumulative effect, would entail identical policy commitments on 
the part of one’s treaty partners—because the gains it proffers are more secure.  First, the more 
parties are included in any particular deal, the lesser the likelihood that a potential for mutually 
beneficial agreement between any two will go unrealised.  Say that A signs a treaty with B under 
which B is granted preferential market access to A.  However, A subsequently realises it can 
improve its position by granting an even more generous deal to B’s competitor C.  If A were to 
sign such a treaty with C, B’s interests would obviously be set-back.  Indeed, B might be left 
regretting signing its treaty with A if the impact of its treaty commitment on the structure of its 
economy left it overly reliant on continued trade with A.  Obviously, had C been included in 
treaty negotiations from the outset—thereby presenting A and C with an earlier opportunity to 
realise what they might gain from one another—B might have been saved some trouble. 
 Of course, as economic and political circumstances change, new opportunities for 
secondary deals might emerge, even if the universe of such opportunities were exploited initially.  
The second advantage of coordinated deals—in terms of better securing the prospective gains of 
treaty—is, however, that they might include limits on what further trade deals signatories to that 
treaty might negotiate.  As discussed in the introduction to this chapter above, these limits might 
apply to further agreements among some subset of treaty members and/or to secondary deals 
involving outside states.  And they might take the form of either explicit prohibitions or merely 
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provisions that serve to dis-incentivise such deals.  From a certain perspective—although not the 
(neoliberal) viewpoint from which any non-zero trade barrier is irrational, regardless of the 
policies of others—the WTO’s most-favoured-nation principle is a provision of the latter kind.  
Although no member of the WTO is prohibited from unilaterally extending market access to 
another society as part of some special deal, by requiring that any such offer also be extended to 
all other WTO members—as well as requiring the same via a reciprocal concession, at least as 
long as the other party to that deal is also a member of the WTO—the MFN serves to render 
such deals less attractive.  After all, why grant a whole set of countries besides one’s bargaining 
partner market access without getting anything in return? 
 In reality, of course, there is no reason why a bilateral trade agreement might not be 
restrictive in the sense discussed above (i.e. there is no reason why a bilateral deal cannot include 
an MFN clause, even if neither party would find this attractive).  However, for the purposes of 
expository parsimony, the reader will recall that the potential that treaties might take this form 
was ruled out when specifying the world of bargaining states.  That this unrealistic assumption is 
now relaxed is one reason why the hypothetical world upon which the reader should now reflect 
is properly termed the world of coordinated bargaining, rather than, say, the world of multilateral 
bargaining.  We are not merely concerned with how the gains of treaty are to be divided amongst 
a plurality of parties; we also wish to ascertain the moral implications of what might be thought 
of as collusion between states in the “market” for trade agreements. 
 The third reason why the prospective gains of a coordinated deal are likely to entail a 
lesser risk—than, say, a set of bilateral agreements entailing identical commitments on the part 
of each of one’s treaty partners—is that coordinated deals typically marshal a greater 
enforcement capacity.  If a state fails to uphold its side of a bilateral bargain, the worst it can 
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expect is reciprocal defection on the part of its treaty partner—plus, perhaps, some diminishment 
of its international reputation as a reliable treaty partner in general.  In contrast, if a state fails to 
live up to its commitment under a multilateral treaty, it might suffer retaliatory action by all 
members of that agreement.  The utility of coordinating a collective punishment strategy for the 
failure of any single party to live up to their commitments is, of course, one of Hobbes’s most 
important contributions to political philosophy.5  The idea is powerfully illustrated in the famous 
frontispiece from the 1651 edition of Leviathan, in which the body of the figure representing the 
sovereign—whose purpose is to keep the people “in awe”—is literally composed of all the 
individual parties to the social contract. 
 Finally, the gains of a coordinated deal are more secure than the gains of a set of bilateral 
deals—even a set entailing identical policy commitments—to the extent that the former takes on, 
in the minds of its parties at least, a normative authority that the latter lacks.  When the parties to 
a treaty specify precisely what would constitute a sanctionable failure to fulfil a commitment, 
stipulate a procedure for determining if a putative failure is indeed illegal, and authorise a 
punishment for that failure, they are certainly assuming a certain normative authority—namely 
an authority to prescribe international law.  But besides this there are reasons why the parties to 
such an agreement—one involving multiple parties and specifying legal wrongs and attendant 
punishments—might consider failing to fulfil a treaty commitment a greater wrong than they 
otherwise  would.  Say that a society felt no duty to uphold its commitment under a treaty merely 
on promissory grounds—and would, as a consequence, only be inclined to abide by its 
commitment to the extent that it could be deterred by threatened penalties.  It might nevertheless 
be the case that such a society would feel some moral reason to abide by its commitments if the 
coordinated treaty it was party to was of the form identified above.  First, when a state is party to 
                                                 
5 Rawls (2007, p. 80). 
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a treaty that not only specifies treaty commitments, but failures to fulfil commitments and 
attendant punishments, that state is part-author of any penalties it would incur if it defected from 
the agreement.  It would be unsurprising, then, if such a state interpreted these penalties as more 
than merely costs, or, at least, assigned them additional weight on normative grounds.  For a 
failure to consider penalties in this way when considering defection either reflects inconsistency 
or unfairness (why should these penalties have been considered justified when specified in the 
original treaty, and/or where other parties are involved, but not now?).  Second, there is sheer 
weight of opinion.  Although there is nothing preventing a bilateral treaty from clearly 
identifying what would constitute a failure to fulfil a commitment, and specifying an attendant 
punishment, the fact is that a multilateral treaty takes into consideration the views of number of 
outside parties.  How could it not be the case, for instance, that a state defecting from a WTO 
commitment not assign the penalty it must face some normative weight, when the procedure 
giving rise to the penalty was signed off on by near every country’s government? 
It is also important to point out that while, in characterising the world of coordinated 
bargaining above, I have spoken of coordinated treaties, deals, or arrangements, I do not mean 
to imply that the choice states face in this world is necessarily between political autarky, on the 
one hand, and cementing their trade-policy commitments to one another formally, on the other.  
Their choice is not restricted, in other words, to either determining their trade-policy in political 
isolation or signing-off off on trade-policy commitments in writing.  Indeed, because the world 
of coordinated bargaining admits formal agreements of this kind—on account of the more 
advanced state of social-scientific knowledge and diplomatic capacity, when compared to the 
world of bargaining states—the reader should take it that this world necessarily admits the 
possibility of informal deals between states.  This is a particularly important point to bear in 
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mind because, in the pages to follow, I am also concerned with the moral implications of 
coordinative arrangements that are not formalised, in particular bargaining coalitions.  Consider, 
for example, groups of states with similar interests that ally themselves in WTO negotiations in 
the quest for better treaty terms.  Sometimes, of course, groups of states that have a formal trade 
agreement amongst themselves also constitute a bargaining coalition with respect to outsiders.  
The countries of the European Union might be thought to constitute such a bloc in WTO 
negotiations, and, of course, the WTO itself constitutes a bargaining coalition with respect to 
prospective members. 
 
I. The Most-Favoured-Nation Principle 
There are a number of strategic reasons why the original parties to GATT might have adopted 
the MFN provision.  Most significantly, and as I have previously noted, if a state includes an 
MFN clause in an agreement with another state, it is guaranteeing them that the concession that it 
is making will not be eroded if it signs a secondary deal.  As such, utilising an MFN principle 
enables states to conclude trade agreements that would otherwise require a great deal of trust.  (It 
is worth noting that if MFNs proliferate in a bilateral bargaining world, there will be pressure to 
multilateralise negotiations, as every time a new deal is signed bilaterally, those countries 
already with MFN status get something for nothing).6  There are other strategic benefits too: the 
MFN provision makes negotiations much simpler; maximises liberalisation whatever the terms 
that are agreed upon; lessens bureaucratic costs for customs agencies; and increases the cost of 
raising trade barriers (as it is not possible to do this selectively across countries), thereby locking 
in liberalisation “gains” by dis-incentivising any one country from sparking a tit-for-tat trade-
war. 
                                                 
6 Ethier (2004). 
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But the MFN principle also has value from the perspective of fairness.7  Indeed, to the 
extent that establishing GATT relied upon good will between the founding parties, the MFN 
principle’s fairness value was also of strategic worth.  The most-favoured-nation principle states 
that no country may discriminate amongst trade partners in terms of the trade barriers that it does 
have in place with respect to relevantly similar goods.  If the US had tariffs of 0.5% on bananas 
from Belize but 50% on plantains from Costa Rica, this would fall foul of the MFN provision of 
GATT.  Now, treating similar goods similarly, even if treating them differently would be to an 
actor’s economic advantage—external preferences to one side—has obvious ethical appeal.  
Consider again the example I raised in Chapter 2 of an employer considering what to pay his or 
her female employees as compared to his or her male employees—output and revenue being 
equal.  Surely it would be wrong for that employer to pay women less than men for the same 
work even though this would, clearly, be in the employer’s economic interest.  Indeed, perhaps it 
would be wrong for that employer to pay women less than men even if its revenue would fall as 
a result (say that if it did not pay inequitably the business would be boycotted by sexist 
customers)?8  Then surely it would be equally wrong for America to exploit its greater market 
power (let us say) with respect to Costa Rica as compared to Belize to extract a greater gain from 
the former than the latter. 
The MFN principle has fairness appeal in another way too.  The reader will recall that in 
the final section of the previous chapter I argued that it is wrong for a state to induce another 
state to violate its obligations to dependent foreigners via signing a treaty with that other state.  
Picture a case in which, by signing a preferential trade agreement with another society, 
foreigners dependent on that society are wrongfully disadvantaged by being undercut.   But in 
                                                 
7 Brown and Stern (2012). 
8 Blake (2006). 
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world in which states are densely tied by treaty—even only bilateral treaties—there would, 
presumably, be another obligation of a similar kind.  Picture circumstances in which a 
prospective treaty partner already has treaty ties, and obligations, to third-party societies: in 
circumstances like this, it might be very hard to find treaty terms that would not lead that 
prospective partner to violate its pre-exiting duties.  One way to get around this, however, is to 
ask your prospective partner to extend any (otherwise preferential) concessions that it extends to 
you to its pre-existing treaty partners.  In this way it is possible to sign a treaty with another 
country without implicating oneself in the wrongful disadvantaging of other societies.  In other 
words, even if a society did not have an obligation to extend MFN status to others (just so long 
as it did not engage in concession erosion later) it might face an obligation to refrain from 
signing a bilateral treaty with a society that did not itself extent that status to others. 
However, depending on the context and the particular interpretation of what the MFN 
principle implies, it can be a barrier to achieving equity all-things-considered.  Firstly, and most 
importantly, the MFN provision does allow discrimination on the basis of the type of good being 
traded.  So it is permissible, for instance, for rich countries in the WTO to effectively 
discriminate against poor countries by having higher tariffs and other trade barriers on the goods 
that they happen to have a comparative advantage in as compared to the goods that wealthy 
countries happen to have a comparative advantage in.  The most obvious example of this is the 
relatively high levels of protection on agriculture and textiles as compared to industrial goods 
and services that the WTO permits.  Picture again our employee deciding what he or she will pay 
his or her female as opposed to male employees, output and revenue being equal.  Now suppose 
that the males and females are going to work in different teams doing functionally differentiated 
tasks (this might be objectionable on other grounds, but put this to one side for a moment).  
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Further suppose that there is absolutely no difference in the talents, skills, and drive of any two 
people in this workplace, all of whom contribute equally to the business’s success.  Wouldn’t it 
be objectionable for the women to get paid less than the men even if they work at different tasks 
and produce different (intermediate) goods? 
In general, in other words, the MFN principle, as interpreted by the WTO at least, is 
consistent with exploitation in trade and treaty.  Consider a case where a lower tariff would be 
required on one import rather than another, because if an equal tariff were applied then some 
producers would be exploited.  Imagine, for example, that the banana-producers of Belize are 
absolutely needy, while the banana-producers of Costa Rica are not.  And were America to level 
the same tariff on bananas from Belize as it does bananas from Costa Rica, then Belizean 
producers would receive a lesser share of the gains of exchange than would enable them to 
minimise their poverty.  Then “discriminating” would not be objectionable.  Indeed, it would be 
necessary.  Or consider exploitation in treaty (regarding which I will have more to say below).  
Say that the asymmetry in permissible protection under the WTO according to the type of good 
being produced resulted in an inequitable division of treaty gains across countries (as is 
eminently plausible).  Then the MFN provision (as currently interpreted) is again a barrier to 
fairness.  But rather than being too restrictive, it is not restrictive enough.  Rich countries ought 
not to be able to level high tariffs on goods in with Southern countries have a comparative 
advantage.  After all, discrimination in the sense of treating cases that ought to be considered 
different differently in the right way is not wrongful, but obligatory. 
    
  
212
II. The Single Undertaking and Blackmail 
One criticism that has been made of the WTO is that, in contrast to GATT, it is insufficiently 
flexible.  Each and every member state must sign on to each and every element of each and every 
agreement.  Now, at first glance, it is difficult to understand why this would be a problem, at 
least as long as the WTO ensures that the gains of membership are equitably distributed across 
countries (again, discussed further below).  Consider the domestic analogy.  Each and every 
American is subject to each and every American law across each and every domain of 
government competence.  Surely the question is not whether the American politico-legal order is 
insufficiently flexible, but whether than order is just.  Indeed, were individual citizens to be able 
to pick and choose which laws to abide by, and horse-trade with their compatriots over these 
laws, I think most people would be shocked.  In the light of this analogy, it may be tempting to 
think that what critics of the WTO are really objecting to is not the flexibility of the system per 
se, but the way the system distributes gains.  In other words, no one would be too worried about 
how flexible the WTO system is, were it not for the fact that developing countries seem to be 
getting such a raw deal. 
Yet there is another way of interpreting this objection altogether.  It may that the 
argument is actually that the WTO, or significant players within the WTO, is blackmailing 
weaker states.  In this light, the problem of inflexibility is a particular kind of procedural wrong.  
Indeed, if it is a wrong of this kind, the WTO is not merely inequitably distributing treaty gains, 
but wrongfully disadvantaging poorer countries, or submitting them to wrongful threats to be 
disadvantaged.  This objection might be levelled at the WTO in its dealings with non-members, 
whether in order to achieve a better deal for existing members in accession negotiations or in 
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order to pressure outside states into seeking admission.  Or it might be levelled at coalitions 
within the WTO with respect to weaker members considered individually. 
Now, it might be useful to start off by noting what this interpretation of the flexibility 
objection isn’t.  It isn’t merely the claim that developing countries have been wronged because 
they would be better off now if the WTO had never been formed and multilateral treaty 
negotiations had continued in the flexible mode of GATT.  Interestingly, and despite the 
widespread belief that the advent of the WTO has benefited its members (even if inequitably) 
there is some evidence for this claim.  For instance, economists Kamal Saggi and Faruk Sengul 
have shown—by modelling the WTO game-theoretically—how the formation of a most-
favoured-nation club can leave some countries worse off than if no such club existed, including 
members of that club (for whom exit isn’t even an option as this would leave them worse off 
still).9  Indeed, it would be tempting to say—following along these lines—that no country should 
be worst off in a bargaining world than they would have been in the world of protectionist states 
(in which there was no potential for diplomatic contact between governments).  The idea that a 
group of states ought not to “gang up” or “conspire” together in such a way as to leave others 
worse off has obvious fairness appeal, and probably lay behind Rawls’s brief comments on fair 
trade in The Law of Peoples. 
But it is important to note that merely because some actor is worse off in a world in 
which others cooperate with one another in some way—relative to how well off they would have 
been in the absence of that cooperation (or if some party or parties to cooperation did not 
exist)—is not sufficient to establish that they have been wronged.  Consider again the example in 
which a new diner opens up in Ithaca and drives State Diner out of business.  State Diner is not 
wronged merely because the majority of diner customers decide to frequent the new diner 
                                                 
9 Saggi and Sengul (2009).  See also Hoekman and Kostecki (2009),  Saggi and Yildiz (2005). 
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instead, rather than, say, dividing their custom equally between the two businesses.  State Diner 
certainly would be better off in a world in which the other diner did not exist, or in which 
customers did divide their custom equally between the two businesses, but this doesn’t seem 
relevant.  Or consider again the issue of protectionism.  It doesn’t seem that merely because a 
foreigner is worse off than they would be if their target market did not possess the institutional 
capacity to prohibit imports is sufficient to establish that they have been wronged.  As long as 
such a prohibition can be justified to citizens—say all actually consent to be bound by such a 
prohibition as it is in the interests of economic development, with legal penalties serving 
assurance purposes only—it wouldn’t appear that that foreigner is wronged.  Or consider a case 
in which residents of a small town cooperate together by voluntarily “buying local” so as to 
protect local businesses and the urban dynamic they generate.  Walmart might be worse off 
relative to a world in which locals did not cooperate in this way, but this is not sufficient to 
establish that Walmart has been wronged. 
More instructively, perhaps, consider again the case I offered in the previous chapter in 
which I live next door to someone with a very beautiful garden.  Now, I claimed there that it 
would be wrong for my neighbour to threaten to plant a tree that would obstruct my view 
(something that would otherwise be within his rights) in order to extract some benefit from me, 
even if I would still be better off submitting to my neighbour’s blackmail than if he left the 
neighbourhood altogether and his garden thereby deteriorated.  Suppose, however, that my 
neighbour decides he is going to convert his beautiful garden into a plot for growing Christmas 
trees to sell.  Obviously, I would prefer he blackmail me than that this happen; and I would be 
better off in a world in which there were no customers for Christmas trees for my neighbour to 
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cater to.  Nevertheless the potential for my neighbour and these customers to arrive at mutual 
beneficial deals (an analogy to an international treaty) does not give me a claim against them. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that sometimes acting in a way that would otherwise be 
within one’s rights is wrong—in particular when one acts to extract some benefit from another 
party.  Besides coercion, it is difficult to think of a way of behaving that better approaches mere 
usage than this.  Say that the governments of developing countries within the WTO were 
paralysed, or were so weak that it was beyond their means to make trade-barrier concessions, 
even should they wish to.   This is obviously not the case, but supposing it is so is necessary in 
order to establish the baseline that would enable us to determine if more powerful members of 
the WTO are responsible for blackmailing weaker states or not.   Now, suppose that if poor-
country governments were paralysed in this way, when it came time for the next round of WTO 
negotiations, they would be offered some degree of market access by wealthier countries 
anyway.  Although these countries would not be in a position to offer any reciprocal concession 
or concessions, this would not impact what more wealthy countries would do (to some degree at 
least).  Then if, in reality, powerful members of the WTO threaten not to liberalise their markets 
unless developing countries do so too, then what is occurring is blackmail. 
This is analogous to the following scenario involving my gardening neighbour.  Say that I 
am, in fact, indifferent between whether my neighbour maintains his garden the way it is or 
instead grows Christmas trees to sell.  It is just nice to have a view over his property.  Now 
suppose that my neighbour knows that, come Christmas time, I will need a Christmas tree as 
much as the next person.  And he threatens to build a fence obscuring my view of his property 
unless I purchase a Christmas tree from him.  Indeed, suppose he goes further and says that I 
must buy a Christmas tree from him for a price several times market value.  Now it seems to me 
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that my neighbour is wrongfully using me here, even if I am better off being blackmailed in this 
way—and retaining my view—than I would if he left the neighbourhood and his garden was 
replaced by a block of flats.  This is because the relevant baseline is one in which he is not in a 
position to put this proposition to me.  Say that my home was in fact a minimum security prison, 
and I was prevented from buying anything except in the prison store.  Then my neighbour would 
not be in a position to threaten to build a fence around his property unless I bought an 
exorbitantly-priced tree from him, and I could continue to enjoy the view from my window 
undisturbed. 
The reader might object that wealthy countries would not extend market access to poorer 
countries unilaterally.  Now, whether they would of course, is an empirical question, albeit one 
that would require some counterfactual analysis.  But the claim that richer countries would 
extend some benefits to poorer countries (particularly the poorest countries) even if they did not 
fully reciprocate is not so implausible, even on theoretical grounds.  For one thing, the most-
favoured-nation clause means that even if wealthy countries restricted reciprocal concessions to 
one another, poorer countries would gain incidentally.  And if there are any countries for whom 
direct or indirect protection is less important for developmental reasons, it is wealthy countries.  
Infant industry and dynamic comparative advantage arguments apply to relatively poorer 
countries who are seeking to catch up.  Finally, even to the extent that neoclassical economic 
prescriptions are wrong, they are held in most high regard amongst wealthy elites.  And, of 
course, the neoclassical case for trade liberalisation is a unilateral one.  It makes as much sense 
to level tariffs on imports as it does to brick-up your border crossings or throw rocks in your 
harbour. 
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Now suppose that more powerful members of the WTO are blackmailing weaker 
members of the group.  Any “agreement” on reciprocal liberalisation that might be made in such 
a context is tainted.  Thus, it may not merely be the case that, were my fair trade ideal to be 
applied, all states in our own world ought to gain equally from WTO agreements.  Some may 
need to gain more than others to compensate for the wrong of blackmail that preceded the 
agreement.  Treaty gains are to be assessed, in other words, relative to how well off each country 
would be if every state adopted that trade policy that was in its best interest in the world of 
protectionist states—not what each state would adopt purely in order to extract some benefit that 
it would not be possible to extract in the absence of the potential for diplomatic contact between 
governments. 
Notice that non-members of the WTO might be subject to blackmail too.  Suppose that 
none of the current non-members of the organisation were a realistic prospect for membership of 
the WTO, nor could it be foreseen that they ever would be.  Further suppose that, if this was the 
case, some or all of the members of the WTO would extend to these non-members concessions 
that, in our own world, they restrict to other members.  Also suppose that the reason they restrict 
these concessions to other members is because they want to put pressure on these outside states 
to join the WTO, or because they want to have a good bargaining position when it comes to 
accession negotiations, or because they fear that more powerful actors in the WTO have interests 
in these things.  If this is the case, then non-members of the WTO certainly have a right to feel 
unfairly treaty.  And if the WTO is actively seeking their accession, then they are actually subject 
to blackmail.  This is true, is should be remembered, even if these non-members benefit from the 
private ties of trade their citizens have with citizens of WTO members, in the sense that they 
would be worse as a whole if suddenly all WTO markets were barred to them.  Remember the 
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example I gave in the previous chapter of blackmail in a relationship that was mutually 
beneficial overall (this was the example in which my neighbour threatened to obscure my view 
by planting a tree). 
Blackmail is normally wrong regardless of the power resources that it marshals.  But it is 
worth pointing out that as the WTO—and coalitions within that body—have become larger and 
larger, encompassing a greater and greater share of world markets, the power at their disposal to 
blackmail has also been magnified.  When one country threatens a dependent society in the 
world of bargaining states with an adverse adjustment to its trade policy, or offers to adjust its 
trade policy (in a way that would be in its interest regardless) only if that society reciprocates, it 
cannot afford to be indifferent to such a move.  After all, to be dependent is precisely to be 
unable to safely ignore the strategic moves on the part of some other party, or so I have defined it 
here.  To be dependent is not to be able to costlessly exit a relationship, whether that relationship 
is cooperative one or not.  But it is worth noting that there is no pure dependence in the world of 
(bilateral) bargaining states.  There is always some room to shift trade ties, or indeed treaty ties, 
to some other party. 
Picture a world, however, in which every country but one is a member of the WTO (we 
will be at this point soon).  Or picture the relationship between one member of the WTO and the 
remaining members as a collective, in circumstances where each and every country in the world 
is a member.  There is obviously tremendous power for blackmail here.  Indeed, it seems as if it 
might be possible for powerful members and coalitions in the WTO to blackmail others without 
even thinking about it.  Consider the “take-it-or-leave-it” approach to decision-making in the 
WTO that has only recently begun to break down.   Under this format, powerful interests 
determined the nature of the bargain in exclusive “green room” negotiations, which was then 
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offered to the membership as a fait accompli.  The WTO sometimes defends itself by claiming 
that it rules by consensus, but in the context of this decision-making format it is effectively rule-
by-veto.  Now, for a small or poor country to exercise its veto in this context is for it to put itself 
in a very vulnerable position.  Even if the WTO might not have a specified process for expelling 
members, this is the ultimate penalty, at least in theory.  And states possess other means to 
threaten dissenters outside the domain of trade. 
Now, the reader might object that the standard I am advancing here would prohibit 
eminently reasonable action against free-riders in a cooperative scheme.  (For free-riders are 
harmless parasites when considered individually.  They are only harmful as a critical mass).  If it 
would be wrong for the WTO to withhold or threaten to withhold concessions from some single 
economy unless that single economy itself made some concession, merely because it would not 
cost all other members of the WTO anything to do so—or because those concessions would be 
extended regardless if the government of that country were “paralysed”—then the WTO can do 
nothing to get any single member of the scheme to make a contribution.  This would be rather 
odd, because it is often thought that coercion (not merely blackmail) would be justified in order 
to get actors to abide by the principle of fair play.10  And if the WTO or coalitions within it 
refrained from acting in this way with respect to each and every member, then the cooperative 
scheme that is the WTO would break down. 
But this is not my intention.  I think if would be acceptable to take action against free-
riders.  Nevertheless, not everyone who would receive market-access concessions for nothing if 
their government was paralysed in a WTO-dominated world can be counted a free-rider.  
Countries like this that would prefer that “free-riding” (putative or actual) reach a critical mass—
and that cooperation in the WTO break down—rather than have to make a concession 
                                                 
10 This principle’s formative statements are in Hart (1955, p. 185) and Rawls (1964, pp. 9–10).  
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themselves cannot be counted as free-riders.11  Non-members of the organisation might fall in 
this category, although not necessarily.  If it is thought that, contrary to these countries’ 
expectations, the trade regime that would likely replace the WTO would be even worse for these 
countries, it is still indisputable that no country can be alleged to be a free-rider that would be 
better off in the world of protectionist states, regardless of how much market access they might 
appear to be granted under the WTO. 
Also, I don’t wish to argue that blackmail is always wrong.  Indeed, I think that blackmail 
might be justified just as long as it is necessary to more equitably distribute treaty gains (a 
departure into non-ideal theory, I grant you).  One of the potential benefits of the WTO—a 
potential that has increasingly been taken advantage of—is that it provides a space in which poor 
countries might form a united front in their negotiations with rich countries.  For such a coalition 
to threaten to withhold concessions from rich countries that it would otherwise be in its interest 
to extend is not wrong as long as it aims towards a more equitable division of the gains of treaty 
across signatory societies.  Indeed, if it is recognised that treaty gains might be inequitable 
distributed, then a party that gets “something for nothing” is only a free-rider to the extent that 
such gains are already equitably distributed.  And getting “something for nothing” might be 
required in order to achieve equity. 
 
III. Exploitation in Treaty and Accession 
In the previous chapter I argued that the net-gains of treaty in bilateral agreement ought to be 
equally distributed, unless some special reason (such as the impoverishment of one party’s 
citizens) justified a departure from equality.  I further argued that the appropriate baseline from 
                                                 
11 This seems to be why “acceptance” of benefits, not merely receive of them, is required for an obligation of fair 
play to be established—Simmons (1979, pp. 132–135). 
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which to assess how much any party would benefit from a trade agreement under a given set of 
terms is how well off that country would be were the potential for diplomatic contact between 
societies an impossibility (a non-cooperative context in international relations, to use the 
language of game theory).  The best alternative set of terms that a state might be able to arrive at 
with some other society (without violating their negative rights) is not the right baseline.  This is 
because if it were, and that state did opt for that alternative treaty, we wouldn’t be able to say 
that that state benefited at all, which confounds ordinary usage as well as common sense.  
Indeed, we might even have to say that that state was harmed, despite it being better off than it 
would have been if no treaty had been signed at all. 
Now, merely because more than one society is party to a trade deal is no reason to think 
that some parties to that deal should gain more than others.  Picture a group of states in the world 
of coordinated bargaining uniting together to advance their common interests.  Some might have 
had advantages to begin with—in the sense that they would have been better off than others in 
the world of protectionist states, perhaps because they would have been more trade-integrated 
(interpersonally) than others—but it is unclear why this ought to be relevant.  It would certainly 
be objectionable to use the greater credibility of a threat to exit negotiations (on the part of 
countries that would be better off than others if the negotiations failed, although still worse off 
than if an agreement was reached on any terms) to wrestle a greater share of treaty gains. 
That the gains of treaty ought to be equally distributed bears both on what existing 
members of the a coordinated agreement are entitled to, as well as what prospective admits and 
countries currently negotiating accession ought to receive.  Members of the WTO, for instance, 
must receive an equal share of the net-gains of the treaties that that organisation administers 
(overall, if not in each separately) and be given equal effective voice in determining what would 
222
constitute an equal division of those gains, at least when negotiations next take place.  As such, 
the WTO is not permitted to offer an outsider admission terms that would ultimately entail that 
admit standing to gain less than this once the cost of admission concessions is factored into those 
gains (in addition to the cost of liberalisation-concessions required under WTO treaties), even if 
an outsider would voluntarily assent to terms less generous than this. 
Consider what this entails for potential WTO members who stand, were they admitted 
without any strings attached, to contribute to the treaty surplus more than what currently 
constitutes an equal share.  Consider, in other words, a case in which there are increasing (treaty-
gain) returns to scale in membership.  In such a case, a potential admit should not be charged any 
additional price—i.e. a cost beyond a promise to abide by what WTO treaties already require.  
Unfortunately, there is some empirical evidence that the inverse is the case, at least if we take 
economic welfare as an approximate proxy.  The more a prospective-admit to the WTO stands to 
benefit existing members, the more likely it is that extra concessions will be demanded of it in 
accession negotiations.12 
 There is, of course, an additional case to consider.  What are we to say in circumstances 
where a prospective admit would increase the treaty gains accruing across the WTO on 
aggregate, but, in the absence of extra strings attached, would not contribute enough such that, 
once these gains were equally divided, each and every other existing member would be better 
off?  What are we to say, in other words, when there are decreasing (treaty-) returns to scale in 
membership?  I have already implied that, normally speaking, it is not impermissible for parties 
to a coordinated trade agreement to deny admission to an outside party, if, were that party 
admitted, avoiding exploiting that party would necessitate all other members being worse off, as 
least as long as duties of beneficence to those in absolute need are fulfilled.  It seems a logical 
                                                 
12 Pelc (2011). 
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extension, therefore, to say that is permissible for members of a coordinated trade agreement to 
demand some additional concessions on the part of a prospective member—if it is, indeed, to 
join—if this is what is necessary to ensure that pre-existing members do not lose out once treaty 
gains have been equitably distributed.  What this seems to mean for the WTO is that unless 
fulfilling the demands of beneficence that fall on the affluent within the WTO is best fulfilled by 
extending admissions offers to outsiders no-strings-attached, it is permissible to demand extra 
concessions by way of admittance.  This is only in an ideal world, however.  If outside states 
have been exploited in their bilateral treaty relations with WTO members, or subject to wrongful 
disadvantaging, then costless admittance may be needed by way of compensation. 
 
IV. Coercion and Distributive Justice 
The claim that it is collective or institutional coercion that generates distributive duties of a 
more-or-less egalitarian kind (henceforth “the coercive claim”)—owed by those who both author 
and are governed by that coercion (at least in a democracy) to one another, but neither incumbent 
on, nor owed to, others—is common in the global justice literature.  Indeed both statists, who 
restrict the scope of these duties to the co-citizen relationship, and cosmopolitans, who argue that 
duties of these kind are global in scope, have utilised this claim in relation to our own world. 
In particular, it is often claimed that coercion grounds a requirement that no person 
subject to that coercion face worse prospects than another person subject to the same coercion 
merely as a consequence of an accident of birth (at least unless they would be better off—in 
absolute terms—otherwise, as under the difference principle).  So, on the statist version of this 
argument, it is unjust that the life-prospects of equally talented and motivated (at birth) 
Americans are unequal only because all Americans are subject to the same coercively-enforced 
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legal order.  An equivalent inequality across borders can be neither just nor unjust because, while 
there might be such a thing as international law, there is no comprehensive legal order globally.  
States both author whatever international law there is—which is limited in terms of the matters it 
addresses—and enforce it (to the extent that they see fit). 
Nevertheless, whether in statist or cosmopolitan form, this claim is difficult to fathom.  
This is for several reasons.  First, there is no agreement on what constitutes that baseline which 
would enable us to distinguish a conditional proposal that is wrongful—a coercive threat, on a 
moralised account of “coercion”—from a permissible (or even obligatory) such proposal.  In 
ordinary language, we often used “coercion” in a non-moralised sense, with the status quo ex 
ante—or state of affairs absent the encounter with a putative coercer—as the baseline.  On this 
account, coercive encounters are synonymous with those in which the actor subject to coercion is 
made worse off, even if he or she is reserved some latitude for choice.  Thus, the thief who steals 
my antique watch at the point of a knife coerces me, but the merchant who purchases antique 
watches for below-market prices from needy petitioners who are desperate to sell does not.  And 
the employer who succeeds in getting an employee to do X or Y by threatening the sack coerces, 
but the employer who only agrees to hire someone on condition they do X or Y does not.  A non-
moralised account enables us to speak of coercion as being either wrongful or permissible.  So 
the thief’s taking of my watch is wrong, but the government’s taking of an equivalent value in 
income tax (backed ultimately by the threat of prison, say) is not.  Or coercing an employee into 
a sexual relationship (via a threat to fire) is wrong, but coercing another employee into acting in 
a professional manner (via exactly the same threat) is not. 
However, the disagreement that really matters here is not about what baseline to employ 
when using “coercion” in a non-moralised sense.  Rather, it is about what baseline to employ 
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when utilising “coercion” in a moralised sense—when the term is reserved only for those 
scenarios entailing harm in which the actor so harmed had their rights violated, and is expanded 
to cover, additionally, some scenarios in which benefits are withheld (namely those scenarios in 
which the benefits were owed as a matter of positive right).  Thus, the libertarian might argue 
that the government’s taking of income tax (at least for redistributive purposes) is wrong, and it 
is on that account, rather than any other, that it should be labelled “coercive”.  Or the egalitarian 
might argue that no one should have to work more than X hours a week, such that demanding 
someone do so on pain of lacking a job is coercive, even if they would be better off working on 
those terms than unemployed. 
In other words, in debates over global distributive justice—amongst professional 
philosophers and more widely—there is such disagreement about what rights people have—
whether on a natural basis and/or engendered in their relations—that it is not clear what we are to 
count as coercion (in a moralised sense, such that what is deemed coercive is necessarily wrong) 
and what we aren’t.  Are the penalties reserved for putative wrongdoers under the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism—and the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the organisation (that 
exists at least in theory)—penalties that help define a picture that is coercive (i.e. wrong) overall, 
or are they not?  Is the assent of developing countries to WTO agreements akin to an employee 
consenting to sex to avoid the sack, or an employee consenting to behave in a professional 
manner?  Indeed, is remaining outside of the WTO—in the case of current non-members—such 
a poor option that charging some price in admission negotiations is coercive?  Is this picture, in 
other words, akin to that describe above in which a watch-merchant takes advantage of the need 
of petitioners to part them from their beloved heirlooms?  Or is it, rather, analogous to an 
ordinary market exchange, which most people would not find morally problematic?  Whether 
226
one maintains that there is coercion occurring or not, in other words, will depend to a 
considerable degree—if not entirely—on what view of global distributive justice one already 
subscribes to. 
However, the coercive claim is not merely difficult to fathom because there is normative 
disagreement about what constitutes coercion.  A more significant barrier to making sense of this 
claim is the following: on a moralised account of coercion—whatever that account’s precise 
form, and there are obviously going to be competing accounts—coercion is always wrong.  In 
ideal theory at least, there should be no coercion.  Thus, to speak of what duties coercion 
engenders does not make any sense, for a defensible ideal would not reserve a space for 
coercion.  To speak of permissible coercion—even conditionally permissible coercion—is to 
commit a category error.  Further, for the purposes of non-ideal theory, coercion is only ever 
justified to prevent or rectify a wrong (this is a case in which, it is thought, two wrongs do make 
a right, or else we slip into a non-moralised sense of coercion again).  So, if someone is 
vulnerable to being robbed, they (or the state on their behalf) are entitled to use (certain) threats 
to prevent this, or to recover property if a robbery does occur. 
Of course, coercion is likely to play a role in any plausible egalitarian theory of 
distributive justice.  But it seems to make most sense to say that coercion (in a non-moralised 
sense, again) may or should be used to ensure that people’s existing rights are respected.13  Why 
should we think that the coercive enforcement of pre-existing obligations generates some new 
obligations, which, presumably, should be enforced in additional to those pre-existing 
obligations?  As, according to the coercive claim, coercion grounds egalitarian duties of 
distributive justice, this question can be thought of as implying something like the following: if a 
libertarian account of our distributive duties would be adequate for a state of nature (in which 
                                                 
13 Pevnick (2008). 
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only virtuous individuals could be relied upon to fulfil their duties, but others might not fulfil 
them) why is it not adequate for us given that we live under a political order that can, to some 
degree, enforce duty-fulfilment?  Why do I owe my compatriots more—on the statist version of 
the coercive claim that is—than merely adherence to and support for a libertarian legal regime?  
Why support “redistributive” taxation, for instance? 
Third, the coercive claim is difficult to fathom to the extent that there is, implicitly at 
least, disagreement about what conditions would need to pertain for it to make sense for us to say 
that someone faced with a certain set of conditional options is being coerced, rather than not.  
When asked to provide examples of coercion, philosophers often turn to cases involving 
individuals—usually individuals encountering one another against the backdrop, presumably, of 
some political order.  However, the coercive claim references coercion by a political order.  
Whether an order can be wrongfully coercive, despite the fact that no particular interaction 
within that order is wrongfully coercive, is obviously a matter over which political philosophers 
disagree.  Libertarians argue that it cannot, while egalitarians from Rawlsians to Marxists argue 
that it can.  But the disagreement at stake here is different: the question is what constitutes a 
political order carrying a coercive capacity?  For the coercive claim to make any sense, not just 
any background conditions constitute such an order. 
For illustration, consider the following example.  Picture again a world of autarkies, in 
which the globe is divided into a number of independent states, each economically autarkic and 
exercising exclusive political sovereignty within its borders.  Now imagine that identically 
resourced and governed societies in this world are unequally wealthy, say as a legacy of 
decisions made by past generations in each of these societies respectively.  Or imagine that 
identically endowed and motivated individuals are unequally wealthy as a consequence of in 
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which society they happen to have been born.  Is the coercive claim applicable to this world—
justifying something being done for societies or persons arbitrarily worse off in this world—or is 
it not?  Clearly, there are no political or legal ties between countries or across borders in this 
world.  This seems to point to the coercive claim being inapplicable.  Yet despite the absence of 
such ties, there is a global political arrangement (a different sense of “order”): namely one in 
which there are multiple autarkic states and any arbitrary inequalities that might arise are left 
unaddressed.  And, crucially, there is a collective capacity (at least if we allow for the possibility 
of cross-border ties being established) to change this arrangement.  Does this capacity mean that 
the coercive claim is applicable even in a world of autarkies?  Is there, in other words, a political 
obligation incumbent on societies advantaged under this arrangement to push for the 
establishment of a global politico-legal system to address arbitrary inequalities, even if such a 
system does not yet exist? 
 Yet despite these interpretive problems with the coercive claim in the abstract, which 
undermine its effectiveness in grounding an all-things-considered view of global distributive 
justice (whether statist of cosmopolitan in form), a particular variant of this claim—which 
obviously must take a series of stands on the disputed matters raised above—might be thought to 
do some work in articulating a defensible fair trade ideal.  The general form of this claim is that 
when a particular distribution of gains across parties to a cooperative project is collectively 
enforced—rather than all parties being trusted to play the role that will ensure that the 
cooperative gains are equally distributed—a greater than equal share may need to accrue to those 
parties who would end up worse off overall (i.e. worse off once all the benefits and burdens they 
bear—not merely those arising from that particular cooperative project—are taken into 
consideration), and not merely on the grounds of beneficence.  How much more, exactly, 
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depends on what is necessary to ensure that better off members of the project have good reason 
to take it that worse off members can generally be relied upon to play the role assigned them by 
the terms of that project—out of their sense of justice—and will not be tempted to snatch a 
greater share of these gains in spite of this sense.  Returns of cooperative projects should be 
distributed such that, in other words, threatened punishments serve—with respect to parties 
motivated by duty at least—a signalling rather than deterrent role.  This claim is akin, in some 
respects, to Rawls’s argument that merely because the gains of social cooperation are divided in 
a putatively fair manner—namely in that way that persons behind a veil of ignorance would 
choose—is no guarantee that this division is just all-things-considered.  For the terms of social 
cooperation must also be such as to secure “stability”.  Namely real persons, rather than merely 
hypothetical ones, must be able to live in accordance with them, at least to the extent that they 
are motivated by a sense of justice. 
 But why think that the gains of cooperation should be divided in any other way than 
equally?  If a party to some cooperative project is tempted to snatch more than an equal share as 
a consequence of how well-off this share would leave him or her overall—by free-riding say—
why not think that this necessarily reflects anything more than an inadequate sense of justice?  
Yet the claim I seek to make is not that acting on any such temptation would be justified.  
Indeed, my claim is not grounded on the intrinsic merit of some particular distribution of goods, 
but the instrumental value of some distribution in ensuring equality of standing or status.  
Specifically, I would posit that equality of standing within a cooperative project requires that the 
more advantaged not have reason to think that the worse off are only abiding by the terms of the 
project for fear of the penalties they will incur if they do not.  For only when the more 
advantaged have such a reason can they trust the worse off.   A circumstance in which one 
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cannot be sure that one’s partner in cooperation is abiding by its terms out of a sense of justice or 
from fear of resultant penalties is an impediment to equality of standing in two ways.  First, in 
the absence of trust, it is difficult to take one’s partner’s input into democratic deliberation 
seriously.  In other words, in the absence of a division of gains adequate to secure trust, there is 
no way of telling if a view one’s partner in cooperation might offer on what would constitute an 
equal distribution of the gains of social cooperation is made in good faith, or in an attempt to 
avoid being so badly off overall. 
Second, without trust it is difficult to hold one’s cooperative partner in high regard.  
Sadly perhaps, those who are worse off economically tend to be looked down upon.  But at least 
in the absence of enforcement of the terms of cooperation, those who are worse off can hold their 
heads high on the basis that they could get more by cheating, but decline to do so.  And those 
who have more might ask themselves “if I was worse off, I would if I could exercise such 
admirable self-restraint”.  But when the terms of cooperation are enforced—penalties are laid 
down for failing to abide by these terms—the worse-off lose this opportunity to demonstrate 
their good will. 
This second point—that a system of legal penalties deprives the worse off of an 
opportunity for virtue, and therefore, potentially, of equal standing—can be revealingly 
contrasted with a seemingly contrary claim made by contemporary (neo-Roman) republicans, 
such as Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett.  These scholars, and their historical precursors, have 
claimed that legal enforcement is of value quite apart from its effects—in terms of ensuring, for 
example, that people get their fair share of cooperative gains—because it is important for 
securing equal standing.  The argument here is that receiving the share of social goods to which 
one is otherwise entitled is necessary for justice, but not in itself sufficient.  As long as the weak 
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have to rely on the forbearance of the powerful to secure the share to which they are entitled, an 
unacceptable status inequality endures.14  For a political order that allows some persons such 
scope in exercising their private will that others live at their mercy is not one that can plausibly 
claim to reflect the fact that persons as equals, even if everyone gets an equal share of the pie.  It 
is not enough, in other words, that people be guaranteed what they are entitled to statistically.  
For it also matters how they are statistically guaranteed what they are entitled to.  The political 
order should be one in which no person’s private will is privileged over another person’s, and the 
rule-of-law is vital in this endeavour. 
 The fair trade ideal I develop in this dissertation obviously shares much in common with 
the republican take on distributive justice.  Most obviously, the ideal I develop is, like the 
republican idea, a relational one.  I am not merely concerned with how well off people are, but 
with the nature of the social, economic, and political processes and practices that determine how 
well off they are.  Indeed, to the extent that I advocate legal constraints to ensure that what 
people and societies are owed—in particular to ensure that they are not exploited in their 
cooperative relations—my ideal is directly a republican one.  Yet, in addition, I recognise that 
legal enforcement has the potential not only to advance equality of status, but to undermine it.  
Consider some typical republican policy proposals.  Republicans argue that not only are the 
needy owed assistance, but they are owed a legal guarantee of provision.  In the absence of a 
such a guarantee, the poor are degraded even if their material needs are provided for.  For 
without such a guarantee, the political order is not one that expresses the poor’s civic equality, 
but rather one that implies that what the poor receive is at the behest of the wealthy.  Or 
republicans argue for legislated minimum wages and conditions, or the institutionalisation of 
collective bargaining, such that workers’ conditions are not merely dictated by capitalists.  In 
                                                 
14 Pettit (1997); Lovett (2010). 
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advancing proposals such as these, republicans are primarily concerned to limit the sway of the 
wealthy and propertied.  But there is also reason to be concerned with what legal restrictions on 
the poor and property-less implies for equality of status.  My argument is, essentially, that legal 
restraints on the poor threaten to undermine their status, through the two avenues discussed 
above.  I do not mean to imply, however, that it would be wrong to politically authorise 
punishments for the violation of duty that apply equally to the rich and the poor.  Indeed, it is 
hard to see how a legal order that failed to do so could embody equality of status either.  Rather, 
I am arguing that, given a schedule of punishments legislated for failures to adhere to duty, 
economic inequality should not be so great that equality of status can no longer be maintained. 
To be clear, let me recast this claim and its basis directly in terms of what it implies for 
coordinated trade treaties, using the WTO for illustration.  What I have already said in this 
chapter implies that members of the WTO should seek to ensure that any new agreement they 
enter into equally divides the gains of treaty across parties to that agreement—even once the 
demands of beneficence are satisfied and even if no treaty-dependent country or trade-dependent 
person (within or without the WTO) would be exploitatively disadvantaged or net-harmed if they 
were not.  This is because, were the gains of treaty unequally divided, those WTO-members who 
benefited less would be wrongfully exploited, even if their governments assent to that agreement, 
perhaps because their society would be worse off than others if no agreement was reached at all. 
Now, according to the argument I have made thus far in this dissertation, the gains of 
treaty would have to be equally divided even if the WTO had no established mechanism for 
enforcing cooperation.  Say that the WTO did not monitor its member-states in an attempt to 
ensure that they abided by their treaty commitments, and there was no dispute settlement 
mechanism to adjudicate cases of alleged cheating.  Rather, countries were left to their own 
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devices, either to fulfil their commitments out of a sense of justice or due to a fear of bilateral 
retaliation.  It doesn’t seem that merely because there is no “coercion” here, that a departure from 
equality of gain would be justified.  For cooperation alone grounds an obligation to equally 
distribute treaty gains.  Nevertheless, if the coercive claim is to do any work here, some parties to 
an international agreement might be able to justifiably claim a greater than equal share when 
agreements simultaneously specify—as WTO agreements do—how putative wrongdoings are to 
be judged, and what penalties will be incurred for wrongdoing.  If they were not differentially 
treated, then trust among members of the WTO would suffer, as would the standing and voice of 
poorer members. 
 
V. Common Criticisms of the WTO 
As I discussed more extensively in the introduction, the purpose of this project is to develop a 
moral ideal that would enable us to assess trade and trade relations in our own world, not to 
critique trade and trade relations in our own world by contrasting the current state of affairs with 
some ideal that must necessarily remain opaque.   It is also the case that the current chapter is 
intended to provide guidance with respect to all coordinated trade agreements, not merely the 
largest and most importance of these, which are governed by the WTO.  Nevertheless, I want to 
conclude by saying a few words about some common criticisms that have been levelled against 
the WTO to make clear the need for an explicit fair trade ideal.  Without such an ideal we are not 
well placed to assess the merits of these criticisms, fine-tune those that have some basis, or make 
those additional moral criticisms that are necessary. 
 One criticism that has been levelled at the WTO is that it has overstepped its legitimate 
function.  There are now WTO agreements that cover much more than border measures (like 
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tariffs), requiring concessions in the realm of industrial policy, services, and, most 
controversially, intellectual property (under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights—TRIPS).  But in the absence of some reason to think that, in a world without 
the WTO, it would be wrong for countries to arrive at agreements covering anything but tariffs, 
this criticism is shaky.  Presumably, there is no policy domain that it is necessarily wrong for 
states to seek to reach agreement in, distributive concerns domestically and internationally to one 
side. 
More plausible versions of this objection can be formulated, however, once an explicit 
ideal has been made articulated.  The TRIPS agreement, for instance, might be criticised on 
several grounds developed in this dissertation.  To the extent that the ability of poor countries to 
manufacture generic copies of drugs it vital to tackling diseases like AIDS, it can be argued that 
TRIPS violates duties of beneficence that the global affluent owe to the needy.  Indeed, to the 
extent that these drugs were developed with a view to taking advantage of rich-world markets 
only, and absent a reason to think that further pharmaceutical research will be stunted without 
wider markets, repealing TRIPS represents an entirely costless why to further need alleviation, 
and would be demanded by any plausible principle of beneficence, including the Principle of 
Sympathy.  Or it can be argued that the WTO blackmailed developing countries into accepting 
TRIPS by threatening to deny them market concessions that would have been extended to them 
anyway if intellectual property had been off the bargaining table.  At the very least, it can be 
claimed that by bundling TRIPS into the Uruguay round—a treaty that is of no benefit to poorer 
countries in and of itself—rich countries exploited poor countries overall, providing them with an 
inequitable share of the gains of treaty.  To be sure, to successfully advance one of these 
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arguments would require the right sort of empirical evidence.  But the normative ideal I have 
developed helps us to determine what sort of empirical evidence is important. 
 Another criticism that is levelled at the WTO is that is biased towards the market as a 
mode of economic organisation, interpreting any government measure that might limit trade, and 
thereby the scope of the market, as “protectionism”, even when the motivation behind that 
measure was not trade-related.  It is not just that the treaties that the WTO administers now cover 
more than border measures.  The allegation is that the WTO has interpreted national measures 
that protect workers, animals, and the environment in such a way as to undermine their 
effectiveness.15  The classic example is the dispute in the 1990s between the US and Mexico 
over tuna imports.  The US sort to restrict imports of tuna that were caught using methods that 
result in the deaths of dolphins.  Mexico alleged that the US was unfairly limiting trade.  In 
deciding the case, the WTO ruled that countries may not discriminate on the basis of the 
production process, as this would infringe on the sovereignty of producer-nations.  Countries 
may only discriminate on the basis of the nature of the product.  (For example, a member of the 
WTO could legally ban imports of toys painted with lead paint, even if no other country had such 
a prohibition). 
Now, clearly what we are to make of this criticism depends on the particular moral ideal 
that we subscribe too.  Peter Singer’s position is shaped by his utilitarianism and his concern for 
the welfare of animals.  Presumably, he would think that the case should be decided in whatever 
way happened to ensure that animals were better protected.  But the WTO decided the case in 
terms of national sovereignty.  Yet even if we were to think in terms of the rights and duties of 
sovereignty rather the aggregate good, there would be arguments on both sides.  On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the US would be exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction if Mexican 
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fisherman were induced to adopt a costly change in their production technique.  But from the 
alternative point of view it could be argued that, in fact, the ruling threatened to undermine US 
sovereignty.  As long as government regulations result in costs for domestic producers, those 
producers will not be able to survive even in the domestic market as long as foreign competitors 
supplying imports are not held to the same standard. 
An argument like this is most often made in relation to worker’s rights.  For the US to 
ban imports that were produced by foreigners working in conditions, and receiving wages, that 
would be substandard and illegal in the United States would constitute an illegal barrier to trade 
under current international trade law.  But is it obviously the case that US producers who must 
bear the cost of upholding American law will have trouble competing with overseas producers 
who need not bear this burden.  The claim is then that globalising markets will lead to a “race to 
the bottom” in terms of labour standards. 
Now, clearly what we are to say about objections such as these is going to depend heavily 
on what we take the correct fair trade ideal to be.  Here, I offer a thought on the US–Mexico 
dispute in terms of the ideal I have developed in this dissertation.  First and foremost, for 
Mexican fisherman to have to bear some additional cost that they would not have to bear if they 
did not trade with the US is no reason to think that that the US is encroaching on anyone’s 
sovereignty.  What matters is not whether any additional cost must be born, but whether the 
gains of exchange are equitably distributed net costs.  On the other hand, if the US regulation on 
nets was such that it left Mexican fisherman worse off than they would be in a world of 
protectionist states (in which there is no potential for diplomatic contact between societies); or if 
a threat to disadvantage them in this way lead to the gains of exchange being inequitably 
distributed despite Mexican fisherman ultimately being better off than they would be in a world 
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of protectionist states, then this is a different matter.  But clearly, even in a world of protectionist 
states the US would adopt the relevant regulation on tuna nets—and would bar imports of fish 
caught using the illegal nets to the extent that this would dis-incentive their use—so it can’t be 
construed as merely an attempt to manipulate Mexico’s environmental policy. 
Finally, as noted in the introduction, one of the criticisms that is levelled at the World 
Trade Organization most frequently is that it suffers from a “democratic deficit”.  Now, under 
any plausible (non-moralised) definition of democracy this is likely to be true.  First, many 
members of the WTO are not democracies, so it can’t be claimed that the citizens of these 
countries have even indirect voice.  Second, even citizens of democracies are only represented 
third-hand.  Treaty negotiators are neither elected representatives, nor governments, but 
bureaucrats selected by governments.  Third, and as I have mentioned in passing previously, 
until very recently most of the big questions at WTO negotiations were decided by the most 
powerful players (the largest economies) in exclusive and secret “green room” sessions.  Other 
members had very limited deliberative input, and obviously faced severe pressure not to attempt 
to exercise their veto when presented with the outcome of these sessions. 
But merely pointing out these facts tells us nothing about why we should care.  Maybe 
the WTO isn’t “democratic” in these senses, but many spheres of life are not.  Why is it wrong, 
unjust, or unfair that the WTO is not democratic?  The virtue of this project is that it gives us 
reasons to see why the WTO ought to be more democratic.  Until weaker states are given greater 
voice, countries will still proceed as if utilising one’s maximum bargaining advantage without 
violating anyone’s negative rights was legitimate.  And only when weaker states genuinely 
participate in collective deliberations can we be sure that trade and treaty gains will be equally 
divided. 
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Conclusion 
 
It might not seem so controversial to think that in a world of separate societies—in which each is 
economically autarkic—economic obligations with distributive import across borders would be 
limited.  Yet much recent scholarship in political philosophy has implied the opposite.  Natural-
right luck-egalitarians and sympathetic others have argued that as nationality is as unchosen-a-
trait as race or gender, it ought not to skew what one should expect to reap under the global 
order—regardless of how persons and societies stand with respect to one another under that order 
already, or might permissibly stand.  Even scholars sympathetic to the view that greater natural 
talent entitles one to greater rewards—regardless of how “arbitrary” that talent might be (in the 
sense of being unchosen)—imply a position that disputes that nationality can legitimately figure 
into what one ought to expect to reap under the global economic order.  After all, while national-
culture might differentially shape what we can expect to be able to offer others on the market, 
any inequality in our natural capacity to carry any given culture does not correlate with our 
society of birth. 
Even cosmopolitans who see themselves as relationally sensitive—and who argue that an 
egalitarian distribution is demanded only given the nature of the global “basic structure”—
advance arguments that would imply the existence of such a structure even if every society in the 
world was economically self-contained.  Remember that the option sets faced by both individuals 
and societies in a world of autarkies would be equally as “unavoidable” or “inescapable” as they 
are in our own world.  Indeed, the circumstances that face us remain inescapable, regardless of 
how the world is ordered, just so long as there is not an infinite number of alternative universes 
to which persons or states in our own world can costlessly escape. 
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From perspectives such as these, trade and the political order in which trade takes place 
are to be judged according to the extent to which they advance the distributive pattern that justice 
would demand even in a world in which every society was autarkic.  Not only does this 
perspective seem implausible when we reflect on a world that is not as deeply integrated as our 
own, but it fails to provide us with the right conceptual tools to talk about the nature and basis of 
the obligations that are owed across borders in our own world.  As I noted in the introduction, 
until quite recently almost all scholars of global distributive ethics either argued that the global 
poor were owed assistance (with a key point of contention being why we should think that aid is 
obligatory rather than merely supererogatory) or rectification (for the coercive imposition of a 
harmful economic arrangement globally).  Yet between these two poles lies a third alternative.  
In developing a (trade-) relational fair trade ideal, I have not only been able to show how it is that 
what is owed across international borders has expanded as the world has trade-integrated, but 
opened a space for this third alternative while parsing out the truth in both beneficence and 
rectification talk. 
If beneficence is, in the first instance, a natural rather than relational obligation, it is 
simply not possible to determine what range of duties in our own world might be accounted for 
by beneficence without picturing—to the extent that this is possible—a world in which cross-
border and international relations are absent.  Establishing what beneficence demands, in other 
words, necessarily requires reflecting on something like the world of autarkies.  And if we want 
to know if anything more might ever be owed than that which would be owed on the basis of 
beneficence alone, there is no better way to establish what is owed and its basis than by 
contrasting a world of autarkies with more integrated worlds, hypothetical or real.  Finally, to 
consider if there might be some third basis or range of bases for distributive demands besides the 
240
need of others and our harming of them, we must picture circumstances in which harms—or at 
least those things most commonly thought to constitute harms—are either impossible or absent.  
This is what I have done in this dissertation.  No hypothetical world I described in previous 
chapters allowed for direct harms or externalities that might arise in the context of real-world 
trade relations.  Yet it seemed clear to me, in reflecting on these hypothetical worlds, that there 
were obligations beyond mere beneficence grounded on distinct dimensions of trade-integration. 
First, interpersonal exchange across borders—trade proper—grounds an obligation to 
equitably distribute the gains of exchange.  If this obligation is not fulfilled, the relevant wrong is 
exploitation.  It is possible to exploit someone without harming them.  Indeed, it is possible to 
exploit someone even if you benefit them, just so long as you do not benefit them sufficiently to 
equitably distribute the gains of trade.  Now, one might accept that trade grounds an obligation to 
avoid exploitation, while maintaining that fulfilling this obligation would not necessitate 
redistribution in our own world.  After all, it might be that the right account of equitable division 
of the gains of trade implies that the global market price for any given good necessarily reflects 
an equitable division.  Yet in Chapter 2 I provided some reason for us to doubt this.  For one 
thing, actual reserve prices—those terms on which a potential party to trade would not consent to 
exchange given their alternative trade possibilities in a liberal order, at least as long as they 
behave in the mode of homo economicus—are not an adequate baseline from which to assess 
how much that actor would net-gain from exchange on some more beneficial terms.  This is 
because actual reserve prices usually reflect alternative possibilities for being benefited (by 
others), not how well of one would be absent the benefit in question. 
Second, the capacity for a society to determine a trade policy—and to change that policy 
given a pattern of trade ties to foreigners that is already established—ground both extra-
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beneficent obligations incumbent on non-traders, and extra-beneficent duties owed to trade-
dependents.  Even if it is not wrong for a society to democratically determine how much it 
wishes to be trade-interdependent per se, non-trading citizens are implicated in whatever 
exploitation occurs when their country’s trade policy impacts the terms of trade—affecting not 
merely the number of exchanges with foreigners that are concluded, but the terms of those 
exchanges.  Further, given the vulnerability of foreigners who are dependent on their particular 
trade ties, those responsible for moulding a state’s trade policy must not wrongfully disadvantage 
foreigners via a change in that policy.  This is an obligation not to “harm” in one sense, but not 
all disadvantagings of foreigners should be counted as wrongful harms.  Only when trade-
dependents would be left worse off than they would have been if our society had never been 
open to trade, or are exploitatively disadvantaged, has a wrong been committed. 
Third, when states bargain with one another over the shape of trade policy, obligations 
beyond beneficence are generated even to foreigners who are not themselves direct trade-
participants.  In ideal circumstances at least, states must not use their capacity to mould their 
trade policy as a means to blackmail other states.  And when states are party to trade 
agreements—even agreements that do not occur against a backdrop of blackmail and under 
which the gains of private exchange would be equitably distributed—they acquire an obligation 
to ensure that treaty gains are equitably distributed too.  Because trade policy has implications 
for the macro-structure of an economy—particularly a country’s specialisation profile, with 
attendant distributive and developmental implications—it is rightly regarded as part of a 
society’s basic structure, not merely as that part of public policy that concerns the interests of 
traders only.  As such, treaty gains are properly thought of as distributed across societies, rather 
than across trade-participants only.  In the non-ideal circumstances where prospective treaty 
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partners cannot be relied upon to fulfil their obligations to foreign dependents, there is even an 
extra-beneficent duty to foreigners who are neither tied to my society directly by trade, nor 
indirectly via a treaty with their government.  Specifically, states ought not to induce a treaty 
partner to violate its obligations to trade-dependents by requiring such by way of treaty 
concession. 
If each state and its share of the global economy were small, it might be that meeting 
many of the obligations summarised above would not be unduly burdensome.  But when states 
coordinate their trade policies—with multiple states reaching agreements that entail limits on 
what further deals signatories might arrive at—it is all the easier for these obligations to be 
broken.  Take the WTO and its most-favoured-nation provision.  Including an MFN provision in 
a treaty would be unlikely to be problematic if that treaty was only concluded between two 
similarly structured states.  Indeed, if it ensured against one party to that treaty from 
subsequently eroding the trade-policy concessions it was ostensibly offering in such a way as to, 
for example, net-harm or exploitative disadvantage trade-dependents, it would be ethically 
useful.  But including such a measure in a near-comprehensive global treaty is potentially 
deleterious.  First, restricting MFN-status to WTO members may be part of a picture that is 
overall one in which non-members are blackmailed into membership.  Second, requiring all 
members of the WTO to extend any concessions made to non-members to all members may 
serve to decrease the bargaining leverage of outsiders by disincentivising such concessions.  To 
the extent that this leaves them ill-placed to gain an equitable share of treaty gains even in non-
WTO-treaties, this is problematic.  Third, interpreting the MFN provision in such a way as to 
allow unequal concessions by good is consistent with an inequitable division of treaty gains 
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across countries within the WTO, even if it can be effectively argued that no WTO member is 
actually blackmailed. 
Finally, it may well be that when cooperative commitments are enforced, in the sense that 
that failing to fulfil them is deterred by a specified legal penalty, rather than merely by the threat 
of bilateral retaliation or loss of reputation, those who are worse off overall are entitled to a 
greater share of the cooperative surplus than would otherwise be the case.  Contemporary 
republicans remind us that equality of standing is undermined if people are not legally 
guaranteed what they are entitled to.  As long as they have to rely on the forbearance of the 
advantaged, in other words, their political status is degraded.  But law has a flip side too.  
Legally enforcing some division, rather than leaving it up to each and every particular actor to do 
what fairness requires of them, removes an opportunity from the less-advantaged to exhibit their 
goodwill and sense of justice.  In the case of the world trade regime, for instance, it may well be 
that the fact of enforcement by the legal organisation that is the WTO grounds a requirement that 
developing countries not be so badly off overall that others cannot believe they have sufficient 
reason to abide by WTO rules.  And it is impossible for developing countries to stand next to 
other societies as trustworthy partners and status equals in cooperation without a basis for this 
belief.  If this is indeed the case, we do not merely have extra-beneficient obligations of non-
exploitation in a trade-integrated world, but an additional obligation of a still more demanding 
kind. 
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